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In 2018 the New Zealand Supreme Court issued judgments in three cases which indicated that the 
Court was reconsidering their role in respect of rights protection in New Zealand; Ngāti Whātua 
Ōrākei Trust v Attorney-General,1 Attorney-General v Taylor,2 and Ngaronoa v Attorney-General.3   
 
Building on the apparent shift in the dominance of the judiciary which is exhibited by these cases, 
the aim of this thesis is to explain the division of power between the judiciary and Parliament in 
respect of rights protection in New Zealand. I suggest that this relationship is dictated by, what I 
term, foundational norms. These foundational norms are social rather than legal rules which exist 
and draw their authority from outside the legal system but which the legal system reflects. In the 
context of rights protection by Parliament and the judiciary, the relevant foundational norms are 
parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law.  I suggest that these norms exist in a state of 
constant competition where when one gains a degree of dominance, the other must give way to 
an equal and opposite degree. This normative zero sum game has emerged due to the rise of 
human rights. Human rights have effectively supercharged the rule of law and given it a substantive 
element such that parliamentary sovereignty can no longer be absolute.  
 
It is against this backdrop of norms in competition that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(NZBORA) was enacted. I argue that NZBORA, while enacted as a parliamentary bill of rights, 
failed to clearly define the role of the judiciary. Parliament and the judiciary were left to determine, 
between themselves, the appropriate level of power for the judiciary to exercise in rights protection. 
I suggest that Parliament has failed to fulfil the role which it was expected to fulfil in 1990. As a 
result, the judiciary need to fill the gaps if rights are to be protected. In 2018, the judiciary rose to 
this challenge by issuing a declaration of inconsistency for the first time but they remain hesitant 
to use the interpretative method to ‘cure’ inconsistencies. I conclude that, as there has been a shift 
in the foundational norms, NZBORA has given the judiciary significant interpretative powers and 
Parliament has failed to fulfil its role in rights protection, it is necessary and acceptable that the 
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Justice Thomas once said “the legal distribution of power consists ultimately in a dynamic 
settlement, acceptable to the people, between the different arms of government.”4 This focus on 
acceptance by the people is fundamental to New Zealand’s constitution which, I suggest, is based 
primarily on social norms rather than legal rules. Dynamism is equally fundamental. Social norms, 
by their very nature, are subject to change and this change has a trickle-down effect into every 
aspect of the constitution. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the distribution of responsibility 
for safeguarding human rights between Parliament and the judiciary.  
 
This thesis suggests that parliamentary and judicial protection of rights is ultimately dictated by the 
relationship between the norms of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. In recent times, 
we have seen a shift in dominance of the rule of law and, by extension, an increasing dominance 
in the judiciary’s role as protector of rights. It has become clear that Parliament is unable to fulfil 
the role prescribed to it by the NZBORA and the judiciary must fill in the gaps if rights are to be 
preserved and promoted.  
 
In Chapter II, I establish my theory of the role social norms play in the New Zealand constitution. I 
suggest that New Zealand has, what can be termed, a ‘cultural constitution’. This cultural 
constitution is characterized by, what I term, foundational norms. Foundational norms are created 
and underpinned by cultural values of the community. These cultural values are, in turn, 
established because of the shared political, historical, societal, and geographical experiences of 
the community. I suggest that parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law are two such 
foundational norms and that they are in fundamental competition with one another resulting in a 
zero-sum game where when one loses a degree of dominance the other increases in dominance.  
 
In Chapter III, I trace the development of parliamentary sovereignty, from its genesis in England5 
through importation to New Zealand and its ongoing evolution to sovereignty of the New Zealand 
Parliament. I also conclude, by reference to the example of the changes in the recognition of Māori 
land rights, that parliamentary sovereignty may not be absolute in New Zealand and may now be 
weakening.  
 
                                                     
4 EW Thomas “The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts” (2000) 31 VUWLR 3 at 14.  
5 In this thesis, I refer to England up until the passage of the Act of Union 1800 which united the Kingdom of 
Great Britain with the Kingdom of Ireland to form the United Kingdom. After 1800, I refer to England as the United 
Kingdom or Britain.  
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In Chapter IV, I trace the development of the rule of law. I suggest that the rule of law, with the rise 
of human rights, now has a substantive element. In other words, society now expects more from 
the rule of law than just procedural protection. Substantively, under the rule of law, we also expect 
laws to comply with human rights.  
 
In Chapter V, I discuss examples in New Zealand’s history where the legal system has fallen out 
of step with the status of the foundational norms due to sudden action by either the judiciary or 
Parliament which did not align with the status of their respective norm. When faced with such an 
action, the legal system has responded to re-align norms and law. This illustrates that social norms 
are the ultimate driver of New Zealand’s ‘cultural constitution’ and explains why, generally, the 
branches of government restrain themselves out of loyalty to the status of the social norms lest the 
legal system respond to undo their decision or undermine their power.  
 
In Chapter VI, I explore the enactment of NZBORA as a parliamentary bill of rights and the division 
of responsibility in NZBORA between the judiciary and Parliament. I conclude that the balance of 
power, while ambiguous under NZBORA, was tipped towards Parliament as primary rights 
protector with an unclear role to be occupied by judges. Ultimately, this meant that the role of the 
judiciary was left to be determined by the branches of government, informed by the status of the 
foundational norms.  
 
In Chapter VII, I conclude that, while New Zealand deferred to Parliament on rights issues as at 
1990, since then, Parliament has revealed itself to be unable to protect human rights. I conclude 
that this is due to executive dominance, the lack of expertise in the select committee process, the 
timing of inconsistencies arising, and Parliament’s complacency towards the rights of certain 
groups of society. I conclude that the influence of politics means that Parliament is not the 
appropriate branch to carry out the protection of rights in isolation.  
 
In Chapter VIII, I analyse the tools available to the judiciary to protect human rights. I discuss how 
most of NZBORA’s history, and indeed rights protection before NZBORA has been characterized 
by judicial hesitancy. I conclude that this hesitancy was rooted in the loyalty and dominance of 
parliamentary sovereignty. I discuss how, in recent years with the rise of the rule of law and the 
falling dominance of parliamentary sovereignty, judges have recently become willing to exercise 
their power to issue declarations of inconsistency. However, I note that the majority of judges 
remain unduly hesitant around the use of value-based interpretation to cure inconsistencies. I 
conclude that section 6 of NZBORA, which I argue promulgates and builds on the principle of 
legality, gives judges significant interpretative power to ensure legislation is consistent with rights. 
It is, therefore, critical that judges use this tool available to them as the foundational norms have 
shifted in such a way to allow such a use, the tool is legally available and Parliament have 
9 
 
demonstrated that there is a need for it by failing to fulfil their role under NZBORA. All that remains 
is for the judiciary to rise to the challenge.  
 
Finally, in Chapter IX, having concluded that judges should take on a more dominant role in rights 
protection, I briefly assess the possibility of a power of substantive judicial review arising in New 
Zealand. I conclude that, while criticisms of such a power are misguided, it is unlikely to arise in 
New Zealand in the near future, due to the ongoing loyalty to Westminster principles and New 
Zealander’s incremental approach to changes to foundational norms.  
 
Justice Thomas was correct when he suggested that the distribution of power in New Zealand is 
marked by societal acceptance and dynamism. New Zealand’s constitutional journey in respect of 





























In Jurisprudence or the Theory of the Law, Sir John Salmond wrote that:6 
there may be a state and a constitution without any law, but there can be no law without a state 
and a constitution. No constitution, therefore, can have its source and basis in the law. It has 
of necessity an extra-legal origin.  
 
Like Salmond, my thesis proceeds from the perspective that New Zealand’s constitution has an 
extra-legal foundation. In this chapter, I suggest that New Zealand’s constitution and the division 
of power between the judiciary and Parliament is underpinned by, what I term, foundational norms. 
Foundational norms are social norms which exist outside of the legal system and whose normative 
status is based on cultural values, beliefs and principles deemed important by the New Zealand 
public. These foundational norms are the building blocks upon which the legal aspects of our 
cultural constitution lie. The dominance attributed to each foundational norm within the legal 
system at any particular time is dictated by the societal value attributed to that norm.  
 
In the context of an analysis of rights protection by the judiciary and Parliament, the two most 
significant norms are parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. I suggest that these norms are 
not complementary. Rather, they exist in competition. Where one gains a degree of dominance, 
the other must give way to an equal degree. The contradictory nature of the norms mean that a 
sort of zero-sum game exists where any increase in the influence or weight of a value underpinning 
one foundational norm must come at the expense of a decrease for the other. 
 
This exchange of dominance is in constant fluctuation depending on the social context of the day. 
Parliament and the judiciary understand the system in these terms and exercise their constitutional 
power in accordance with where the balance sits between the norms at that particular time. The 
branches constrain themselves in accordance with this balance because their relationship with 
each other involves a sense of mutually assured destruction. The threat of reprimand from one 
generally, though not always, acts as a deterrent for the other. As New Zealand’s constitution is 
underpinned by foundational norms which are, by their nature, social rather than legal rules, any change 
to these norms must only arise out of slow and incremental social change.  
 
                                                     
6 John Salmond Jurisprudence: or the Theory of the Law (7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1924) at 154; see 
also PG McHugh “John Salmond and the Moral Agency of the State” (2007) 39 VUWLR 743.  
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This chapter provides an overview of my foundational norm theory and the way in which New 
Zealand approaches constitutional change. The purpose of this chapter is to present the theory of 
New Zealand’s constitution which informs this thesis. The following chapters serve to establish 
support for such a theory and explain how this theory informs the approach to rights protection by 
the judiciary and Parliament.  
 
The New Zealand Constitution  
Many New Zealanders would be surprised to hear that we have a constitution.7 For many, the word 
‘constitution’ brings to mind a single, entrenched and supreme document along the lines of the 
Constitution of the United States rather than our ‘unwritten’ constitution made up of both legal and 
normative aspects.  
 
The term ‘unwritten constitution’ is inherently misleading as it describes constitutions which are 
made up of both written and unwritten aspects.8 The New Zealand constitution clearly goes beyond 
written legal rules. As noted by Sir John Salmond:9  
A complete account of a constitution, therefore, involves a statement of constitutional custom 
as well as of constitutional law. It involves an account of the organized state as it exists in 
practice and in fact, as well as of the reflected image of this organization as it appears in legal 
theory. 
However, there is no accepted exhaustive list of what our constitution includes.10 Theorists have 
differed on this point. Some of the most influential lists have been put forward by Joseph, the Rt 
Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer and the Constitutional Arrangements Committee.  
 
Joseph suggests that the New Zealand constitution comprises of, among other things:11  
 Imperial legislation;  
 New Zealand legislation;  
 Common law including customary common law, judicial precedent and statutory interpretation;  
 Customary international law;  
 Prerogative instruments;  
 The law and custom of parliament;  
 Authoritative works, and  
 Conventions of the constitution.  
Sir Geoffrey suggests, like Joseph, an inclusive rather than exhaustive list of sources, including:12  
 Specific New Zealand and United Kingdom legislation; 
                                                     
7 Geoffrey Palmer and Andrew Butler A Constitution for Aotearoa New Zealand (1st ed, Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 2016) at 9: “New Zealand has a constitution. But it is neither well known, nor well understood.”   
8 Larry Kramer The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review” (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2004) at 12-15.  
9 John Salmond Jurisprudence: or the Theory of the Law (7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1924) at 154.  
10 N Mereu “A Written Constitution for New Zealand?” (2009) 11 NZLSJ at 219.  
11 Philip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand  (2nd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2001) at 
17-31. 
12 Geoffrey and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power: New Zealand’s Constitution and Government (4th ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2004) at 5. 
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 Instruments of the royal prerogative;  
 Parliamentary law and procedure; 
 Cabinet procedure;  
 Judgements of the Courts;  
 The Treaty of Waitangi and international law, and  
 Broader constitutional principles, doctrines and conventions.  
The Constitutional Arrangements Committee of the House of Representatives suggested, in 2005, 
that the Constitution Act 1986 is the central formal statement of our constitution and is 
accompanied by other major sources including:13  
 The prerogative powers of the Queen;  
 Other relevant New Zealand statutes;  
 Relevant English and United Kingdom statutes;  
 Relevant decisions of the courts;  
 The Treaty of Waitangi, and  
 The conventions of the constitution.  
After considering all these categorizations, I suggest that, at a high level, the New Zealand 
constitution includes sources that are drawn from both inside and outside the legal system. Those 
sources drawn from inside the legal system are the formal legal rules that dictate the exercise of 
power; such as legislation, Cabinet procedure and common law. Those drawn from outside the 
legal system are the normative rules that bind the branches of Government such as conventions 
of the constitution, constitutional principles and, as I suggest, foundational norms.  
 
In my view, the categorization of sources by Joseph, Sir Geoffrey and the Constitutional 
Arrangements Committee are too prescribed. Rather, I agree with Matthew Palmer QC’s later 
approach to focus on broader categories of sources which encompass the above rather than 
seeking to define them in granular detail.14 M Palmer suggests that there are four “conceptual 
categories” into which the sources of the constitution can be categorized; constitutional 
conventions, the common law, instruments of each branch of government and the interpretations 
of the instruments of each branch of government.15 I agree that this understanding of our 
constitutional sources in “conceptual categories” is of more use than attempts to set out examples 
as the theorists above have done. As our constitution is constantly subject to change, it is more 
accurate to categorize it in the sense of conceptual categories rather than specific examples. While 
I agree with M Palmer’s idea of “conceptual categories”, I would add another dimension: 
specifically foundational norms. While the other conceptual categories are worthy of exploration, it 
is the idea of foundational norms which underpin all other sources of our constitution and which I 
explore here.  
                                                     
13 Constitutional Arrangements Committee. Inquiry to Review New Zealand’s Existing Constitutional 
Arrangements: Report of the Constitutional Arrangements Committee (Constitutional Arrangements Committee, I 
24A, August 2005) at 26. 
14 Matthew Palmer “What is New Zealand’s Constitution and who Interprets it? Constitutional Realism and the 
Importance of Public Office Holders.” (2006) 17 PLR 133 at 138.  
15  Matthew Palmer “What is New Zealand’s Constitution and who Interprets it? Constitutional Realism and the 




Foundational Norm Theory  
Foundational norms are drawn from outside the legal system in that their authority is found in 
cultural principles, beliefs and values deemed important by New Zealand’s populace. They achieve 
their normative status because of underlying cultural values and beliefs and, likewise, they will 
change as those underlying values and beliefs change.  
 
Sir Robin Cooke noted, in extra judicial writing, that:16 
…the modern common law should be seen to have a free and democratic society as its basic 
tenet and, for that reason, to be built on two complementary and lawfully unalterable principles: 
the operation of a democratic legislature and the operation of independent courts.  
 
I suggest that the two most significant foundational norms which dictate the relationship between 
the judiciary and parliament in respect of protecting human rights are parliamentary sovereignty 
and the rule of law. Parliamentary sovereignty, in its simplest terms, gives authority to Parliament 
to make or unmake any law it chooses and the rule of law, as I will suggest in the following 
chapters, gives the judiciary the power to ensure that Parliament is enacting legislation consistently 
with human rights. I suggest that these norms have an extra-legal origin but inform the division of 
power between the judiciary and Parliament within the system. Society dictates where the norms 
sit in relation to each other but the law should reflect that status. These foundational norms are 
contradictory. Parliamentary sovereignty gives authority to parliament to make or unmake any law 
it chooses but, as I argue in Chapter IV, the rule of law constrains parliament by requiring it to 
enact laws which comply with human rights. The result of this normative conflict is a zero sum 
game where, when one foundational norm gains a degree of dominance, the other must equally 
give way to the same degree. The amount to which the norm gains or loses dominance at any one 
time is dictated by the societal value ascribed to that norm. The judiciary and Parliament 
conceptualize their power in these terms. Each branch must only go as far as the societal status 
of their respective norm allows. The result is a relationship where one branch must avoid 
overstepping lest it faces an equal and opposite reaction by its counterpart. How far each branch 
is willing to push the boundaries of their power is dependent ultimately on the status which is 
attributed to their respective foundational norm by society. Where the rule of law has gained a 
degree of dominance, the courts will be willing to go further and conversely, where parliamentary 
sovereignty has gained dominance, the courts will be restrained.  
 
As is discussed in Chapter V, there have been examples in New Zealand’s history when either 
branch has misread the social status of a norm and overstepped. Where this has occurred, the 
legal system has responded with sudden change to align the authority of the branches at law with 
the authority of their norms at a societal level. Further, as I will argue in Chapter VIII, in recent 
                                                     
16 Robin Cooke “Fundamentals” (1988) NZLJ 158 at 164.  
14 
 
years, the judiciary have taken more overt steps to safeguard human rights and this has been 
accepted by Parliament. I suggest that the explanation for this is that the social value of the rule of 
law, supercharged by human rights, has exceeded that of parliamentary sovereignty to some 
degree, albeit limited. This allows the courts to stretch their power beyond that which they would 
have done without such a social shift in the balance. In summary, the characteristics of my 
foundational norm theory, which I establish in this thesis, are as follows:  
 Foundational norms are social in nature and do not arise from any legal rule, though legal rules 
should reflect them.  
 They exist in competition such that, where one gains a degree of dominance, the other must 
lose an equal degree of dominance.  
 This zero sum game is dictated by the value placed on each norm by society.  
 The judiciary and parliament conceptualise their power in these terms and, generally, attempt 
to align their exercises of power with the status of the norms at that particular time.  
 Where they misread the division of dominance and overstep, the legal system will correct and 
align the division of power between the judiciary and Parliament with the division of dominance 
attributed to each norm by society.  
Identifying the Foundational Norms  
Parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law are two foundational norms of our constitution. In 
this section, I provide an overview of these norms which I will expand on throughout this and the 
following two chapters.  
 
AV Dicey provides one of the earliest and best known accounts of the relationship between the 
rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty. AV Dicey’s understanding of parliamentary sovereignty 
was that:  
parliament thus defined has … the right to make or unmake any law whatever, and, further that 
no person or body is recognized by the law … as having the right to override or set aside the 
legislation of parliament.17 
Under Dicey’s theory, Parliament can make any law it choses, cannot bind its successors, and no 
valid act of parliament can be overturned or set aside by the courts.18 Dicey therefore 
conceptualised parliament as being a supreme law-making entity that cannot be constrained 
through legal means.19  
 
                                                     
17 AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, MacMillan and Co Ltd, London, 1931) 
at 38.  
18 AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, MacMillan and Co Ltd, London, 1931) 
at 83-85.  
19 AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, MacMillan and Co Ltd, London, 1931) 
at 86 - 89 
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This understanding of parliamentary sovereignty has been applied in a number of New Zealand 
cases in the modern era.20 For example in Rothmans of Pall Mall (NZ) Ltd v Attorney General, the 
High Court noted that:21  
The constitutional position in New Zealand … is clear and unambiguous. Parliament is supreme 
and the function of the courts is to interpret the law as laid down by Parliament. The Courts do 
not have a power to consider the validity of properly enacted laws. 
 
Similarly, ideas such as the principle of non-interference are based in this Diceyan conception of 
parliament’s sovereignty. The principle of non-interference is a separation of powers construct 
under which the courts will not interfere with Parliament’s right to legislate freely.22  
 
The rule of law, an ancient and notoriously difficult to define principle, was considered by Dicey to 
sit alongside parliamentary sovereignty as one of the key aspects of the British constitution. 23 
Dicey suggested that there are three aspects to the rule of law. The first principle of the rule of law 
put forward by Dicey is that “no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or 
goods except for a distinct breach of the law established in the ordinary legal manner before the 
ordinary courts of the land.”24 Dicey argues that citizens may only be punished for breaches of 
laws which are properly passed where their culpability or liability is established lawfully through the 
courts. Notably, there is no explicit reference to the substance of the laws. The focus is on 
procedural rather than substantive proprietary. This aspect is consistent with Dicey’s 
understanding of parliamentary sovereignty that Parliament may enact any law it chooses and the 
Courts must apply that law.  
 
The second principle of the rule of law suggested by Dicey was that “every man, whatever be his 
rank or condition is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary tribunals.”25 Again, Dicey focuses on the procedural basis of the rule of law. Individuals 
have equality before the law, whatever that law is.  
 
Dicey’s third principle of the rule of law is ambiguous. He notes that individual rights are best 
protected by the common law rather than a formal, written Bill of Rights.26 The effect of this principle 
                                                     
20 Cooper v Attorney-General [1996] 3 NZLR 480  (HC) at 484; R v Knowles CA146/98, 12 October 1998 at 2; 
Westco Lagan Ltd v Attorney-General [2001] 1 NZLR 40  (HC) at 62–63; Attorney-Generalv Taylor [2017] NZCA 
215 at [44] citing Lord Steyn in R (Jackson) v Attorney-General[2005] UKHL 56. 
21 Rothmans of Pall Mall (NZ) Ltd v Attorney-General[1991] 2 NZLR 323 at 330, quoted in Shaw v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue [1999] 3 NZLR 154  (CA) at 157.   
22 See for example Te Runanga o Wharekauri Rekohu Inc v Attorney-General[1993] 2 NZLR 301 (CA) and Ngāti 
Whātūa Ōrakei Trust v Attorney-General[2018] NZSC 84.  
23 Brian Tamanaha On the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) at 3.  
24 AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, MacMillan and Co Ltd, London, 1931) 
at 110.  
25 AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, MacMillan and Co Ltd, London, 1931) 
at 114.  
26 AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, MacMillan and Co Ltd, London, 1931) 
at 221 and 179-189. For example, Dicey noted (at 194) that: “the proclamation in a constitution or charter of the 
right to personal freedom, or indeed of any other right, gives of itself but slight security that the right has more 
than a nominal existence, and students who wish to know how far the right to freedom of person is in reality part 
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is unclear. Dicey’s other two principles are clearly procedural in nature. However, the third principle 
could be interpreted as deference to the courts to protect human rights. By extension, Dicey could 
be understood as saying that in order to conform with the rule of law, individual rights must be 
protected. Such an interpretation is unlikely to be what Dicey intended. This idea of a substantive 
aspect to the rule of law would be inconsistent with Dicey’s understanding of parliamentary 
sovereignty as absolute. If Parliament was constrained by human rights, it would not be able to 
make or unmake any law it chooses as Dicey claims. Dicey’s conception of the rule of law must, 
therefore, be procedural in nature. There was no need for the rule of law to be substantive because 
Dicey claimed that avenues existed to prevent ‘bad’ law. Dicey placed much emphasis on 
Montesquieu’s concept of the separation of powers as a protection for the rule of law.27 He argued 
that judges would act as an institutional limit on Parliament’s supremacy and that society would 
not tolerate an abuse of power.28 Judges would potentially question or comment adversely on laws, 
which would have great democratic significance, thus providing a deterrent for any arbitrary uses 
of power. Dicey also noted that the will of Parliament may only be expressed through legislation 
which is enacted through a formal and deliberative process involving bicameral consideration and 
judicial interpretation. In Dicey’s view, such institutional and political checks constrained 
Parliament, but there were no legal restraints on Parliament to make or unmake any law they 
choose.29  
 
Dicey’s theory falls short where the rule of law takes on a substantive element. In such a scenario, 
the judiciary will not take an overt or drastic step to undermine Parliament’s sovereignty unless the 
balance of the social norms allows it. It is constrained from doing so by the risk of Parliament taking 
its own drastic steps to undermine the rule of law. And vice versa. Dicey considered the rule of law 
and parliamentary sovereignty to be the two pillars of the British constitution, jointly supporting its 
practices and institutions. However, Dicey’s theory has properly been criticised by academics who 
argue that parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law are not complementary.30 A procedural 
rule of law is consistent with parliament’s sovereignty as it remains free to legislate on any topic it 
chooses. If the rule of law is substantive, however, it cannot be consistent. In Chapter IV, I support 
my conclusion that the rule of law has become supercharged by human rights and, as a result, has 
taken on a substantive element. Such an understanding of the rule of law as substantive and 
requiring consistency with rights cannot exist in harmony with parliamentary sovereignty.   
 
                                                     
of the law of the constitution must consider both what is the meaning of the right and, a matter of even more 
consequence, what are the legal methods by which its exercise is secured.”  
27 Robert Hazo “Montesquieu and the Separation of Powers” (1968) 54 ABAJ at 665-668.  
28 AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, MacMillan and Co Ltd, London, 1931) 
at 179 – 182.  
29 AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, MacMillan and Co Ltd, London, 1931) 
at 179 – 189.  
30 Vernon Bogdanor The Conflict between Government and Judges. (University of Oxford, Oxford, 2007) at 1-12; 
see also TRS Allan Law, Liberty and Justice – the Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1995) at 16.  
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The contradictory nature of the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty mean that they are better 
described as existing in a state of constant competition, forming a sort of zero-sum game where 
any increase in the influence or weight of one principle comes at the expense of a decrease for 
the other. Parliament cannot be completely supreme while the rule of law exists and vice versa. 
This state of competition is a fundamental part of our constitution and a key characteristic of the 
relationship between the judiciary and Parliament.  
Extra-legal Nature of Foundational Norms  
Foundational norms gain their authority from extra-legal origins. By this I mean that their authority 
is drawn from socio-political values, beliefs and principles deemed important by the community. In 
other words, their authority is drawn from outside of the legal system, rather than from inside the 
legal system.  
 
Problems with intra-legal origin arguments  
Some theorists have unconvincingly argued that the authoritative status of parliamentary 
sovereignty and the rule of law can be derived from inside the legal system.31 For example, Hobbes 
and Austin tried to explain rules of ambiguous legal origin, such as parliamentary sovereignty and 
the rule of law, by arguing that at the apex of every system there is a dictatorial sovereign whose 
commands form the basis of all laws to be followed.32 They posited that in an anarchic “state of 
nature” where such sovereign authority is absent, each individual has the goal of self-preservation. 
This goal then leads them to submit in a social contract to the dictatorial sovereign who is the 
source of all laws and is, in turn, above the law.33  
 
Locke identified problems with this approach in his Two Treatises of Government when he posited 
that such a dictatorial theory of law is: 34 
…to think that men are so foolish that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done 
them by pole-cats or foxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured by lions.  
 
Locke argues that since individuals are seeking to protect themselves from harm, it does not make 
sense that they would agree to be ruled by a dictatorial sovereign if there was then no protection 
against that sovereign’s actions.  
 
                                                     
31AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, MacMillan and Co Ltd, London, 1931)  
See also; William Wade. “The Basis of Legal Sovereignty” (1955) 13 CLJ 172 at 186-9; Thomas Hobbes 
Leviathan (Penguin Classics, 2017);  John Austin The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of the 
Study of Jurisprudence (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1954).  
32  Thomas Hobbes Leviathan (Penguin Classics, 2017); see also John Austin The Province of Jurisprudence 
Determined and the Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1954) at 31.  
33 Hilaire Barnett Constitutional and Administrative Law (6th ed, New York: Routledge Cavendish, 2006) at 151-
153.  
34 Peter Laslett (ed) Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1967) at 346.  
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Further, Hobbes and Austin’s theory becomes problematic when applied to a modern democracy 
which is characterised by multi-polar sovereignty and the distribution of public power among 
different institutions. As former Chief Justice Sian Elias noted, Hobbes’ theories “manifestly break 
down when applied to a constitution where…there is a partition of powers between different 
authorities.”35 Under Hobbes and Austin’s theory, a system characterised by multi-polar 
sovereignty could not exist in a stable manner as if one person did not have complete power, then 
we would revert to a state of war. Multi-polar sovereignty can and does exist in a stable manner. 
Clearly, there is a third option between one institution with complete omnipotence and anarchy; a 
balanced constitution with equally powerful branches of government. As we have no dictatorial 
sovereign of Hobbes and Austin’s conception, foundational norms cannot be “declared” in such a 
way.  
 
While Dicey attempted to distance himself from Hobbes and Austin, academics have historically 
sought to explain Dicey’s theory through Hobbesian and Austinian lenses.36 More recently, Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy has argued that Dicey is more reflective of Lockean traditions of the community as 
being the supreme entity which places moral and practical limits on the legislature.37 This appears 
to be an ex post facto attempt to align parliamentary sovereignty with a theory of law more 
palatable to modern audiences, an end not inconsistent with Goldsworthy’s neo-Diceyean views. 
We can see both Hobbesian and Lockean roots in Dicey’s theories. He places emphasis on the 
role of the community, like Locke, but the fact that he did not feel obliged to explore the ultimate 
legal authority for his theories in any real way aligns him with Hobbes and Austin regardless of 
whether he considered himself Hobbesian.38 
 
At the outset of Law of the Constitution, Dicey notes that the term “constitutional law” describes all 
the “rules” which affect the distribution or exercise of sovereign power in the state.39 He specifically 
uses the word “rules” because, in his view, there are two types of rules of the constitution: laws 
and conventions.40 He describes laws of the constitution as laws in the traditional written sense 
that are enforced by the courts whereas conventions of the constitution are practices accepted by 
all branches of government but not enforced by the courts.41 By the title of his book, one can infer 
that Dicey viewed parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law as laws of the constitution.  
 
                                                     
35 Sian Elias “Sovereignty in the 21st Century: another spin on the merry-go-round” (2003) PLR 14 at 5. 
36 David Ritchie “On the Conception of Sovereignty” (1891) 1 The ANNALS 385 at 385-414.  
37 Jeffrey Goldsworthy The Sovereignty of Parliament (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1999).   
38 Kerry Hunter “Locke’s Democracy v Hobbes’ Leviathan: Reflecting on New Zealand’s Constitutional Debate 
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39 AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, MacMillan and Co Ltd, London, 1931) 
at preface. 
40 AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, MacMillan and Co Ltd, London, 1931) 
at preface.  
41 AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, MacMillan and Co Ltd, London, 1931) 
at preface.  
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While Dicey implicitly characterises parliamentary sovereignty as a “law of the constitution”, he 
does not explain where the authority for these “laws” comes from within the system. If we accept 
Dicey’s understanding of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law as “laws” in the traditional 
sense, the question becomes whether these “laws” arise from common law or statute.  To attribute 
the source of parliamentary sovereignty to legislation would be a fallacy.42  As Salmond said, “no 
statute can confer this power on Parliament for this would be to assume and act on the very power 
that is to be conferred.”43 While parliamentary sovereignty has been declared by statute, it cannot 
be created by statute.44 
 
By process of elimination, if the origins of parliamentary sovereignty lie within the legal system, but 
it does not come from statute law, then it must come from common law.45 William Wade argued 
that parliamentary sovereignty must be judge-made law, meaning that judges can alter or repeal 
it unilaterally.46 However, Wade oversimplifies the exercise of altering parliamentary sovereignty. 
I suggest that parliamentary sovereignty, like the rule of law, has its basis in the socio-political 
values of the community. One branch of government cannot, and would not, make a unilateral 
change to the values of the community. New Zealand’s constitution is characterised by incremental 
and evolutionary change. When sudden change is required to the system that change must reflect 
the state of the norms rather than purport to alter them. It would be unpalatable for New Zealanders 
to have one branch of government unilaterally decide that a foundational norm of our constitution 
simply no longer exists. By taking Wade’s view to its logical conclusion, we reach the same 
problem as in the statute law hypothesis where we are unable to explain how judges have the 
authority to create parliamentary sovereignty.47  
 
Hobbes’ and Austin’s views that parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law are “laws” declared 
by a dictatorial sovereign cannot be applied to a system in which multiple institutions share power. 
The Diceyan approach is also unable to explain our system because it is impossible to accurately 
describe parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law as deriving from statute or the common law. 
Therefore, arguments that parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law arise from inside the legal 
system are incorrect. Accordingly, we must look outside the system to understand the origins of 
parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law.  
 
                                                     
42 John Salmond Jurisprudence: or the Theory of the Law (7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1924) at 170. 
43 John Salmond Jurisprudence: or the Theory of the Law (7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1924) at 170.  
44 Constitution Act 1986, s 15.  
45 Robert French “Common Law Constitutionalism” (paper presented at the Robin Cooke Lecture, 27 November 
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46 William Wade “The Basis of Legal Sovereignty” (1955) 13 CLJ 172 at 172 and 186-9; see also Hilaire Barnett 
Constitutional and Administrative Law (6th ed, Routledge-Cavendish, New York, 2006) at 163; see also the 
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47 Attorney-Generalv Taylor [2017] NZCA 215 at [46]. 
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In my view, behind each foundational norm sits a series of cultural values that have developed 
overtime and society has deemed to be important. This means that foundational norms cannot be 
changed or displaced unilaterally by any one branch of government. Change to a foundational 
norm can only arise out of slow societal development in underpinning principles which may be 
reflected in enactments and interpretations of law by the various branches of government 
accumulatively. In a properly functioning legal system, the importance society places on an 
underpinning principle will dictate the strength and dominance the branches give to the associated 
foundational norm.  
 
Foundational Norms as a ‘Rule of Recognition’  
My theory is based on a Hartian approach to laws of ambiguous origin. HLA Hart explained rules 
of ambiguous origin through his conception of the rule of recognition.48 According to Hart, law is 
best understood as a series of primary and secondary rules. Primary rules are those which require 
some act or omission, in short, ordinary laws.49  Secondary rules are the rules which manage the 
change, adjudication, and recognition of ordinary laws within the system. The rule of recognition 
provides the method for affirmatively identifying ordinary laws.50 The rule of recognition is a social 
rule rather than a legal one.51 It gets its authority from a regularity of behaviour from public officials 
and a normative attitude towards that behaviour. Wade and others have argued that parliamentary 
sovereignty can be explained as a rule of recognition.52 The implication is that Hart viewed 
Parliament’s sovereign legal authority as being drawn from normative behaviour rather than 
traditional legal origins from within the system.  
 
Building on Hart’s theory, I suggest that foundational norms sit outside the system but draw their 
authority and are developed by underpinning principles which establish the normative attitude 
towards the foundational norm. There can never be one supreme foundational norm that the whole 
of the community accepts due to the multi-faceted nature of that community. The people that make 
up that community bring with them a multitude of attitudes, beliefs, understandings and values. No 
one foundation norm can therefore be supremely applicable to all of the community’s values. 
Parliamentary sovereignty reflects New Zealanders’ value for branches of government with 
separate and well-defined powers, a supreme legislature, representative democracy, and a faith 
in Parliament to act in the interests of the people. Conversely the rule of law reflects New 
                                                     
48 HLA Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961).  
49 HLA Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961) at 95 – 101.  
50 HLA Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961) at 95 – 101.  
51 HLA Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961) at 95.  
52 HWR Wade Constitutional Fundamentals (Stevens & Sons, London, 1989); see also James Allan “The 
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Zealanders’ belief in equality, protection of individual rights, fairness, protection from abuses of 
power and a judiciary which checks and balances the other branches of government.  
 
Changing Foundational Norms: A Question of Social Change    
The New Zealand constitution, like many constitutions around the world, is comprised of formal 
legal rules but the creation and interpretation of those legal rules and the practice of the branches 
of government is dictated by the cultural values and beliefs of the community expressed through 
social norms.53 In other words, constitutional practice exists first and law second. The legal rules 
evolve from the values, beliefs, and relationships within the community. Social change is, 
therefore, the driver of legal change in New Zealand.  
 
In the New Zealand context, Sir John Salmond noted:54  
The constitution as a matter of fact is logically prior to the constitution as a matter of law. In 
other words constitutional practice is logically prior to constitutional law. There may be a state 
and a constitution without any law, but there can be no law without a state and a constitution. 
No constitution, therefore, can have its source and basis in the law. It has of necessity an extra-
legal origin. For there can be no talk of law, until some form of constitution has already obtained 
de facto establishment by way of actual usage and operation. When it is once established, but 
not before, the law can and will take notice of it.  
 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, Sir Ivor Jennings noted;55  
A constitution, in anything more than a formal sense, is only an organisation of men and women. 
Its character depends upon the character of the people engaged in governing and being 
governed. In this respect it is a transient thing, changing like the colours of the kaleidoscope; 
and an examination of its working involves an examination of the social and political forces 
which make for changes in the ideas and desires and habits of the population and its various 
social strata. A public lawyer will not understand his constitution unless he understands these 
aspects of it.  
 
As noted by Salmond, the constitution arises after the practice exists and, as Jennings notes, the 
practice is dictated by the changing social and political forces in the community. These are extra-
legal in nature.  
 
M Palmer has noted that social and political factors result accumulatively in a cultural “contentment 
with ad-hoc pragmatism” which is evident in our constitutional arrangements.56 New Zealand has 
long taken an “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” approach to constitutional change. The Constitutional 
                                                     
53 For discussion of the impact of culture on the French constitution, see: Pierre Legrand “Fragments on Law-as-
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Arrangements Committee illustrated this attitude when it said, in 2005, after inquiring into New 
Zealand’s constitutional arrangements:57  
Although there are problems with the way our constitution operates at present, none are so 
apparent or urgent that they compel change now or attract the consensus required for 
significant reform. We think that public dissatisfaction with our current arrangements is 
generally more chronic than acute.  
 
I agree that New Zealanders are happy to continue with the status quo unless and until a problem 
arises. In other words, the default is incremental change. This approach can be seen in the 
response to changing the flag58 and the, as yet, unsuccessful attempts by Sir Geoffrey to introduce 
a written constitution.59 It can also been seen in New Zealand’s adoption of incrementalism in its 
approach to public policy development.60 However, sudden change can and does happen. The 
explanation for these pockets of sudden change, as discussed in Chapter V, is that they arose 
where the legal system fell out of alignment with the social norms underpinning the system. As a 
result sudden change to the legal system was required. In short, New Zealanders will accept 
sudden legal change but only if it reflects the status of the underlying foundational norms of our 
constitution. We accept constitutional change provided that the change is to the system itself and 
not to the norms underlying the system. As the foundational norms are, by their nature, social 
norms, shifts in dominance can only arise out of slow, incremental change. New Zealand’s 
constitution has long been incremental in its dynamism.  
 
Conclusion  
As Salmond said at the turn of the 19th Century, constitutional law follows practice. This applies to 
New Zealand’s constitution, which can properly be described as a ‘cultural constitution’. I suggest 
that one of the significant sources of our constitution are foundational norms. Foundational norms 
are norms which gain their authority from outside the legal system, from external values of the New 
Zealand community. They are social rules, not legal ones though legal rules should reflect them. 
New Zealand’s constitution, including the balance between these foundational norms, is coloured 
by social, economic, geographical, historical and political context which have created certain 
cultural values, beliefs and principles that underpin parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law.  
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As I will establish in the following chapters, parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law are 
competition which each other. The result of this inconsistency between two foundational norms is 
a dynamic settlement of power between the judiciary and Parliament. This dynamism characterises 
our system and should be embraced in any analysis of the division of public power between 




































PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY  
 
Introduction  
In Chapter II, I concluded that New Zealand’s constitution, and the relationship between Parliament 
and the courts, is characterised by the competition between foundational norms, specifically, 
parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. In this chapter, I will discuss the development of 
parliamentary sovereignty as a foundational norm and establish that parliamentary sovereignty, 
like all foundational norms, has its origins in social rather than legal fact.  
 
New Zealand, as a British colony, and Britain have a shared history. Parliamentary sovereignty 
has a long and well-established history in Britain. This idea of sovereignty of Parliament began to 
emerge soon after Parliament was established as an institution. However, the pivotal period in the 
history of parliamentary sovereignty was the Glorious Revolution and the associated rise of Whigs. 
These events had a lasting effect on the English people. This led to a deep, entrenched value for 
representative democracy, and separation of powers and, by extension, a sovereign Parliament. 
This can be contrasted to the United States model whose cultural values arising from historical 
experience led to a very different development of parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
As a colony, New Zealand’s early history was intrinsically tied to Britain. However, in a ‘disguised 
revolution’, New Zealand slowly broke with Britain and created its own national identity. In the 
1800s and for most of the 1900s, the foundational norm of parliamentary sovereignty in New 
Zealand referred to parliamentary sovereignty of the British parliament. Over the 20th century, as 
New Zealand’s cultural values, the foundational norm of parliamentary sovereignty, likewise, 
evolved to become the sovereignty of the New Zealand Parliament, rather than the British. This 
did not happen overnight and was characteristic of our incremental approach to constitutional 
change.  
 
The Second World War and the events of the 1970s and 1980s were significant in shifting New 
Zealand’s cultural values away from loyalty to Britain towards a desire to be more independent. 
This shift to a culture of independence and national identity led to a change in the foundational 
norm of parliamentary sovereignty in New Zealand.  
 
The events of the modern period, likewise, are indicative of a weakened parliamentary sovereignty. 





History of Parliamentary Sovereignty  
Parliamentary sovereignty, as a foundational norm of the Westminster system of government, 
originated in England. To understand parliamentary sovereignty, it is necessary to consider the 
beginning of Parliament’s existence as an institution.  Soon after the installation of the English 
monarchy in 1066, the Great Council was established to discuss matters of state with the King.61 
The Great Council consisted of nobles and clergymen who would advise the King on the exercise 
of his powers and levy taxes from the freemen.62  
 
By 1215, the relationship between the Great Council and the monarch had become strained, 
leading to the First Barons’ War and ultimately the Magna Carta. The Magna Carta, among other 
things, recognized the rule of law in England and attempted to limit the absolute power of the 
monarchy.63 The first “parliament” was called by King Edward I in 1295 and consisted of both 
aristocrats and clergymen as well as representatives of the freemen.64 Eventually, these 
representatives of Parliament would be divided into the House of Commons, made up of the 
freemen, and the House of Lords, made up of the nobility. They were called at the discretion of the 
King when he needed to increase taxes.65  
 
By the 17th century, the divine right of Kings was a foundational norm of the English legal system. 
This norm could be traced back to medieval times and argued that God alone could control the 
monarch’s actions as He had endowed the monarch with the power to rule. Any temporal attempt 
to intervene with the monarch’s higher authority was considered heretical.66  
 
In 1625, Charles I was crowned King of England. King Charles I strongly believed in the divine 
right of Kings, a view he had inherited from his father James I.67 While Charles I was a Protestant, 
he married a Catholic which angered and concerned the House of Commons.68 When Charles I 
and his unpopular favorite, the Duke of Buckingham, approached Parliament to ask for funds for 
war with Spain, they refused him. The irate Charles dissolved Parliament.69 This calling and 
dissolving of Parliament became a feature of Charles’ reign resulting in a growing tension between 
Parliament and the monarch.70 The United Kingdom was split between Royalists and 
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Parliamentarians. Royalists believed in the divine right of Kings whereas Parliamentarians used 
the Rule of Law to argue that the King was subservient to God and the law.  
 
The tension between Royalists and Parliamentarians exploded into civil war in 1642.71 After the 
Royalists were defeated, England became a republic ruled by a Council of State and then by Oliver 
Cromwell as Lord Protector in 1651.72 The next decade was characterized by a series of bloody 
wars between those who supported Charles I’s son, Charles II, and those who supported 
Cromwell. In 1660, after Cromwell’s death, the Protectorate of England collapsed and the 
monarchy was restored.73 Charles II became King of England. Charles II was officially a Protestant 
as he had denounced his Catholic faith during his exile. However, his internal struggle between 
Catholicism and Protestantism became a theme of his life.74  
 
The English Civil War and the toppling of the monarchy proved ultimately unsuccessful at curbing 
the absolute monarchy. In 1685, King James II became the Catholic King of a predominantly 
Protestant country. He also married a Catholic which meant his heirs would be Catholic.75 This 
was extremely concerning to the ruling class. The simmering religious tension between the King 
and the ruling class overflowed due to two key events which occurred in 1688. First, the Queen 
gave birth to her first son, a Catholic heir to the English throne.76 Second, James II imprisoned 
seven Anglican Bishops who refused to sign his Declaration of Indulgence.77 The Declaration of 
Indulgence was a very unpopular attempt to create religious freedom in England and, by extension, 
protect the minority Catholics.78 This act of imprisoning the bishops underlined the King’s ability to 
arbitrarily subvert the rule of law and, for his critics, it reinforced their fear that he would attempt to 
revert England to Catholicism.  
 
On 30 June 1688, seven noblemen wrote to William of Orange, the Stadtholder79 in the 
Netherlands, essentially inviting him to invade England. With the bloody English Civil War still in 
living memory, the noblemen knew that any attempt at revolution had to be done lawfully.80 They 
carefully chose the protestants William of Orange as he was James II’s nephew and his wife, Mary, 
was James II’s daughter.81 Their Stuart roots meant that William and Mary could be painted as 
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legitimate rulers arriving to save England from the tyrannical King. On 10 October 1688, William 
of Orange printed his Declaration of the Prince of Orange which was distributed widely in England 
once William arrived.82 The Declaration noted that William had arrived in England “for preserving 
the Protestant religion, and for restoring the laws and liberties of England, Scotland and Ireland.” 
The Declaration heavily criticized James II, painting him as an evil tyrant who had acted contrary 
to law and “to that express provision of Magna Carta”. William cited James II’s abuses of power 
and promised to assemble a free and lawful Parliament with elected members.83  
 
After a failed attempt to reclaim his throne, James II retreated to France. William and Mary were 
made joint monarchs and presented with a declaration at their coronation.84 This declaration was 
passed into law and became the Bill of Rights 1689. The Bill of Rights 1689 characterized James 
II as a tyrant, thus furthering the narrative that an absolute monarch is destined to become 
tyrannical.85 The Bill of Rights, following on from the Magna Carta, recognized the rule of law by 
declaring certain rights such as protecting citizens against cruel and unusual punishment, and 
arbitrary fines. The Bill of Rights recognized that these rights existed prior to and independent of 
the document, thus it merely gave them formal legal status. The Bill of Rights declared that the 
execution or suspension of laws by regal authority without the consent of parliament was illegal.86  
 
While there was some resistance, particularly in Scotland and Ireland, the Bill of Rights established 
the first constitutional monarchy in England.87 The overthrowing of James II and the creation of the 
constitutional monarchy became known as the Glorious Revolution. Parliamentary sovereignty and 
the rule of law were not arbitrarily created by the Bill of Rights. Rather, they are norms which grew 
and developed over time, informed by the events of history. As the institutions began to pass laws 
and exercise their powers in a way which placed more value on democracy, a principle 
underpinning parliamentary sovereignty, the concept of parliamentary sovereignty gained 
dominance and eradicated the divine right of kings. It is important to note that the Bill of Rights did 
not specifically declare that Parliament is sovereign or that the Courts were prohibited from 
disapplying Acts of Parliament. If the question was only one of the words of the document, the Bill 
of Rights could have been interpreted by the English courts and Parliament to mean that should 
an Act of Parliament breach a right preserved by the Bill of Rights, the courts could decide not to 
apply that law. But it was not interpreted in this way in England. This is indicative of the fundamental 
and extra-legal nature of foundational norms. Foundational norms colour the way in which legal 
instruments are interpreted. From a legal stand point, the Bill of Rights did not prevent the Courts 
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from disallowing acts of Parliament but it was not interpreted or applied in this manner because of 
the way in which the foundational norm of parliamentary sovereignty evolved.  
 
Conversely, in the United States, a system where parliamentary sovereignty evolved very 
differently, the judiciary were given the power to review legislative action.88 This difference is 
attributable to the different historical, political and societal factors which meant that different 
cultural values, beliefs and principles were given dominance from those that dominated in England. 
In 1689, when the Bill of Rights was signed, England wanted to protect itself from the autocratic 
monarchs they had endured for the last 600 years. In 1787, the founders of the United States 
wanted to protect themselves from what they viewed as an unchecked legislature.89 In the United 
States, the underpinning value of separation of powers was used to strengthen the judiciary and 
the rule of law whereas in England, it was used to strengthen the legislature and parliamentary 
sovereignty. This shows that the same underpinning value or principle can be given different 
importance and, thus, create very different foundational norms depending on the system’s 
historical context and values. 
 
In England, prior to the Glorious Revolution, there were indications that English judges might 
consider that they had a role in disapplying Acts of Parliament where they were deemed contrary 
to reason. In 1610, in Dr Bonham’s Case, Elizabethan jurist Sir Edward Coke said: 90   
…in many cases, the common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge 
them to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against common right or reason, or 
repugnant or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it and adjudge such 
acts to be void.  
 
Coke repeated his sentiment in Rowles v Mason where he said that if there was a repugnancy in 
an Act of Parliament, “the common law disallows and rejects it.”91 Following the Glorious 
Revolution, the English jurists and scholars attempted to explain away Coke’s statement as an 
exercise in statutory interpretation. For example, Dicey tried to bury Coke’s view, wrongly 
characterising him as subscribing to the complete omnipotence of Parliament,92 despite Coke 
being a key proponent of natural laws during his time.93  
 
In 1610, Coke was writing prior to the English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution, when 
parliamentary sovereignty was ideology rather than political reality. The events of the 17th century 
solidified parliamentary sovereignty’s role as a foundational norm by underlining the importance of 
parliament’s role to protect the people from abuses of the sovereign. The belief was that 
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parliamentary sovereignty would complement and protect the rule of law. So, any threat to 
Parliament’s growing supremacy had to be suppressed. Theorists felt obliged to explain away 
Coke’s statements by interpreting them narrowly, considering the Bill of Rights and the newly 
established constitutional monarchy.94  
 
The purpose of the Bill of Rights, for England, was to provide the citizens protection from the 
Crown. Conversely, in the United States, where the citizens wanted to be protected from an 
unchecked legislature, Coke’s statements were used as the basis of judicial review of legislative 
action and of establishing a more dominant judiciary. This was reflective of the importance placed 
on a strong judiciary by the United States, because of the people’s experience with a dominant 
legislature. The differences in the development of parliamentary sovereignty in England and the 
United States is indicative of the persuasive nature of historical, socio-political factors in shaping 
the community’s cultural values and, by extension, the dominance of a foundational norm.  
 
Parliamentary Sovereignty in New Zealand  
Parliamentary sovereignty has a well-established history in England and is the antecedent to New 
Zealand’s parliamentary sovereignty.  The development of parliamentary sovereignty in New 
Zealand provides an example of how a foundational norm can and does evolve because of 
changes in cultural values, beliefs and principles. At the start of our colonial history, parliamentary 
sovereignty in New Zealand described the sovereignty of the British Parliament. However, by the 
latter half of the 20th century, it had shifted to describe the sovereignty of the New Zealand 
Parliament. I will establish that this shift occurred because of changes in cultural values, beliefs 
and principles shaped by socio-political context, thus establishing that foundational norms can and 
do change over time.  
 
There is extensive discussion elsewhere on how the legal system came to exist in New Zealand 
and how the British Parliament gained sovereignty over New Zealand, which was already 
populated by an indigenous population.95 Such a topic is worthy of exploration but cannot be 
debated in any depth here. For the purposes of my thesis, it is sufficient to say that prior to 1840, 
the land that came to be called New Zealand was populated by whānau, hapu and iwi who followed 
a clear and accepted customary law regime.96 However, there was no national institution charged 
with governance and law-making authority. This gap was filled by the legal and political institutions 
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established in New Zealand which purported to govern both the colonial and indigenous 
populations.  
 
On 15 June 1839, Letters Patent were issued altering the boundaries of New South Wales to 
include “any territory which is or may be acquired in sovereignty by Her Majesty…within that group 
of islands…known as New Zealand.” Joseph notes that the use of the verb in its present tense 
(“which is or may be”) means that the Letters Patent did not purport to effect acquisition of 
sovereignty over New Zealand.97 It was not until 1840, when the Treaty of Waitangi was signed, 
that Britain claimed to have sovereignty over New Zealand. Of course, there were issues with the 
Treaty arising from both translation and its legal status which are not canvassed in detail here. 
However, at the time, the British claim sovereignty via a mix of the Treaty and discovery.  On 2 
October 1840, the British government ratified Captain William Hobson’s proclamations of 21 May 
1840 which asserted sovereign rights over all of New Zealand. In New Zealand Māori Council v 
Attorney General, Somers J acknowledged that the ratification of these proclamations established 
British sovereignty.98  By the New South Wales Continuance Act 1840, New Zealand was 
constituted as a separate colony and the establishment of the Legislative Council, which would 
become New Zealand’s upper house, was authorized.99 From early on in the colony’s history, the 
Government and the Courts accepted that English law applied to New Zealand.100  
 
Following the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, the UK Parliament enacted the New Zealand 
Constitution Act 1852.101 The Constitution Act granted a limited form of self-government to New 
Zealand. It established what would become the New Zealand parliament, consisting of the 
Legislative Council and the House of Representatives. The New Zealand Parliament were given 
the power to legislate for “peace, order and good government” of New Zealand provided that the 
laws are not “repugnant to the law of England.”102  
 
While New Zealand’s Parliament was given some sovereign powers under this Act, it was severely 
limited by UK parliamentary sovereignty. The doctrine of repugnancy meant that the UK parliament 
was supreme over the New Zealand Parliament. In addition, New Zealand’s Parliament could not 
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legislate extra-territorially. Therefore, according to theorists like Sir Ivor Jennings, it was not 
“sovereign”. Jennings, echoing Dicey, argued that a sovereign Parliament is an entity that can 
legislate on any subject whatsoever.103 While the foundational norm of parliamentary sovereignty 
existed in New Zealand, that sovereignty remained with the UK parliament and had not yet shifted 
to the New Zealand legislature. In 1931, the UK Parliament enacted the Statute of Westminster 
which would give its dominions legislative supremacy, if they wanted it.104 Effectively, the British 
Parliament voluntarily abdicated its sovereignty over New Zealand, should New Zealand choose 
to adopt the Statute of Westminster.  
 
How the British Parliament was able to abdicate an aspect of its sovereignty is explained by 
reference to Hart’s theories on sovereignty. Hart classifies sovereignty as either ‘continuing’ or 
‘self-embracing’. He considered that “"it in effect makes a choice between a continuing 
omnipotence in all matters not affecting the legislative competence of successive Parliaments, and 
an unrestricted self-embracing omnipotence the exercise of which can only be enjoyed once."105 
According to Dicey and Wade, sovereignty is ‘continuing’.106 The theory of continuing sovereignty 
assumed that there is one supreme parliament empowered to pass any laws that cannot be 
overridden, meaning there are no limits to its sovereignty. To break this continuing sovereignty 
requires a “disguised revolution”, which would create a new basic norm within a system and cut 
ties to the previously supreme Parliament.107 In my view, the sovereignty of the New Zealand 
Parliament was likely effected by such a disguised revolution in that it did not occur by strictly legal 
means. Rather it shifted because the foundational norm of parliamentary sovereignty changed as 
a result of changes in cultural values.  
 
A number of theorists have argued that parliamentary sovereignty is a rule of recognition in the 
Hartian sense.108 Hart suggested that the rule of recognition is a question fact and there must be 
a form of social practice comprising both patterns of conduct regularly followed by most members 
of the group and a distinctive normative attitude.109  
 
I agree that parliamentary sovereignty has a normative status and can be described as a social 
rule rather than a legal one, but it is more appropriately termed a foundational norm on the basis 
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that there can never be one ultimate rule of recognition in a system. Nevertheless, parliamentary 
sovereignty’s normative status means that, over time, it can and does change. The change in 
parliamentary sovereignty in New Zealand from resting with the British Parliament to the New 
Zealand Parliament is indicative of this fact. When the Statute of Westminster was enacted by the 
British parliament in 1931, there was little appetite to adopt it in New Zealand.110 New Zealand was 
closely tied with Britain socially and economically. Many New Zealanders were only first or second 
generation and New Zealand’s economy was dependent on trade with Britain.111 On 3 September 
1939, when Michael Joseph Savage announced that New Zealand was to join Britain in the war 
against Germany, he affirmed New Zealand’s connection with Britain:112  
where she goes, we go; where she stands, we stand. We are only a small and young nation, 
but we march with a union of hearts and souls to a common destiny.  
 
Soon after this statement was made Savage died and was succeeded by Peter Fraser. Fraser had 
previously indicated his desire for New Zealand to have its own identity on the world stage:  
What does matter is that this country has to make up its own mind on international problems 
as a sovereign country – because under the Statute of Westminster ours is a sovereign country 
– and though we work in the closest cooperation with the British Government, that does not 
mean to say that we must be prepared to swallow everything the British Government cares to 
put forward.113 
 
During the Second World War, New Zealand began to increase its presence on the world stage. 
During the war, diplomatic posts were created in Ottawa and Moscow, and Tokyo after the war in 
1947.114 Further, New Zealand became a charter member of the United Nations in 1945.115 New 
Zealand was beginning to see the value of an independent presence on the world stage. In 1942, 
when Singapore fell to the Japanese, the Fraser Government and the public were faced with the 
real possibility that the war would arrive on our doorstep while our soldiers were off fighting for the 
empire in North Africa and Italy.116 We wondered at the wisdom of supporting the UK at the risk of 
ourselves. The post war period was characterised, at the international level, by the decline of 
Britain as the global hegemon and the increasing rise of the United States and Russia.117 All of 
these events had a lasting effect on New Zealanders, and increased the appetite for becoming a 
more independent nation, standing separate from Britain.  
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The deciding factor came in 1947 when Sidney Holland introduced a Bill to abolish Parliament’s 
upper house, the Legislative Council.118 The Legislative Council had fallen out of favour and was 
viewed as ineffective.119 It was a British construct based in the classist, hierarchical system of the 
British parliament. As a nation of generally working and middle class settlers who left Britain in part 
to escape the classism, the Legislative Council made little sense. In order to make a change to the 
Constitution Act 1857, New Zealand was required to adopt the Statute of Westminster. Accordingly 
the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1947 was enacted.120 The Adoption Act meant that the 
UK Parliament were no longer able to legislate for New Zealand and validly enacted New Zealand 
laws were not void by reason of their inconsistency with UK law.121  This is reflective of New 
Zealand’s characteristic approach to constitutional change as evolutionary. New Zealand could 
have legally adopted the Statute of Westminster in 1931 but it did not do so for another 16 years. 
It was the socio-political effect of the Second World War which led to New Zealanders increasing 
desire for independence. The enactment of the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act, while 
revolutionary, only reflected the status of the norms as they existed at that time based on cultural 
and historical context.  
 
Notwithstanding the new powers in the Statute of Westminster, the New Zealand Parliament was 
not entirely sovereign. The British Parliament still had the legal right to legislate on its behalf. It 
was the events of the 1970s and 1980s that finally separated parliamentary sovereignty in New 
Zealand from the British “mother Parliament”. In the 1970s, New Zealand was confronted by Britain 
joining the European Economic Community which left many concerned about the effect on our 
heavily British dependent economy. There was a strong sense of betrayal amongst New 
Zealanders.122  New Zealand initially sought to maintain preferential access but was only partially 
successful in the short term.123 It seemed that the UK had turned away from New Zealand towards 
Europe. It required New Zealand to look elsewhere for development of trade agreements. 
However, Robert Muldoon’s heavy handed approach to fiscal policy made this difficult. As an 
isolated nation dependant on trade, we could no longer rely on the ‘motherland’ to take care of us. 
We needed to forge out our own independent path.  
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Another turning point in the development of an independent national identity occurred in 1984 with 
the Rainbow Warrior.124 The strong nuclear free stance taken by New Zealand and the footage of 
David Lange debating the American reverend in the Oxford Union was a source of pride for 
many.125 The events of the 1970s and 1980s increased the cultural importance placed on 
independence from Britain. This attitude shift further from Britain was reflected in 1986 when the 
Constitution Act removed any ability for the UK parliament to make laws for New Zealand and 
codified the foundational norm already identified by the Courts by declaring the New Zealand 
Parliament’s sovereignty.126 
 
The legislative changes that shifted sovereignty from the British Parliament to New Zealand’s 
Parliament did not occur in a vacuum. In fact, many New Zealanders would be surprised to learn 
that this change was completed so relatively recently. The change ultimately reflected a new 
version of the foundational norm of parliamentary sovereignty influenced by changes in cultural 
values arising from socio-political events which had a deep and lasting effect on New Zealanders 
and shifted us from a colony to an independent nation.  
 
Recent challenges to Parliamentary Sovereignty: Māori Land Rights    
In recent years, there have been indications that parliamentary sovereignty is declining in influence 
in New Zealand due to the cultural values underpinning it becoming less dominant in our society. 
Consequently, New Zealanders are becoming increasingly willing to accept that Parliament’s 
supremacy may not be absolute.  
 
While I suggest that one illustration of this shift in cultural values away from omnipotence of 
parliament is the rise of the rule of law which will be discussed at length in the following chapters, 
a related illustration of the changing nature of parliamentary sovereignty is the rise in recognition 
by the Courts of Māori land rights. In the same way that the rule of law’s increased dominance has 
weakened parliamentary sovereignty, the increased dominance of indigenous rights recognition 
has weakened parliamentary sovereignty. The fact that the increase of indigenous rights 
recognition has been able to weaken parliamentary sovereignty shows that it is no longer absolute 
in the Diceyan sense.  
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In the example of Māori land rights, we see the weakening of a fundamental principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty – the principle of non-interference. The principle of non-interference 
dictates that the judiciary will not hear a matter that is before the House.127 The basis of this 
principle lies in the supremacy of parliament and the concern that parliamentary proceedings would 
be undermined by another branch of government. This principle was declared in the Bill of Rights 
1688, Article 9, which states: “the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament 
ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament”.128 The genesis 
of this weakening of the principle of non-interference has occurred in the context of settlements 
between iwi and the Crown under the Treaty of Waitangi. It is, in other words, aligned with the 
increase in the cultural value and importance placed on reaching final settlements between  Māori 
and the Crown in respect of their land rights.  
 
Both domestic and international recognition of indigenous rights has increased in recent years. 
Māori land rights issues increased in prominence from the 1970s and, by the 2010s, the settlement 
of treaty claims was of central importance to the New Zealand Government and many parts of 
society.129 As of mid-2018, 73 settlements had been passed into law, the total value of which was 
$2.24 billion.130 This importance of reaching treaty settlements is reflected in the judiciary’s 
weakening of the principle of interference and, by extension, parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
The traditional approach to the principle of non-interference is couched in the protection of 
parliament’s sovereignty and was set out in Milroy v Attorney-General.131 Milroy concerned a treaty 
settlement, with the applicants arguing that officials had made errors when advising the Minister.132 
The Court of Appeal found that it was not appropriate for the Court to entertain a challenge to 
legislation which had not yet been introduced to the House because of the non-interference 
principle.133 It should be noted that in Milroy there was no bill introduced to the House. The 
challenge was to the treaty negotiations process.134 However, this was deemed too much of a 
threat to the principle of comity and the Court rejected the claim.135 The Milroy approach, therefore, 
took a wide interpretation of the principle of non-interference, in that it meant that if a matter will 
be non-justiciable if it can be sufficiently linked to a matter which is or is likely to be before the 
House.  A number of subsequent cases followed Milroy’s wide interpretation of the non-
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interference principle.136 Such an interpretation was particularly problematic in the area of  Māori 
land rights and treaty settlements because legislation follows the event as a formality. In effect, the 
decisions are already made before legislation is even introduced.  
 
There was, however, another interpretation of the non-interference principle at play which has 
since gained traction and appears to have displaced the Milroy approach. In Morrison v Treaty of 
Waitangi Fisheries Commission137 the High Court noted that “once the proposals have been 
included in draft legislation, they will clearly be non-justiciable.”138 The suggestion being that the 
principle of non-interference is not engaged until the bill is actually drafted, rather than after a 
decision to legislate is made. This narrows the situations where the principle of non-interference 
will be engaged. A series of cases following Morrison and dealing with indigenous rights have 
further weakened the principle of non-interference. 
 
In the recent case of Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei Trust v Attorney-General,139 the Supreme Court applied 
this narrowed version of the principle of non-interference in an application for declaratory relief. 
This case exemplified the courts’ increased willingness to narrow the scope of the principle of non-
interference and, by extension, illustrates that the importance attached to parliamentary 
sovereignty is weakening.  
 
Ngāti Whātua concerned the negotiation between Ngāti Whātua and the Crown in respect of its 
rights over various properties. The Crown had introduced legislation to Parliament which would 
give effect to its decision in respect of the relevant properties.140 Ngāti Whātua sought various 
declarations from the Court which would undermine the Crown’s decision. The first four 
declarations sought were in respect of the rights Ngāti Whātua had in the land as well as the 
process followed by the Crown in making its decision.141 The final two declarations asked the Court 
to declare that the decisions were made inconsistently with tikanga, the Treaty of Waitangi, its 
principles and the United Nations Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).142 Both 
the High Court and the Court of Appeal struck out the claim as requiring too much interference by 
the Court in Parliament’s business.143  
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The Supreme Court was unanimous in its decision to reinstate some aspects of the claim; however, 
it split on precisely which parts. The majority (William Young, O’Regan, Ellen France and Arnold 
JJ) reinstated the claim apart from the claim for declarations (e) and (f).144 Elias, however, would 
reinstate the whole claim.145 Both the majority and the minority limited the scope of the principle of 
non-interference. The Court found that the purpose of the principle of non-interference is to protect 
freedom of expression in parliament and it should not be extended beyond this purpose.146 The 
mere fact that a decision by the government may take the form of legislation is not enough to 
engage the principle of non-interference and make that decision non-justiciable.147 The Court 
noted that the judiciary have a constitutional responsibility to make declarations about rights. 
Accordingly, Ngāti Whatūa were entitled to have access to the Courts to seek rights declarations. 
The Court also noted:148  
It is, nonetheless, appropriate to sound a note of caution at the extent to which the principle of 
non-interference in parliamentary proceedings has been held to apply to decisions somewhat 
distant from, for example, the decision of a minister to introduce a Bill to the House or from 
debate in the House. It would be overbroad to suggest that the fact a decision may, potentially, 
be the subject of legislation would always suffice to take the advice leading up to that decision 
out of the reach of supervision by the courts. That would be to ignore the function of the courts 
to make declarations as to rights.  
 
The minority, Elias CJ, would go further than the majority and reinstate the entire claim. Her Honour 
considered that the proposal to implement the decision by legislation did not prevent the judiciary 
from making declarations of right.  
 
The narrower approach to the principle of non-interference applied by the court in Ngāti Whatūa  
and the relationship of comity between the Courts and Parliament was subsequently explored by 
the Court of Appeal in Ngāti Mutunga O Whakauri Asset Holding Company v Attorney-General.149 
Discussing Ngāti Whatūa , the Court noted that:150  
the reasoning of both the majority and Elias CJ in Ngāti Whatūa  is consistent with the 
proposition that the courts may make declarations of existing right, interest or entitlement 
whether or not there is a bill before the House which may affect them in some way. Such relief 
is not in relation to parliamentary proceedings in the sense provided for in the Parliamentary 
Privilege Act … because such declarations would be about existing rights, interests or 
entitlements and not what Parliament may be proposing to do in relation to them. 
 
The Court of Appeal struck out the claim on the basis that the pleadings needed to be redrafted 
but noted that, although it would require them to “walk a narrow and fine line”, it would be possible 
for the appellants to replead their claim to focus on their own rights and entitlements. This 
willingness to narrow the principle of non-inference reflects the value placed on righting the wrongs 
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145 Ngāti Whātūa at [127].  
146 Ngāti Whātūa at [47]  
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148 Ngāti Whātūa at [46].  
149 Ngāti Mutunga O Whakauri Asset Holding Company v Attorney-General[2020] NZCA 2.  
150 Ngāti Mutunga O Whakauri Asset Holding Company at [33].  
38 
 
of the past and recognising Māori land rights. As a result of this change in societal values, the 
importance of recognising  Māori land rights was deemed to outweigh the importance of preserving 
the principle that courts will not weigh in on a matter which may come before the House.  
 
Conclusion  
New Zealand began its road towards modern nationhood as a colony, both in the legal sense of 
being beholden to Britain and in the cultural sense. New Zealanders felt a strong connection to 
Britain as their ‘motherland.’ This meant that, when the colony was created, parliamentary 
sovereignty in New Zealand meant the sovereignty of the British parliament. However, as the 20th 
century progressed, New Zealanders’ desire for independence from Britain increased as a result 
of historical, political and social changes which occurred, particularly in the second half of the 20th 
century. This increased appetite for independence was reflected in a significant change to the 
foundational norm of parliamentary sovereignty – sovereignty no longer lay with the British 
Parliament but instead rested with the New Zealand Parliament. This change to the foundational 
norm was reflected in legislative change. This illustrates the fact that foundational norms can, and 
do, change. They are always evolving, not because of legislative change but rather social change 
that is then reflected in legislative change. In recent years, there have been indications that 
parliamentary sovereignty is losing its dominance. An example of this is the recent changes to the 
principle of non-inference which mean that Courts may be able to weigh in on matters which will 
come before the House, particularly where  Māori land rights are involved. The weakening of the 
principle of non-inference, as a principle underpinning parliamentary sovereignty, indicates that 




















THE RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I traced the development of parliamentary sovereignty and its deep 
historical roots in Britain and then New Zealand. The rule of law is another significant foundational 
norm of our constitution and one which is in constant competition with parliamentary sovereignty. 
When one gains dominance, the other must respond with an equal and opposite reaction.  
 
In Chapter II, I suggested that this competition is based on the fact that the rule of law has a 
substantive element and requires laws to comply with human rights. If the rule of law requires laws 
to comply with human rights, it constrains parliament’s legislative freedom and, therefore, its 
sovereignty. The purpose of this chapter is to prove that the rule of law has taken on a substantive 
element and has become intrinsically linked to human rights, such that one cannot exist without 
the other. The effect of this is that parliament’s sovereignty is constrained by the substantive 
element of the rule of law.  
 
In the first part of this chapter, I present the two interpretations of the rule of law. The first is 
procedural and suggests that law must be enacted in a procedurally legitimate way. Dicey suggests 
that this means exercises of power must be based in law and that law must be clear and apply to 
all. The second interpretation suggests that, to comply with the rule of law, laws must be 
procedurally robust but must also be consistent with certain values of our society. In other words, 
there is a substantive element to determining ‘good’ and ‘bad’ law. In the second part of this 
chapter, I discuss how the rise of human rights have caused this substantive element to be more 
important and has resulted in the rule of law becoming intrinsically linked with human rights.  
 
The overall purpose of this chapter is to establish that, while the rule of law may have begun as a 
purely procedural requirement, it has since been supercharged by the rise of human rights causing 
it to take on a substantive element despite the existence of such an element being in contradiction 
with another foundational norm of our constitution; parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
Procedural vs substantive theories  
There are two main interpretations of the rule of law. The first interpretation suggests that the rule 
of law provides procedural protection in that it requires the government to obey certain rules in 
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enacting the law and exercising their public power.151 Under this theory, laws comply with the rule 
of law if exercises of public power comply with three principles: predominance and clarity of the 
law, equality before the law and legal rather than arbitrary exercises of power.152  This can be 
described as a procedural understanding of the rule of law. This interpretation was the one 
presented in the Magna Carta. The Magna Carta declared, among other things, that:153  
No free man shall be arrested or detained in prison, or deprived of his freehold or outlawed, or 
banished, or in any way molested, and we will not set forth against him, unless by the lawful 
judgment of his peers and by the law of the land. 
 
Under the Magna Carta, a person could not be punished unless they had been convicted lawfully. 
However, there was no requirement that the substance of that law had to include certain values. 
In other words, under the procedural understanding of the rule of law, the distinction between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ law is not based on what the law says but rather how it says what it says.   
 
The second interpretation argues that the rule of law provides more than procedural protection. 
Rather, it also protects certain values society deems fundamental. Theorists who prescribe to this 
second interpretation of the rule of law argue that there are certain laws which, even if they are 
enacted legitimately in procedural terms, cannot be seen as complying with the rule of law because 
they are fundamentally inconsistent with the protections which society expects from the law.154  
 
Joseph Raz is a staunch supporter of the procedural rule of law theory.155 He considered that the 
rule of law was just one of many virtues which a legal system may possess and “by which it is to 
be judged”.156 Other virtues include human rights, democracy and social justice but these are 
distinct from the rule of law and should not be conflated.157 This distinction is artificial. The 
procedural elements of the rule of law, particularly in the post war period, cannot be separated 
from substantive elements. Citizens expect to be protected by the rule of law and, in the post war 
period, there was an increasing understanding that a strictly procedural rule of law would not 
provide adequate protection.158 An example of this is the Nuremberg Laws. The Nuremberg Laws 
describe two laws enacted by the Reichstag on 15 September 1935, the Law for the Protection of 
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German Blood and German Honour and the Reich Citizenship Law, which, among other things, 
stripped Jewish people of their right to German citizenship and all the protections associated with 
that citizenship.159 Under a procedural understanding, the Nuremberg Laws complied with the rule 
of law because they were enacted in a procedurally lawful manner by the Reichstag according to 
the procedural requirements of law-making at the time. However, taking a substantive view, they 
did not comply with the rule of law because they are so fundamentally at odds with the protections 
expected by individuals from government. Dicey’s second principle of the rule of law states that 
“every man, whatever be his rank or condition is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and 
amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.”160 If the law says all people are to be free 
from discrimination, except Jewish people, the question becomes whether this complies with 
Dicey’s second principle of the rule of law.  Procedurally, this would mean that Jews and non-Jews 
are both subject to the law allowing discrimination against Jews. The fact that they are Jewish does 
not mean they cannot discriminate against other Jews. However, in this example, I suggest that 
the law itself is incompatible with the underlying reason for the principle. The principle is designed 
to ensure that all citizens are treated equally before the law. The law applies the same way to 
everyone. By this, Dicey deems that there is something morally unacceptable about treating 
humans in a different way because of their “rank or condition”. If the unequal treatment is properly 
made law, that does not erase the moral problem. If a law itself treats humans in a different way 
because of their “rank or condition”, surely, it too, is morally unacceptable.  
 
The problems associated with removing the substantive aspect from the rule of law or denying its 
existence were summarized by the former Chief Justice of South Africa, in 2011: 161 
[T]he apartheid government, its officers and agents were accountable in accordance with the 
laws; the laws were clear; publicized, and stable, and were upheld by law enforcement officials 
and judges. What was missing was the substantive component of the rule of law. The process 
by which the laws were made was not fair (only whites, a minority of the population, had the 
vote). And the laws themselves were not fair. They institutionalized discrimination, vested broad 
discretionary powers in the executive, and failed to protect fundamental rights. Without a 
substantive content there would be no answer to the criticism, sometimes voiced, that the rule 
of law is “an empty vessel into which any law could be poured. 
 
The Chief Justice argues that the rule of law would effectively become pointless without a 
substantive element. We expect certain minimum guarantees from our government and a 
guarantee that laws will be framed in a certain way is not sufficient without some additional 
guarantee of the substance of that law. Lord Bingham, who provided one of the most influential 
contemporary accounts of the rule of law, also subscribed to a substantive view of the rule of law. 
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Building on traditional understandings of the rule of law, he identified eight requirements for the 
rule of law:162  
1. The law must be accessible, intelligible, clear and practicable. 
2. Questions of right and liability should resolved by the application of the law and not by the 
exercise of discretion. By this, Lord Bingham suggests that the more discretionary the exercise 
of power, the more there is a risk of arbitrariness.  
 
3. Laws should apply equally to all.  
4. Laws must afford adequate protection of fundamental human rights.  
5. Disputes must be resolved quickly and without prohibitive cost. 
6. Ministers and officials must exercise powers in good faith and with judicial review. Lord 
Bingham underlies the importance of the judiciary to act as a check on the executive.  
 
7. Judicial procedures should be fair and open. In other words, justice must be done and seen to 
be done.  
 
8. Compliance by the state with its obligations to international law.  
Lord Bingham contrasts ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ understandings of the rule of law. A ‘thin’ notion of the 
rule of law generally describes what I refer to as a procedural understanding, that is, the law must 
be enacted with procedural propriety. He compares this with a ‘thick’ notion which suggests that 
there are also substantive requirements of the rule of law, such as that it must afford adequate 
protection of fundamental human rights.163 Lord Bingham explicitly connects the rule of law’s 
substantive element with human rights. Accordingly to Lord Bingham, human rights are the values 
against which we must measure our laws and, in order to comply with the rule of law, laws must 
give adequate protection to human rights. This is reflective of the increasingly important cultural 
role human rights have taken on since the Second World War. This, however, did not happen over-
night.  
 
Rise of Human Rights  
Human rights have progressively become the yard stick against which we measure our laws. The 
importance of human rights in the post war period has led to the position put forward by Lord 
Bingham and the Chief Justice of South Africa, that human rights are so fundamental that a law 
cannot be seen to comply with the rule of law if it does not comply with human rights. I suggest 
that the effect of this is a supercharging of the rule of law from simply a procedural protection to a 
substantive protection.  
 
The rise of human rights is a relatively recent phenomenon and only occurred in the post war 
period. However, there has been a tendency to cherry pick examples of morality from ancient 
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civilizations and retrospectively characterise them as examples of human rights theory.164 These 
arguments typically utilise examples like the Code of Hammurabi, c. 1780 BCE or the Cyrus 
Cylinder, c. 539 BCE. The Cyrus Cylinder was commissioned by Cyrus the Great after his conquest 
of the Neo-Babylonian Empire in 540 BCE and is sometimes seen as the first human rights 
document.165 A replica of the cylinder is held at the United Nations headquarters, adding to the 
narrative. The Cylinder declares freedom of religion without prosecution or forced conversions. 
However, the Cylinder also declares Cyrus the Great as the King of “the four corners of the world” 
and denounces the previous ruler.166 The Cylinder was more likely political propaganda to win the 
hearts of conquered subjects than a beacon of human rights.167  
 
Theorists such as Fred Miller have also retrospectively rebranded Aristotle as a champion of 
human rights in the ancient world.168 Miller uses Aristotle’s theories about natural law in support of 
this characterisation. In The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle speaks of a natural moral order and 
says that “the natural is that which has the same validity everywhere and does not depend upon 
acceptance.”169 While it is true that Aristotle was a proponent of natural law, natural law and natural 
rights are distinct.170 Natural law in the ancient world was inextricably linked with religion – the 
“law-giver” who dictated the moral code was a deity of some form.171 Conversely, natural rights do 
not require endowment, they exist outside of the legal system.172 This distinction can be seen in 
Aristotle’s theories around slavery. While Aristotle was a supporter of natural law and a moral code, 
he also believed that within this moral code some people were born “natural slaves” because their 
souls were incomplete, thus rendering them helpless without a master.173 A theory of natural rights 
would negate this argument because, according to natural rights theory, humans have certain 
basic rights (such as the right to be free) which exist by virtue of their humanness. Miller commits 
various logical fallacies throughout his argument, the most egregious being that because Aristotle 
supported a concept which we now view as a human right, he had a theory of human rights. For 
example, because Aristotle believed in predictability and clarity in the law, then he had a theory of 
human rights. The one does not necessarily follow from the other. Accordingly, arguments that 
posit a concept of human rights existed in ancient times are misleading, and generally involve a 
conflation of morality and religion with human rights.   
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Around the time of the Glorious Revolution, when the focus in society was on limiting governmental 
authority and establishing a balanced constitution, Locke was advancing his view that natural rights 
exist which are inherent to all humans (of a particular class) rather than being tied to citizenship.174 
This concept of inalienable rights was a key theme in both the United States and French revolutions 
of the late 1700s and the resulting declarations of rights. The United States Declaration of 
Independence, whose drafters were strongly influenced by Locke’s philosophy, stated that “all men 
are created equal, [and are] endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights… .”175 this 
was included in the Declaration of Independence. Similarly, the French Declaration on the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen, which was drafted in consultation with Thomas Jefferson who drafted 
the US Declaration of Independence, declared that men are born and remain free and equal in 
rights. 
 
These documents subsequently influenced the rest of the world and the way society viewed the 
rule of law. As Hunt notes, “the idea of universal human rights … did not appear all at once but 
slowly emerged in the eighteenth century in large part as a reaction to contemporary political 
conflicts in Great Britain, between Great Britain and its North American colonies and in France.” 
The fundamental nature of these rights rendered them a powerful check on the absoluteness of 
parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, following on from the Bill of Rights 1688, and the US and French 
Declarations of Rights, various social movements arose which applied this idea of inalienable 
rights.176 The women’s suffrage movement was part of a wider quest for women’s political and 
economic equality which began in the late 1800s.177 Similarly, the labour movement which arose 
in the late 1800s aimed to establish rights for workers.178 Through these movements, we can see 
a definite trend of discussions about rights becoming increasingly prevalent.  
 
That being said, human rights as a modern concept only emerged in the post-World War II period, 
building off the early ideas posited during the Age of Enlightenment, the social movements of the 
late 1800s and early 1900s and the growing dominance of the rule of law.179  World War II was a 
pivotal point in both the rise of human rights and the connection between the rule of law and human 
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rights.180 The international order had seen first-hand what humankind was capable of when 
national power went unchecked. The world had also seen that a procedural rule of law was not 
enough to protect citizens from breaches of cultural values like respect for human rights and 
dignity. The arguments from Dicey and others that political and institutional scrutiny would 
sufficiently protect citizens against national government overreach was resoundingly debunked on 
the world stage.  
 
World War II also appeared to support a connection between respect for human rights and 
international peace. Nations saw that when one country embarked on the path to fascism, 
international military intervention was required and peace was forfeit until rights were restored. In 
January 1941, President Roosevelt, upon announcing that the US was entering the war, noted that 
the US was fighting for “a world founded upon four essential freedoms” and that “freedom means 
the supremacy of human rights everywhere” 181 
 
The establishment of the United Nations in 1947 illustrates this connection between peace and 
respect for human rights. The United Nations was established in the wake of the Second World 
War to encourage peace between nations and to encourage “respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms”,182 and the use of the rule of law to protect human rights. In 1948, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted to urge states to promote a number 
of human rights, with the claim that these rights are part of the “foundation of freedom, justice and peace 
in the world.”183 The UNDHR also notes that “human rights should be protected by the rule  of 
law”.184  
 
Following the UDHR’s adoption, numerous other international agreements declaring rights were 
negotiated and agreed.185 These legal instruments were enacted to reflect the change in social 
values during the post war period and the rising importance of human rights. The legal instruments 
simply reflect the social change already established after the Second World War. It was clear, after 
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the Second World War, that respect for human rights was critical for the maintenance of a peaceful 
world. The Nazi experience also made clear that if the rule of law was strictly procedural, it would 
not adequately protect human rights. Accordingly, the rule of law had to take on a substantive 
element if it was to do what society expected it to do, namely, protect human rights.  
 
This change in social values and the connection of the rule of law with human rights is illustrated 
by the way the international community has viewed the rule of law and human rights in the modern 
era and indicates a clear connection between the rule of law and human rights. In 2002, the United 
Nations Human Rights Commissioner Sergio Vieria de Mello referred to the rule of law as a “fruitful 
principle to guide us toward agreement” and that it is a “touchstone for us in spreading the culture 
of human rights.”186 The Secretary General has also said that the rule of law requires that legal 
processes, institutions and norms are consistent with human rights.187 Further, at the Declaration 
of the High Level Meeting on the Rule of Law, member states agreed that human rights and the 
rule of law were interlinked, mutually reinforcing and indivisible.188 This substantive understanding 
of the rule of law as providing protection against laws which breach human rights suggests that 
the rule of law allows us to make a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ laws. ‘Good’ laws are laws 
which comply with human rights whereas ‘bad’ laws are those that do not.  
 
Waldron, however, argued that, if it is accepted that there is a substantive element to the rule of 
law, everyone will “clamor to have their favourite political ideal incorporated as a substantive 
dimension of the rule of law.”189 While Waldron accepts that there has been a rise in rights-based 
thinking, he suggests that because society does not agree on the scope of those rights, we have 
no firm basis upon which to base such a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ laws. In my view, 
Waldron’s argument does not account for the normative status of rights and conflates the scope 
or application of rights with the rights themselves. Before a right is considered fundamental in any 
one legal system, it must be deeply ingrained in the traditions of that system. It is not a matter of 
simply being a popular ‘political ideal’. While members of the community may differ on the scope 
of that right or how it should apply in different situations, generally, there is a consensus that the 
right, in the abstract sense, exists. An example of this, which is explored further in later chapters, 
is electoral rights for sentenced prisoners. At an abstract level, we all agree that people have the 
right to vote. However, the question of when and how this right can be justifiably limited may not 
be consistent across members and groups of society. We, as a society, accept that a right exists 
and give it normative status. We then defer to the branches of government to declare that right to 
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exist and  determine when and how that right can justifiably be limited in a way which is consistent 
with the rule of law. The branch of government who has primary responsibility for this role is 
determined by the relevant system. The problem arises, as will be discussed in Chapter VI, when 
the branch of government which has been entrusted with primary responsibility of determining the 
scope of rights, does not have the appropriate expertise to do so and fails to ensure that rights are 
adequately protected. At that point, the system must respond and another branch of government 
must fill the gap.  
 
Conclusion  
As a foundational norm, the rule of law exists as a product of society’s values. As society’s values 
change so too does the foundational norm. The rule of law was traditionally considered a 
procedural requirement, this was because the norm of parliamentary sovereignty was considered 
so fundamental that no other norm could contradict it. This is no longer the case. Since the post 
war period, society expects more guarantees from government than procedural legitimacy. It also 
expects law to comply with human rights. Human rights are considered so fundamental that they 
have supercharged the rule of law in such a way as to contradict parliamentary sovereignty. The 
way this contradiction plays out in practice depends on where society’s values are situated as 

























ALIGNING SOCIAL AND LEGAL RULES 
The Clyde Dam and Foreshore and Seabed 
 
Introduction  
In Chapters II to IV, I established that the norms of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law 
exist in a zero sum game where, when one norm gains dominance, the other must give way to a 
certain degree. The extent to which each norm attains dominance is dictated by the weight given 
to that norm at any particular time by members of society. As New Zealand’s societal change is 
characterized by incrementalism, this means that changes to norms should arise out of slow social 
change. This is illustrated by the rise in recognition of Māori land rights and its influence on 
Parliament’s sovereignty, as discussed in Chapter III.  
 
Ideally, the social importance of the norm dictates its importance within the legal system. Where 
the legal system falls out of step with the social norms such that the importance ascribed to one 
foundational norm at law is not aligned with the importance ascribed to it by society, the system 
responds to bring the legal system in line with the values of society. At times during New Zealand’s 
history, this very situation has occurred – one constitutional player over asserted its dominance in 
a way which did not align with the social status of its associated norm and, as a result, the legal 
system had to correct itself to bring the legal dominance of the norm in line with its social 
dominance. This illustrates the critical nature of the social value attributed to each norm. Where 
the legal rules do not reflect the social rules, the legal rules change.  
 
In this chapter, I discuss two examples which illustrate that social norms are the drivers of change 
to the legal system. The first example is the Clyde Dam litigation where Muldoon’s dominant 
Government was able to undermine the rule of law in a way that was not justified by the status of 
the rule of law as a social norm. This action, along with the actions of the Muldoon and the Fourth 
Labour Governments, contributed to the public disillusionment with First Past the Post (FPP) and 
was one of many events which led to the adoption of MMP. It revealed to the New Zealand public 
that, under the current voting system (being FPP), Parliament had limited power to check executive 
action. This lack of parliamentary dominance did not align with the dominance of parliamentary 
sovereignty outside the legal system. Accordingly, the legal system had to correct, which it did so 
by the adoption of Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) in 1993.  
 
The second example occurred in 2004 when the judiciary indicated that it may assert its dominance 
in respect of the indigenous rights to the foreshore and seabed. In response, Parliament ensured 
the judiciary would be prevented from taking this step because the status of the norms did not 
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allow it. Notwithstanding other complex issues regarding Pākehā-Māori relations at the time, the 
majority of the New Zealand public were entirely comfortable with Parliament overruling the Courts 
in this way because of the dominance of parliamentary sovereignty in respect of the issue of Māori 
land rights at the time.  
 
In both these examples, one constitutional player asserted more dominance than the status its 
respective social norm would allow at the particular time. As a result, legal changes occurred which 
corrected the balance and brought the dominance of the foundational norms at law in line with the 
dominance prescribed by society. This illustrates both the extra-legal nature of foundational norms 
and the zero sum game which exists between parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law.  
 
The Clyde Dam (1982)  
At the time the Clyde Dam saga played out, the legal system afforded the executive, through 
Parliament, significant power. Under FFP, the House was almost always divided between two 
parties only.190 This meant it was possible for the executive to assert dominance over Parliament, 
through a combination of collective cabinet responsibility and the whip system.191 For example, 
Muldoon’s National party had a majority of 23, 10 and then 1 after the general elections of 1975, 
1978 and 1981.192  
 
In 1992, Sir Geoffrey wrote that:193  
In a sense, Muldoon was a Hobbesian. He demonstrated to New Zealanders just what could 
be done with unlimited amounts of concentrated power.  
 
As discussed in Chapter II, Hobbes put forward the command theory of law. Hobbes argues that 
laws come from a dictatorial sovereign whose commands become laws. This is, in many ways an 
archaic understanding of the law, out of step with modern democracy and the rule of law. However, 
its influence can be seen in Diceyan understandings of the rule of law and parliamentary 
sovereignty. He accepts that these concepts exist without exploring their legal origin and argues 
that Parliament has supreme authority. Our system, as a Westminster system, is influenced by 
Diceyan and Hobbesian traditions. As Sir Geoffrey suggests, Muldoon illustrated the problems with 
a system which both affords parliament supreme authority and yet, by FPP, allows the executive 
to attain dominance within parliament.194 
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When Muldoon came into power, the New Zealand economy was struggling to recover from the 
energy crisis and the loss of Britain to the European Union.195 As a result, Muldoon introduced his 
‘Think Big’ strategy to get the economic back on track. One of the ‘Think Big’ projects was the 
construction of the Clyde Dam. The construction was the subject of significant controversy as it 
had a significant impact on landowners in the area.196 The Government obtained a water right from 
the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority which was chaired by a member of the 
Government and was also the Minister in charge of the project. However, landowners challenged 
this decision before the Planning Tribunal. The Planning Tribunal, in the first instance, found that 
the Government had a water right under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967.197 This 
decision was successfully challenged in the High Court where Casey J held that the Planning 
Tribunal had failed to consider relevant factors.198 This resulted in the application being 
reconsidered by the Planning Tribunal who found that the Crown had failed to establish, on the 
evidence, that the diversion of resources was justified under the Water and Soil Conservation 
Act.199  
 
As a result, the Muldoon Government enacted the Clutha Development (Clyde Dam) 
Empowerment Act 1982 which overturned the Planning Tribunal’s decision and allowed 
construction to begin in 1982.200 The result was significant national outrage.201 Protesters 
padlocked the doors of the Court of Appeal in Wellington and High Court in Christchurch and 
attached a notice to the door which read: “this Court is now obsolete, irrelevant, and just a 
nuisance. Accordingly it is closed until such time as people no longer expect the law to protect 
their rights.”202 Muldoon’s government had overreached and attempted to gain too much 
dominance where that dominance was not acceptable to society.  
 
Electoral Reform  
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The process leading to electoral reform was complex, multi-faceted and cannot be fully canvased 
here.203 Further, I do not suggest that the events surrounding the Clyde Dam caused electoral 
reform. Rather, I suggest that it served to underline, once more, the risks associated with a 
powerful executive and the fact that the legal rules did not align with the status of the foundational 
norms at a societal level.  
 
As discussed in Chapter III parliamentary sovereignty has a long tradition in New Zealand. This 
tradition is based in a Westminster understanding of representative democracy where Parliament 
is supreme. While, as I argue in this thesis, Parliament is no longer as supreme as it once was, 
the tradition of parliamentary sovereignty remains. Contrary to this tradition of a strong Parliament, 
Muldoon often used his significant power to overrule other branches of government and push his 
party’s agenda.204 This tradition of parliamentary sovereignty is illustrated in the response by the 
public to Muldoon’s actions. 
 
Similarly, in 1984, the Fourth Labour Government was elected and its time in office was 
characterised by neo-liberal economic reforms which were considered out of step with the 
traditional beliefs associated with the party.205 These economic reforms were known as 
Rogernomics, named after Finance Minister Roger Douglas. Some significant characteristics of 
Rogernomics included the privatisation of state owned enterprises and state assets and the 
introduction of Goods and Services Tax.206  A number of the Labour Party’s social and economic 
reforms were either not included in the party’s manifesto or were specifically rejected by the party 
prior to election.207 Geddis suggests, and I agree, that this contributed to the general mistrust of 
the FPP party system and its ability to produce a representative Parliament.208 It was the combined 
effect of the exposure of risks associated with executive dominance displayed by the Muldoon 
Government and the sense of ‘bait and switch’ produced by the Fourth Labour Government which 
led to an appetite for electoral reform.  
 
In 1984, Labour launched the Royal Commission on the Electoral System.209 Among the ten criteria 
established by the Commission to choose an electoral system was enabling parliament to be 
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independent from government control.210 The Royal Commission recommended the adoption of 
MMP to replace FPP.211 MMP is a proportional system under which the share of seats a party wins 
in parliament corresponds with the share of the vote that party attracts nationwide.212 This means 
that, generally, no one party receives a majority of seats in the House and so parties must reach 
an accommodation with other parties in order to govern.213 The effect of this is to require greater 
consultation, cooperation and compromise in policy development and adoption. The driving force 
for electoral reform was public opinion.214 As Geddis notes, there was a “broad disillusionment” 
with the FPP system. This led to the inclusion of a referendum promise in the National manifesto 
and the referendum was held in 1992.215  
 
In 1993, MMP was adopted. Under FPP, the content of legislation was dictated by the single party 
majority, however, under MMP, negotiation across party lines is required before legislation can be 
passed. As such, the change to MMP meant that Parliament’s will is more legitimately Parliament’s 
will rather than being simply the will of an influential executive within a single party. This goes some 
way to fetter the dominance of Parliament and prevent the situation which arose with the Muldoon 
and Fourth Labour Governments. This change was required because the dominance assigned to 
norms within the legal system were not aligned with the dominance assigned to those norms by 
society. Society placed emphasis on the role of Parliament within the system but the legal system 
did not. Accordingly, the legal system was driven to change by the social norms.  
 
Foreshore and Seabed  
The foreshore and seabed saga, like electoral reform, is a complex period of New Zealand history. 
However, in this chapter, I present this period as an example of the status of foundational norms 
driving change where the legal system fell out of step with those norms.  
 
The foreshore and seabed controversy began when an application was made to the Māori Land 
Court requesting that the foreshore and seabed of the Marlborough Sounds be defined as Māori 
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customary land under Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993 (TTWMA).216 The Māori Land Court 
concluded that it had jurisdiction to deal with the issue under TTWMA.217 However, the High Court, 
on appeal, held that once the land had been purchased by the Crown, the Māori interest in the 
land under customary law had been extinguished.218 The Court of Appeal held that the Māori Land 
Court did have jurisdiction over the question of whether the category of the foreshore and seabed 
under TTWMA.219  
 
Following this decision, there was significant public concern about how the Māori Land Court would 
resolve the question.220 This concern was echoed by Parliament.221 Deputy Prime Minister Michael 
Cullen noted, when discussing the prospect of Māori ownership of the foreshore and seabed, “that 
is not the sort of stuff that goes down terribly well in an awful lot of the pākehā constituencies. Let’s 
be quite blunt about that.”222 To prevent the question coming before the courts, Parliament enacted 
the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 which declared that the foreshore and seabed was owned by 
the Crown.223  
 
In this example, the courts had asserted jurisdiction to determine a question which the public and 
Parliament were uncomfortable with it determining. As a result, Parliament asserted its supremacy 
by enacting legislation which would prevent the Court coming to a decision which would be 
inconsistent with the majority of public opinion. The public was comfortable with Parliament 
overruling the courts in this way because the status of the foundational norms required it. If the 
Māori Land Court had come to a decision which recognised indigenous rights in the foreshore and 
seabed, this would have constituted a sudden shift in the balance of power between the courts 
and the judiciary which was unacceptable according to the status of the rule of law in respect of 
parliamentary sovereignty at a societal level at that time. Accordingly, the legal system corrected 
to align the division of power between the judiciary and Parliament at law to the division of societal 
dominance between rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
This example can be distinguished from the role the courts played in the Clyde Dam litigation. In 
the Clyde Dam example, the courts had an established role to play under the Water and Soil 
Conservation Act. Under the Water and Soil Conservation Act, the courts were empowered to 
determine whether a water right existed. The judiciary exercised this power but the Government 
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did not approve of the answer so they usurped the Court’s role. As Sir Geoffrey notes, this did not 
“sit well with New Zealanders’ fundamental sense of fair play.”224 The status of the rule of law and 
parliamentary sovereignty did not allow Parliament to overrule the Court in this way because the 
Court was simply determining a question which Parliament had given it the power to determine 
under the Water and Soil Conservation Act. Conversely, in the foreshore and seabed litigation, the 
Court asserted jurisdiction to determine a question which would establish new law. In Clyde Dam, 
Parliament was changing the rules they set for themselves to avoid breaching those rules, in 
foreshore and seabed they were, in effect, clarifying the law lest it be developed by the courts in a 
way that was inconsistent with Parliament’s will. The former constituted an unreasonable 
encroachment on the rule of law and the role of the judiciary, while the latter was justified by virtue 
of parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
Conclusion  
These examples illustrate the natural alignment between norms and the law. Generally, Parliament 
and the judiciary restrain themselves by the status of their respective foundational norms. For 
example, when the rule of law increases in dominance, the courts are willing to extend themselves. 
In usual circumstances, this relationship of mutually assured destruction is sufficient to encourage 
each branch to restrain themselves. However, at times in New Zealand’s history, Parliament or the 
judiciary have misread the social status of the foundational norms. In response, the legal system 
has had to correct itself and align the legal rules with the status of the social rules. The Clyde Dam 
and the foreshore and seabed controversy provide examples of these sudden lurches in the 
balance. In both examples, the law had to change to align the system with the social status of the 
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NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 
An Ambiguous Judicial Role  
 
Introduction  
In the previous chapters, I established that New Zealand’s constitution is characterised by 
foundational norms which exist in fluctuation and whose rise or fall in dominance is dictated by the 
societal value attributed to each of the foundational norms. As discussed in Chapter V, at various 
stages in New Zealand’s history, the legal system has had to correct itself to bring the dominance 
attributed to each foundational norm at law in line with the dominance attributed to that norm by 
society. This illustrates the extra-legal nature of foundational norms and supports my conclusion 
that societal change is the ultimate driver of our ‘cultural’ constitution and the division of power 
between the branches of government. The effect of this is that any change to the legal system 
must be incremental and align with societal norms.  
 
In 1990, after a long discussion about the correct division of power between Parliament and the 
judiciary in respect of safeguarding human rights, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 was 
enacted. As a result of New Zealand’s cautious approach to judicial dominance, NZBORA was 
enacted with the balance tipped towards Parliament as primary protector of rights but with 
ambiguities around the judicial role. NZBORA was enacted as a parliamentary bill of rights in the 
sense that it was not supreme law but, nevertheless, it potentially gave judges significant power to 
ensure parliament complied with human rights. Judges were prevented from declaring law invalid 
but their powers in the face of an inconsistency were not clearly defined. This meant that the 
balance of the foundational norms would ultimately dictate how far judges could stretch their role 
at any particular time.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the ambiguous balance of power between the judiciary 
and Parliament in NZBORA and to provide a backdrop for the following two chapters which discuss 
how Parliament and the judiciary have fulfilled their respective roles within this balance of power.  
 
Background to NZBORA  
While NZBORA was enacted in 1990, discussions about a Bill of Rights were already underway at 
the end of Muldoon’s second term. In the Labour Party’s Open Government Policy, the idea of a 
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Bill of Rights was advanced.225 The Policy advanced six positive outcomes that a Bill of Rights 
would achieve. Specifically, the Labour Party argued that a Bill of Rights would:226  
1. guarantee protection for fundamental values and freedoms,  
2. restrain the abuse of power by the executive and parliament,  
3. restrain the abuse of power by other organisations,  
4. provide an authoritative source of education about the importance of fundamental freedoms in 
a democratic society,  
5. provide a judicial remedy to individuals who had suffered under law or conduct which breached 
fundamental human rights, and  
6. provide a set of minimum standards to which public decision making must conform.  
 
In furtherance of the Labour Party’s policy, in 1985, a White Paper entitled “A Bill of Rights for New 
Zealand” was published.227 This document included a proposed Bill of Rights, which would be 
enforced by the New Zealand Courts as supreme law. However, the public were not amenable to 
this constitutional model.228 The New Zealand public was not comfortable with such a dominant 
judiciary at law because the balance between parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law did 
not support the judiciary gaining such authority.229 Their rejection of this model was reflective of 
the fact that, in the 1980s, the foundational norm of parliamentary sovereignty was dominant. The 
importance of Parliament had been underlined in the decades prior by New Zealand’s experience 
under FPP, as discussed in the previous chapter. It appears that New Zealanders remained 
confident that Parliament would protect them from rights abuses and the judiciary did not need 
such an overriding power for rights to be preserved.230  
 
The purpose of NZBORA was enacted to affirm, protect and promote human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in New Zealand; and to affirm New Zealand’s commitment to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.231 It sought to achieve these goals through 
giving domestic legal force to the recognised rights.   
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Parliamentary Role under NZBORA  
The intention behind NZBORA was to enact a parliamentary bill of rights. It is parliamentary in the 
sense that, under s 7, Parliament are responsible for fixing any inconsistency and, under s 4, the 
courts are unable to strike down legislation by reason of an inconsistency which was not fixed.  
 
Section 7 of NZBORA requires that:232  
 Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General shall,— 
(a) in the case of a Government Bill, on the introduction of that Bill; or 
(b) in any other case, as soon as practicable after the introduction of the Bill,— 
bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill that appears to be 
inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights. 
 
The following chapter includes a more in depth discussion of how the s 7 mechanism has fared in 
practice. In short, s 7 was intended to encourage any inconsistencies to be brought to Parliament’s 
attention so that it could attempt to resolve that inconsistency.  
Palmer noted that: 233 
 it will…be for the Parliament to make up its mind and to decide whether it should pass a 
provision that is contrary to the Bill of Rights. The Parliament still has the power and the capacity 
to do that, but it will have cause to pause, to reflect, and to make members of the public aware 
that their rights are being whittled away.  
 
Notwithstanding Sir Geoffrey’s comment that Parliament must “pause and reflect” before it enacts 
rights inconsistent legislation, whether or not Parliament is legally permitted to proceed with 
legislation which is inconsistent under NZBORA is unclear. Section 3(a) states that:234  
This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done— 
(a) by the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the Government of New Zealand; 
It is arguable that s 3(a) creates a statutory duty on the branches of government, including 
Parliament, to act consistently with the rights contained in the NZBORA. However, s 4 means that, 
in the event that Parliament breaches that statutory duty by enacting legislation which is 
inconsistent with the rights in NZBORA, the offending legislation must still apply even though it is 
inconsistent. This means that legislation which is enacted in breach of a statutory duty, is still good 
law. This interpretation of s 3(a) as creating a statutory duty is referred to as the ‘strong account’ 
of NZBORA.235   
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Some academics disagree with the strong account and instead subscribe to the ‘weak account’.236 
The weak account holds that while NZBORA outlines and promotes the human rights that are 
important in New Zealand, Parliament still may legislate inconsistently with rights as a matter both 
of law and fact. Under this account, there is no substantive legal constraint to prevent them from 
doing so, the constraint is moral and political. Sir Geoffrey noted, when NZBORA was enacted, 
that parliament may choose to pass legislation contrary to NZBORA.237  
 
Professor Geiringer argued, in a 2007 article, that the weak account accords with the majority of 
academic discussion and aligns with parliamentary practice since 1990.238 I agree with Geiringer 
that, as at 2007, judicial and parliamentary practice indicated that any restraint on Parliament was 
political rather than legal. The courts had been hesitant to take significant steps in response to 
parliament’s failure to perform this duty when it comes to enacting legislation. However, in recent 
years, with the rise of human rights and the dominance of the rule of law, we have seen judges 
take the novel step of issuing a declaration of inconsistency. This remedy is discussed further in 
the following chapters. Further, the issuance of such a remedy was endorsed by Parliament with 
the introduction of an amendment to NZBORA giving judges the express power to issue 
declarations of inconsistency. Admittedly, a declaration of inconsistency has no effect on the 
operation of a provision but it remains a bold step nonetheless. If Parliament was under no legal 
duty to enact legislation contrary to rights, a legal remedy would not be necessary. Rather, it would 
be sufficient for the courts to indicate (as was the practice when Geiringer published this article in 
2007) that the legislation was inconsistent and leave the matter to the democratic process. The 
additional step of a legal remedy must indicate that parliament breaches a legal duty by legislating 
inconsistently.  
 
If Parliament is under a legal duty not to legislate inconsistently with NZBORA as per s 3(a), the 
consequence of breaching such a legal duty is limited by s 4. NZBORA, by ss 3(a) and 4 effectively 
creates an unenforceable statutory duty on Parliament. Nevertheless, it is subject to, and must 
comply with, that statutory duty. That is not to say Parliament is under no moral or political duty. 
By the inclusion of s 4, New Zealand defers to parliament predominantly on rights matters and 
trusts parliament to rise to the challenge and protect their rights. But the duty it is under is 
unenforceable because of s 4.  
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Judicial role under NZBORA  
If Parliament are under a duty not to enact legislation which is inconsistent with rights, applying a 
traditional understanding of the distribution of governmental power, the Courts must play a role in 
ensuring that the duty is not breached. The extent to which the Courts could practically do this 
under NZBORA is also unclear and was, for most of NZBORA’s history, interpreted narrowly.  
 
Section 5 says that the rights in NZBORA may be subject only to reasonable limits prescribed by 
law which can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Section 6 says that if 
there is an inconsistency between two interpretations of a law, the interpretation which is most 
consistent with rights must be preferred.239 However, s 4 states that NZBORA does not impliedly 
repeal any enactment and no court can decline to apply any provision because it is inconsistent 
with NZBORA.240 
 
These three sections cannot be easily reconciled. They operate sufficiently where a rights-
consistent approach can be adopted or where an inconsistency results in a reasonable limit on a 
right. But section 4 makes it unclear what Courts should do in cases where the inconsistency 
cannot be resolved or the limit justified. This lack of cohesion is described as the “ss 4, 5, 6 
conundrum”.241 Andrew and Petra Butler have noted that on a number of occasions, judges 
avoided the balancing question in s 5 by invoking s 4.242 This illustrates judges’ initial nervousness 
that they would overstep and infringe on Parliament’s sovereignty. The first 30 years of NZBORA 
have been, unfortunately but also unsurprisingly, characterized by judicial caution.  
 
The main issue faced by judges is how to factor s 5 into a s 6 analysis. Lord Cooke believed that 
s 4 rendered s 5 ineffective where there was an inconsistency.243 Conversely, in Noort, Richardson 
J used s 5 to avoid invoking s 6 because he was able to conclude that the limitation was reasonable 
and, thus, there was no inconsistency to be managed.244 In Moonen v Film and Literature Board 
of Review, the Court of Appeal attempted to settle confusion around the ss 4, 5, 6 conundrum.245 
According to Moonen, the correct approach involved a six-step analysis for courts. First, a court 
must determine the scope of the right in question.246 Second, a court should identify the different 
interpretations of the words of the enactment. If there is more than one meaning, a court should 
adopt the interpretation which imposes the least infringement on the right. Then a court should 
enter into a s 5 analysis where they consider the extent to which the chosen interpretation limits 
                                                     
239 Section 6.  
240 Section 4.  
241 Geeti Faramarzi “The Bill of Reasonable Rights: Solving a Conundrum and Strengthening an Enactment” 
(2009) Canterbury Law Review 15 at 37-66.  
242 A. Butler & P. Butler New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2015). 
243 Simpson v Attorney-General(Baigent’s Case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667 at 677.  
244 Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 at 286.  
245 Moonen v Film & Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 
246 Moonen at [17].  
60 
 
the right, and whether that limitation is justified. If it is justified, then there is no inconsistency with 
the NZBORA. If the limit is not justified, the enactment is inconsistent, but must still be applied 
because of s 4.247 This methodology was presented as an option to assist a court in working 
through the ss 4, 5, 6 conundrum. However, it remained unclear how the Court could determine 
the right at step one of the Moonen approach before they had engaged in a s 5 analysis.  
 
In Hansen v R, the Supreme Court proposed a slightly different methodology for courts to apply in 
NZBORA interpretation cases.248 As Professor Geiringer notes, the significant question before the 
Court in Hansen was the relationship between ss 5 and 6.249 In particular, whether the Court is 
required to enter into a s 6 analysis regardless of whether the limit on the right is demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society as per s 5. Contrary to the Court in Moonen, the Court in 
Hansen considered that it was only necessary for the Court to adopt the least-rights infringing 
interpretation if some statutorily imposed limit on the right cannot be justified in a free and 
democratic society.250 
 
The starting point for the Supreme Court majority was to identify the “natural”, or “Parliament’s 
intended”, meaning of the inconsistent provision. If this natural meaning limits a guaranteed right, 
then a s 5 analysis must follow. If the limitation is justified as per s 5, then s 6 has no application. 
If the meaning is not justified, however, then the Court must consider whether another meaning 
could legitimately be given to the words under s 6.251 A meaning is legitimate if it is “tenable” or 
“genuinely open” to the Court. If there is no alternative legitimate meaning, then s 4 requires the 
Court to adopt the inconsistent meaning regardless.252  
 
In my view, the majority’s approach is inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of the NZBORA. The 
purpose of NZBORA is to safeguard human rights. The Hansen approach proceeds from the 
presumption that all rights are subject to limits. While this is an important part of any rights analysis, 
the purpose of NZBORA means that the emphasis should be on safeguarding the right, not 
legitimizing any limits applied to it. The starting point should be the Court assessing the 
interpretation which provides the least limit on the right. Only then should the Court assess whether 
any remaining limit on the right can be justified. The right is the emphasis, not the limit. Instead, I 
agree with Elias CJ’s dissenting approach in Hansen.253 Her Honour considered that s 5 does not 
form part of the s 6 inquiry because s 5 is not a “rule of statutory interpretation”.254 Elias did not 
                                                     
247 Moonen at [18] – [20].  
248 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7 
249 Claudia Geiringer “The Principle of Legality and the Bill of Rights Act: A Critical Examination of R v Hansen” 
(2008) NZJPIL 6 
250 Hansen at [90]  
251 Hansen at [92].  
252 Hansen at [150]; See also, Claudia Geiringer “The Principle of Legality and the Bill of Rights Act: A Critical 
Examination of R v Hansen” (2008) NZJPIL 6  
253 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7 at [1]–[45].  
254 Hansen at [15].  
61 
 
accept that s 6 “gives preference to a meaning consistent with limitations justified under s 5, if a 
meaning consistent with the unlimited right is tenable.”255 Her Honour underlined that s 6 requires 
that a meaning consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in NZBORA is preferred. 
Weakening s 6 in the way suggested by the majority would fail to promote fundamental rights and 
freedoms and would be likely to erode rights.256  I agree with Elias CJ’s analysis that s 6 is critical 
in the protection of rights and that starting the analysis with a question of “what is the limited right” 
before considering the most rights consistent meaning is fundamentally at odds with the 
NZBORA’s purpose of promoting rights and freedoms. In Chapter VIII, I discuss further how the 
judiciary can and should use s 6 to its full potential.  
 
Conclusion   
NZBORA was enacted as a parliamentary bill of rights in the sense that it placed an obligation on 
Parliament to legislate consistently with the rights contained in NZBORA. Parliament had a defined 
role under NZBORA by virtue of s 7. Conversely, the role of the judiciary under NZBORA was 
ambiguous and the majority of judges interpreted it narrowly using s 4 as a means to avoid 
meaningful rights analysis. This meant that it was even more important that parliament fulfilled its 
role. Unfortunately, as will be discussed in the following chapter, parliament has failed to fulfill its 
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PARLIAMENTARY PROTECTION OF RIGHTS 
 
Introduction  
As I concluded in the previous chapter, NZBORA was enacted with a somewhat ambiguous 
division of power between parliament and the judiciary. It was unclear to what extent the judiciary 
were expected to safeguard human rights where parliament had failed to do so. The effect of this 
ambiguous division is that the balance must be struck between the judiciary and parliament 
themselves. In striking this balance, they will be informed by the respective social status of the 
foundational norms of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law.  
 
Notwithstanding the many ambiguities, two things are clear. Parliament must have an 
inconsistency brought to its attention by the Attorney-General under s 7 and the courts cannot 
strike down legislation because it is inconsistent. For this reason, NZBORA has been referred to 
as a ‘parliamentary’ bill of rights. There was an expectation among the populace and the drafters 
that Parliament would take its role under NZBORA seriously, put aside politics and not enact 
legislation which is inconsistent with rights. After NZBORA’s enactment the courts interpreted their 
role in policing Parliament’s decisions under NZBORA narrowly. For this reason, as at 1990, the 
balance was tipped towards Parliament and its sovereignty in that Parliament was expected to 
take on the primary role in rights protection.  
 
As I will establish in this chapter, Parliament has failed to live up to expectations and safeguard 
rights as expected in 1990 with the passage of NZBORA. The reasons for this failure arise from 
four characteristics of the legislative process. First, the residual dominance of the executive under 
MMP, which means that most of the rights scrutiny occurs at the Cabinet stage rather than by 
Parliament. Secondly, the lack of a specialized select committee to manage rights issues. Thirdly, 
the fact that MMP means that a number of inconsistencies arise after a bill’s introduction and when 
the time for formal rights scrutiny has passed. And finally, Parliament’s complacency towards the 
rights of particular groups of society which are not politically popular. I use the example of the 
rights of persons convicted or suspected of crimes to illustrate this complacency. There are few 
political points to be gained from protection of such members of society and, as such, their rights 
are often neglected. In short, this chapter concludes that parliament has failed to fulfil the role 
assigned to it under NZBORA and, as such, the balance needs to shift to allow the courts and the 




Parliament’s failure to safeguard human rights   
As discussed in the previous chapter, Parliament was given responsibility under NZBORA to 
safeguard human rights. Even on a narrow reading of s 3, Parliament is subject to a political or 
moral duty not to enact legislation which is inconsistent with rights. However, in my view, it is under 
both a political and statutory duty not to do so. Regardless of which is correct, the fact remains 
that parliament is obligated, whether legally or morally, to act consistently with rights. As NZBORA 
is a parliamentary bill of rights and there is no express ability for the courts to strike down 
legislation, the task falls predominantly to parliament to scope rights in legislation. It must, however, 
do so in a way which is consistent with NZBORA. Often, Parliament fails to fulfil the significant role 
which it was given under NZBORA and it has, on a number of occasions, enacted legislation 
despite clear inconsistencies with rights.  
 
Section 7 Reporting  
The primary mechanism used by parliament to ensure legislation is rights-consistent is the s 7 
process. Section 7 requires the Attorney-General to report to the House of Representatives any 
inconsistency with the rights in NZBORA. This duty arises upon the introduction of Government 
Bills to the House, and as soon as practicable after introduction for Members’ Bills.  
Section 7 states that:257  
Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General shall,— 
(a) in the case of a Government Bill, on the introduction of that Bill; or 
(b) in any other case, as soon as practicable after the introduction of the Bill,— 
bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill that appears to 
be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights. 
 
The reasoning behind s 7 is that where a Bill has the effect of breaching NZBORA rights, “the 
House must know that this is occurring and give proper consideration to proposed legislation in 
that light.”258 Parliament’s response to a s 7 report is dictated by Parliament itself. Courts have 
been clear that they will not intervene in such matters.259 The courts have noted that Parliament is 
empowered to legislate inconsistently with NZBORA, effectively adopting the weak account of 
NZBORA.260 It is not for the courts to “frustrate that legislative ability.”261 Justice McGechan noted 
that “if content of legislation offends, the remedies are political and ultimately electoral. The fact 
that those alternatives seem momentarily difficult, indeed unreal, to particular persons, or to those 
espousing unpopular cases, is no more than a dark side of democracy.”262  The Court has held 
that interfering in the s 7 process would interfere with the proceedings of Parliament, contrary to 
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the principle of non-interference established by article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1688 and, now, the 
Parliamentary Privilege Act 2014.263 The courts have also noted that as this power was given to 
the Attorney-General by Parliament, it does not fall to the courts to substitute their view for that of 
the Attorney-General. In Mangawhai Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association Inc v Kaipara DC, 
the High Court noted that:264  
In an environment where there is room for genuine differences of view, we remind ourselves 
that Parliament entrusted the s 7 judgment and reporting obligation to the Attorney-General, 
not to the courts. The objective of s 7 is to ensure that Parliament has the benefit of the Attorney-
General’s assessment. There may be room for different views, but the view which Parliament 
is to be provided with under s 7 is the genuinely held view of the Attorney General whether 
others consider that view to be right or wrong. 
 
As at June 2020, 78 s 7 reports have been issued since NZBORA’s enactment. For 40 of these, 
Parliament passed the Bill notwithstanding the fact that it contained an unjustified inconsistency 
reported by the Attorney-General. There is currently one Bill before the House subject to a s 7 
report: the Smokefree Environments and Regulated Products (Vaping) Amendment Bill 2020 
(which is unjustifiably inconsistent with the freedom of expression).  
 
Since 1990, Sir Geoffrey has become increasingly skeptical about Parliament’s ability to rise to the 
challenge and safeguard rights. In 2006, he made a keynote speech entitled “The Bill of Rights 
Fifteen Years On” in which he noted there were some examples of inconsistent legislation, but he 
maintained an air of optimism and underlined the lengths that Parliament goes to in order to ensure 
consistency.265 However, in 2016, he wrote an article that was tellingly entitled “What the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act Aimed to Do, Why it Did Not Succeed and How It Can Be Repaired”.266 
Sir Geoffrey arrived at the conclusion that Parliament “does not examine rights issues sufficiently 
thoroughly and indeed lacks mechanisms to do so.”267 
 
Similarly, Waldron has suggested that Parliament engages in reckless law-making.268 He suggests 
that this recklessness arises because of factors such as powers of urgency and a lack of checks 
and balances on Parliament.269 He also suggests that Parliament is becoming a place of “political 
posturing” and endorses Joseph’s view that the debating chamber has become a place where 
members state their political position without any expectation that their position will change anyone 
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else’s.270 If parliamentary debates are simply an avenue for declaring one’s position, the prospect 
of a s 7 report having a real and tangible effect on legislation is slim at best. Petra and Andrew 
Butler, while arguing that the s 7 report plays an important role, likewise accept that the reporting 
process is deficient in a number of ways.271 The fact that Parliament has proceeded with an 
inconsistent bill in over half of the instances where a s 7 report has been made, in breach of a 
statutory (or at least) political duty calls into question parliament’s competency to fulfil its role under 
NZBORA.  
 
Why has Parliament failed to safeguard human rights?  
I suggest that Parliament’s failure to ensure consistency with rights and breach of its duty under s 
3 of NZBORA is attributable to four characteristics of the legislative process:  
1. executive dominance within the legislative process;  
2. lack of expertise in the Select Committee process;  
3. inconsistencies arising after introduction; and  
4. complacency towards rights protection as it relates to certain ‘unpopular’ groups of society.  
Executive dominance  
One of the significant trends which emerges from this analysis of Parliament’s scrutiny of legislation 
for consistency with human rights is the dominance of the executive in the process. While the 
NZBORA was enacted as a “parliamentary bill of rights”, it is the executive, not Parliament, that 
performs the majority of the rights scrutiny. In an ideal world, such scrutiny should occur at the 
early stages of a Bill’s existence. In New Zealand’s legislative process, the vast majority of Bills 
are Government Bills, which means they are scrutinised from the policy phase by the executive in 
Cabinet and by the Ministry of Justice and/or the Crown Law Office, with the Attorney-General then 
responsible for formulating any s 7 report.  
All Bills begin as policy. In the case of Government Bills, where it becomes apparent that legislation 
is required to give effect to the policy, the responsible Minister will make a bid for a place on the 
Government’s legislation programme. The Cabinet Office periodically invites Ministers to submit 
proposals for Bills to be included in the legislation programme. When making a bid for a place on 
the programme, Ministers must confirm that the Bill arising from the policy will comply with legal 
principles –  for example, the Treaty principles, NZBORA, the Human Rights Act 1993, the Privacy 
Act 1993, international obligations and Guidance from the Legislative Design and Advisory 
Committee.272 On the basis of this information, the Cabinet Legislation Committee will determine 
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the Government’s legislation programme and the priority categorisation of each proposed Bill. If 
the proposed Bill is included in the legislation programme, the relevant department will continue 
development of the policy basis for the Bill. This will involve drafting a Cabinet paper. Various 
guidelines then apply to the drafting of Cabinet papers. For example, the CabGuide notes that 
“when developing policy proposals, consideration must be given to their consistency with the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993”.273 The CabGuide recommends 
that departments, in developing their Cabinet papers, consult with agencies that have experience 
in human rights issues such as the Ministry of Justice and/or the Crown Law Office.274 The Cabinet 
paper template includes a heading called ‘human rights’ which requires policy papers that have 
implications for human rights to include a statement about whether the proposal is in any way 
inconsistent with NZBORA or the HRA. It also recommends that the paper notes the steps that 
have been taken to address these issues.275 The Ministry of Justice is consulted on policy 
proposals leading to legislation to ensure consistency with NZBORA and the Human Rights Act 
1993.  
 
Once the Cabinet paper is prepared, it is referred to Cabinet who determine whether the policy in 
its current form is ready to be drafted into a Bill. When the department has Cabinet’s approval to 
begin drafting, it will either draft the Bill itself or instruct the Parliamentary Counsel Office (PCO). 
At any point in the process, before introduction to Parliament, the responsible department can 
approach the Legislation Design and Advisory Committee (LDAC) for advice. The LDAC’s 
mandate includes:276  
1. providing advice to departments in the development of policy and legislation to identify public 
and constitutional law issues;  
2. publishing Guidelines which are endorsed by Cabinet; and  
3. scrutinising Government Bills that come before Parliament.  
Chapter 6 of the LDAC Guidelines note the importance of ensuring that legislation is consistent 
with NZBORA. The Guidelines note that inconsistency can have serious consequences including 
placing New Zealand at risk of breaching its international human rights obligations and may result 
in the courts declaring “the existence of the inconsistency in their judgments”.277  
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Chapter 6 applies the approach in Hansen to determining whether the inconsistency is justified 
under s 5 of NZBORA. It breaks down the test in Hansen and recommends that drafters and policy 
makers ask the following questions when faced with a possible inconsistency:278  
(a) Does the proposed limit on the right serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify limiting the 
right?  
(b) Is the limiting provision connected to its purpose?  
(c) Does the proposed limit impair the right no more than is reasonably necessary for sufficient 
achievement of its purpose?  
(d) Is the limit proportionate to the importance of the objective?  
As discussed in Chapter VI, the approach in Hansen is problematic as the emphasis is placed on 
the limit rather than the right, which is fundamentally at odds with the spirit and purpose of 
NZBORA. This approach means that an inconsistency may not be identified because the starting 
point is to ask “what is the right as limited by the Bill?” and then “is this limit justified?” rather than 
“what is the most rights consistent interpretation?” and then “is there a remaining limit and is that 
limit justified?” During the Bill drafting process, the Cabinet Manual specifies that the Ministry of 
Justice should be consulted so it can vet Bills for consistency with NZBORA.279 However, Bills 
developed by the Ministry of Justice are vetted by the Crown Law Office.280 All final versions of 
Government Bills must be referred to the Ministry of Justice the Crown Law Office for vetting at 
least two weeks in advance of the Cabinet meeting on that Bill. This timeframe allows one week 
for the Ministry (or Crown Law Office) to prepare its advice for the Attorney-General on the Bill and 
one week for the Attorney-General to produce their advice before the Cabinet meeting.281  
 
Following this the final version of the draft Bill will be referred to the Cabinet Legislation Committee 
for consideration. Under the Cabinet Manual, before a Bill is submitted to the Cabinet Legislation 
Committee, the responsible Minister must confirm in the covering submission that the draft Bill 
complies with the Treaty principles, NZBORA and HRA, the Privacy Act 1993, international 
obligations and the LDAC Guidelines.282 Once the bill has been approved for introduction to 
Parliament, it may be introduced on any working day or by 1pm on any sitting day. 283  On the 
introduction of a Government Bill to Parliament, the Attorney-General must provide their section 7 
report.  
 
However, this pre-introduction scrutiny by the executive does not apply to Members’ Bills. 
Members’ Bills are drafted and proposed on the instruction of a Member of Parliament. The rules 
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governing Members’ Bills are found in the Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 
2017.284 As per the Standing Orders, Members’ Bills can be proposed by any Member of 
Parliament, except current Ministers.285 As they are proposed by individual Members, these Bills 
can cover any topic with the proviso that the Government may veto any Member’s Bill if it would 
have a “more than minor” effect on the Government’s fiscal policy if it became law.286 Members’ 
Bills do not have the benefit of being subject to the various policy vets before and during drafting. 
They are drafted by the Member themselves, a privately engaged lawyer, or with assistance from 
the Office of the Clerk Legal Services Team. Generally, after the Bill is drafted it will be referred to 
the individual Member’s party caucus to ensure that it is consistent with the party’s overall policy 
goals. This also gives the member an opportunity to canvas potential support for the bill from its 
own caucus.287 Members’ Bills often do not make it past their first reading.288 Members’ Bills may 
be adopted by Government, although this has not occurred often. This is because any topics 
supported by Government will generally be included on the Legislation Programme so that they 
may be subject to vetting by Cabinet and become a Government Bill. For the government to adopt 
a Member’s Bill, the policy basis for the Bill would have to be consistent with the Legislative 
Programme and be deemed by the current Government to have enough importance to garner its 
support but not be so important and necessary as to have warranted the Government introducing 
a Government Bill from the outset. Only a small number of Bills will fit this description.289  
 
On the one hand, by comparing the experience of Members’ Bills and Government Bills, it is clear 
that the executive plays an important role in rights scrutiny. Roughly 49% of bills subject to a 
section 7 report have been Members’ or private Bills. However, Members’ Bills are by far the 
minority of Bills introduced to the House (only about 21 per cent of current Bills before the House 
are private or Members’ Bills). This indicates that those Bills which have been through rights 
scrutiny by Cabinet are less likely to be prima facie inconsistent with NZBORA. However, placing 
such faith in the executive to carry out the rights scrutiny is not what was intended by NZBORA, 
nor is it without risk. It means that, where legislation is inconsistent with rights, but is consistent 
with governmental policy, it is more likely to be pushed through the Cabinet process despite its 
inconsistency.  
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Select Committee process  
 
The second characteristic of our legislative process which prevents effective scrutiny of rights is 
the lack of expertise in our select committee process. In 1977, Sir Geoffrey Palmer famously 
described New Zealand’s legislature as the “fastest law-makers in the west”.290 He has since noted 
that while the introduction of MMP means we may no longer retain that uncontested title, the 
“situation remains unsatisfactory”.291 Here, Sir Geoffrey refers to the level of scrutiny of legislation 
as it moves through the legislative process.  
 
Select Committees scrutinise all legislation referred to them by the House. We currently have 12 
subject select committees and five specialist committees. Once a Bill is referred to a select 
committee, generally the committee will advertise for public submissions. This public involvement 
in the select committee process is critical to allow the select committee to adequately scrutinise 
legislation.292 In 2014, the Standing Orders were amended to provide that the s 7 report is formally 
referred to the select committee.293 This was a significant change as, previously, the s 7 report 
was available to the select committee but was not referred to formally. In 2016, Geddis noted that 
the evidence to date gave “cautious reason for hope” that SO 265 would “at least sometimes result 
in parliamentary revisions of the government’s legislative proposals”.294 However, there is debate 
about whether select committees adequately fulfil their role within the legislative process. Burrows 
and Joseph295 have described select committees as “a crucial bastion of democracy” whereas Sir 
Geoffrey has argued, based on his experience chairing the Legislation Advisory Committee, that 
improving Bills via select committee scrutiny does not permit some issues that need to be address 
to be dealt with as it is too late by that stage.296 In 2019, a Law Foundation research project 
confirmed Sir Geoffrey’s anecdotal claim and concluded (based on interviews with Members of 
Parliament, parliamentary officials and five case studies) that select committee scrutiny of human 
rights is “weak” and “ad hoc”.297  
 
Often, select committees do not have the appropriate expertise to deal with rights-based issues. 
New Zealand does not have a specialised select committee to conduct a rights analysis. Rights 
issues are considered by the Justice and Electoral Committee which also considers constitutional, 
                                                     
290 Geoffrey Palmer "Fastest Law-Makers in the West" New Zealand Listener (New Zealand, 28 May 1977).  
291 Geoffrey Palmer “Law Making in NZ - Is There a Better Way?” (The Harkness Henry Lecture, University of 
Waikato, 10 September 2014) at 7. 
292 Elizabeth McLeay "Scrutiny and Capacity: An evaluation of the parliamentary committees in the New Zealand 
Parliament" (2006) 21 APR 158 ["Scrutiny and Capacity"] at 170 
293 Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2014, SO 265; see also Standing Orders Committee 
Review of Standing Orders 2014 AJHR I.18A at 15.   
294 Andrew Geddis “Rights Scrutiny in New Zealand’s Legislative Process” (2016) 4 TPL 355 at 377.  
295 JF Burrows and PA Joseph "Parliamentary Law Making" [1990] NZULR 306 at 307 
296 Geoffrey Palmer “Law Making in NZ - Is There a Better Way?” (The Harkness Henry Lecture, University of 
Waikato, 10 September 2014) at 13. 
297 Judy McGregor and Margaret Wilson Parliamentary Scrutiny of Human Rights in New Zealand: Glass Half 
Full? (Law Foundation, AUT University/University of Waikato, 2019) at 119.  
70 
 
electoral, justice, courts, crime and criminal law issues. This is a wide range of issues which it does 
not necessarily have the expertise to cover. For example, the issues arising in criminal matters 
may require quite distinct expertise from the issues arising where rights are concerned. It also 
means that where the focus falls within two of those categories, for example, crime and human 
rights, adequate consideration may be applied to one but not the other. It may not be clear cut 
which select committee is appropriate. For example, the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced 
Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010 was referred to the Law and Order Committee rather than the 
Justice and Electoral Committee (whose ambit included rights issues). The Government held a 
majority on the Law and Order Committee who declined advice from the Ministry of Justice and 
instead relied on officials from the Department of Corrections. At the end of this process, the 
Amendment Act was enacted despite a s 7 report noting an inconsistency with the right to vote. At 
a bare minimum, for the select committee process to work, the committee must have the correct 
expertise to deal with rights issues.  
 
Since 1988, there have been suggestions of establishing a separate Select Committee to consider 
rights issues. Comparable jurisdictions have established specialised Select Committees for 
inquiring into human rights issues. In 2001, the UK established the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights to consider “matters relating to human rights within the UK, as well as scrutinising every 
Government Bill for its compatibility with human rights.”298 The same year, Canada established its 
Senate Standing Committee on Human Rights which monitors the development of legislation and 
policy at the federal level.299 Australia similarly has the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Rights to examine Bills for compatibility with international human rights standards. In both 2011 
and 2014, the Human Rights Commission advocated for a human rights committee.300 However, 
this was rejected in the review of the Standing Orders which said that “we do not favour the 
establishment of a separate select committee to look at rights matters.”301 Based on the review of 
Standing Orders and the decrease in the number of Select Committees from 14 to 12 in 2014, it 
appears unlikely that a specialised Human Rights Committee will be established in the near future. 
If a specialised Select Committee is established, there will need to be careful consideration of 
when in the legislative process referral to such a committee should occur.  
 
I suggest that it would be most appropriate for referral to such a committee to occur in addition to 
referral to the committee under whose mandate the Bill’s substance falls. For example, a Bill on 
electoral reform would be considered by the Justice Select Committee and then the Human Rights 
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Committee. This would enable the benefit of subject matter experts in both rights as well as the 
main subject area of the Bill. This order is also appropriate as it would allow any substantive 
changes made by the relevant subject matter select committee to also be caught by the Human 
Rights Committee.  
 
Inconsistencies arising after introduction  
The third characteristic which impedes Parliament’s ability to enact rights consistent legislation is 
the fact that inconsistencies often arise after a Bill’s introduction. As discussed earlier, the s 7 
reporting obligation is not a continuing one; it only arises once. 302 However, in an MMP 
environment, negotiation post-introduction and, as Butler terms it, “horse-trading”, is common.303 
It is necessary for governments to get support of other members of the House in order to pass 
their legislative agenda. To do this, they often have to make changes to Bills by Supplementary 
Order Papers (SOPs) during the legislative process. Any amendments by way of SOP are not 
subject to any formal NZBORA vet. Government SOPs are expected to follow the same process 
of rights scrutiny as Government legislation.304 Notwithstanding this expectation, the use of SOPs 
has led to inconsistent legislation being enacted.  
 
An example of this is the Criminal Justice Amendment Act (No 2) 1999 (CJAA 1999) and the 
Crimes (Home Invasion) Amendment Act 1999 (CAA 1999). The CAA 1999 inserted a definition 
of “home invasion” into the Crimes Act 1961 and increased the maximum penalties for specified 
offences involving home invasion. However, by virtue of s 10A of the Crimes Act, the CAA 1999 
could not be applied retrospectively.  
 
The CJAA 1999 amended s 80 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 to include a minimum non-parole 
period of 13 years for murder involving home invasion. Further, s 2(4) of the CJAA 1999 provided 
that:305  
 
Section 80 of the principal Act (as amended by this section) applies in respect of the making of 
any order under that section on or after the date of commencement of this section, even if the 
offence was committed before that date. 
  
Section 2(4) was, therefore, expressly retrospective. It also created an inconsistency with s 4(2) of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1985 which stated that:306  
 
Without limiting subsection (1) of this section, except as provided in subsections 152(1) and 
155(1) of this Act but notwithstanding any other enactment or rule of law to the contrary, no 
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304 Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2017 at [7.72].  
305 Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1999, section 2(4).  
306 Criminal Justice Act 1985, section 4(2).  
72 
 
court shall have power, on the conviction of an offender of any offence, to impose any sentence 
or make any order in the nature of a penalty that it could not have imposed on or made against 
the offender at the time of the commission of the offence, except with the offender’s consent.  
 
In this case, the legislation was amended by SOP agreed to by Parliament at the Committee of the 
Whole House phase and, accordingly, there was no NZBORA vet which would have identified the 
inconsistency.  As will be discussed in the next chapter, this legislation was criticised by New 
Zealand’s highest Court at the time in R v Pora307 and R v Poumako.308  
 
Complacency towards particular groups  
The final characteristic of our legislative process which explains Parliament’s willingness to enact 
legislation which is inconsistent with rights is an apparent complacency towards protecting the 
rights of groups which are politically unpopular.  
 
An example of this, which is discussed further in the next chapter, is the Electoral (Disqualification 
of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010. In 1993, prisoners were re-enfranchised if they 
were serving a sentence of less than three years. However, Paul Quinn MP, then a National MP, 
held the view that, as prisoners had breached the social contract by committing a crime, they were 
not entitled to vote. He introduced a Member’s Bill which would place a blanket ban on prisoner 
voting in general elections where the prisoner was sentenced after 17 December 2010. The 
National Party subsequently adopted and supported the Bill. The report by the Department of 
Corrections to the Select Committee noted that there was a risk that the judiciary would challenge 
the consistency of the Bill with NZBORA. This concern proved to be justified as the High Court, 
and subsequently the Supreme Court, declared the section introduced by the Amendment Act 
inconsistent with NZBORA in Taylor v Attorney General,309 which is discussed in detail in the 
following chapter. 
 
The Attorney-General issued a s 7 report on the Amendment Act which found that the Bill was 
unjustifiably inconsistent with NZBORA:310  
 
The blanket ban on prisoner voting is both under and over inclusive. It is under inclusive 
because a prisoner convicted of a serious violent offence who serves a two and a half year 
sentence in prison between general elections will be able to vote. It is over inclusive because 
someone convicted and given a one-week sentence that coincided with a general election 
would be unable to vote. The provision does not impair the right to vote as minimally as 
reasonably possible as it disenfranchises in an irrational and irregular manner. 
[…] 
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The disenfranchising provisions of this Bill will depend entirely on the date of sentencing, which 
bears no relationship either to the objective of the Bill or to the conduct of the prisoners whose 
voting rights are taken away. The irrational effects of the Bill also cause it to be disproportionate 
to its objective. 
 
This report and all the red flags were ignored by Parliament. In my view, this is attributable not to 
a lack of understanding by parliament of the importance of rights but rather to an unwillingness to 
take steps to protect rights of groups which are politically unpopular. For example, in 2017, in the 
context of a crackdown on drug crime, National spokesperson for drug reform, Hon Paula Bennett 
went as far as saying that serious criminals should have fewer human rights than others.311 Since 
2000, there have been 11 Bills subject to section 7 reports which both touch on the rights of 
persons convicted of crimes and were passed by Parliament despite their inconsistency.312 No 
other group of society has been subject to as much inconsistent legislation. This is principally due 
to the position occupied by prisoner rights as third rail politics. Parliament is willing to push through 
legislation which may be inconsistent with the rights of this group despite its inconsistency.  
 
Parliament is beholden to its voters. This was a reason put forward for deferring to Parliament on 
rights issues, but I suggest, it is also a reason to be wary of its approach. Members of Parliament 
ultimately crave political survival, in part, by fulfilling campaign promises and their party’s legislative 
agenda. A legislative agenda which breaches the rights of a politically unpopular group is less 
likely to be abandoned because the party will weigh up fulfilling a political promise against 
protection of the rights of those who are unpopular within society. The former is likely to be the 
priority, but  the latter is insidious. Where the branch of government which has primary 
responsibility for rights protection starts making value judgments about who is and is not deserving 
of rights, the entire system of rights is in jeopardy.  
 
As a society we agree on the right to vote in the abstract but defer to the branches of the 
government to determine the scope and application of that right. The rights declared in NZBORA 
exist with or without the legislation as they have a societal acceptance. However, in order to protect 
those rights, the scope and application must be determined by someone. In NZBORA, it was 
determined that Parliament would have primary responsibility for scoping and applying rights.  
However, the scope and application of rights is necessarily a legal and not political question. If the 
scope or limitation of a right is a political question, in a democracy, it becomes dictated by the 
majority and minority rights fall by the wayside. For this reason, the question of whether a right to 
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vote exists in the abstract is one of societal consensus but it must be a legal question how that 
right is applied, scoped and limited in practice. Otherwise, minority rights are the ones which will 
suffer.  
 
Where Parliament’s opinion on this is coloured by political considerations, which is often is, it is 
critical that a second layer exists to check and balance parliament’s view of which limitations are 
justified. Even the drafter of NZBORA, Sir Geoffrey, has acknowledged that he was perhaps overly 
optimistic about parliament’s ability to put aside politics to protect rights.313  
 
Conclusion  
Parliament has not fulfilled the role it was expected to fill when NZBORA was passed. It has, on a 
number of occasions, enacted legislation which is inconsistent with human rights and, arguably, in 
breach of its statutory duty under s 3 of NZBORA. It has done so because of certain features of 
the legislative system which make the possibility of inconsistencies more likely. These include 
executive dominance, lack of expertise in the select committee process, the use of SOPs and 
complacency towards the rights of groups who are not politically popular. Rights are not absolute 
and must be limited in some circumstances. How and when these limitations should occur is to be 
determined by the branches of government, or on a traditional reading of NZBORA, by Parliament. 
However, Parliament has shown itself unable to fulfil this significant task alone. This is in part 
because of the nature of our legislative process but also because Parliament’s opinions are 
coloured by political survival. The influence of politics means that a shift in the balance is 
necessary. It is necessary that the Courts intervene but this will only be possible where the rule of 
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JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF RIGHTS 
 
Introduction  
Despite New Zealand’s historic deference to Parliament to enact legislation consistently with rights, 
Parliament has demonstrated an inability to rise to the challenge. This is, in part, due to 
characteristics of the legislative process but also because of its ultimate goal of political survival 
which often results in politically unpopular groups being left unprotected. As discussed in Chapter 
VII, the influence of politics in rights protection is problematic. While rights exist in the abstract by 
consensus amongst the public, the matter of scoping, applying and limiting those rights must be a 
legal question. If politics are able to influence this question, minority rights will not be protected as 
the example of prisoner rights illustrates.   
 
As Parliament has failed to fulfil the role ascribed to it under NZBORA, another branch must 
necessarily step in to ensure that the rule of law is preserved. Judges have the necessary expertise 
and are well placed to fill this role. However, as discussed in Chapter VI, the judiciary’s role under 
NZBORA is ambiguous. This means that the extent to which judges are willing to check Parliament 
depends ultimately on the status of the social norms. Where the rule of law gains a degree of 
dominance, judges are less likely to constrain themselves. The social rules drive and inform the 
application of the legal rules.  
 
NZBORA’s early history was characterised by judicial caution around their role and an adherence 
to parliamentary sovereignty. However, this caution is not as absolute as it once was. In this 
chapter, I suggest that the use of declarations of inconsistency in the Taylor case illustrates that a 
shift has occurred in the dominance of the rule of law and how judges understand their role within 
the system of rights protection.  
 
I also suggest that judges should build on the momentum created by Taylor to change their 
approach to value-based interpretation through s 6 and the principle of legality. Historically, judges 
have approached value-based interpretation with significant nervousness due to loyalty to 
parliamentary sovereignty. I suggest that it is time judges recognised the normative shift and 




A Fundamental Shift in Rights Protection: Declarations of Inconsistency  
 
Initial Approach  
For most of NZBORA’s history, declarations of inconsistency were left as an untapped weapon 
potentially available under NZBORA in the right circumstances. NZBORA does not expressly allow 
or prevent courts from formally declaring a provision inconsistent with NZBORA as there is no 
remedies section in the legislation.314 Judges have been left to define and scope their own role in 
respect of remedies for breaches of human rights.315  
 
Early in the NZBORA’s history, judges confirmed that they had the power to issue damages for 
breaches of human rights.316 The Court of Appeal in Simpson v Attorney General [Baigent’s Case] 
explored the extent of the Court’s remedial powers in relation to NZBORA breaches. In Baigent’s 
Case, the Court held that damages were available as a remedy for breaches of NZBORA by the 
Crown.317 President Cooke noted that NZBORA was enacted in part to affirm New Zealand’s 
commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).318 Article 2(3) of 
the ICCPR requires each member to state to ensure that there are effective remedies for violations 
of rights. Under the ICCPR, New Zealand citizens may access the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee for violations of rights. Justice Casey in Baigent’s Case noted that it would be strange 
if Parliament intended New Zealand citizens to have to access the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee to remedy a breach rather than seek remedies from their own domestic Courts.319  
 
In 1992, Professor Brookfield suggested that s 4 of NZBORA did not prevent a Court from declaring 
that an enactment unreasonably limited rights.320 Cooke referred to Brookfield’s article in an early 
NZBORA case and noted that such declarations could be seen as gratuitous criticism of Parliament 
but may be necessary to uphold the NZBORA’s rights guarantee.321  For some time, Cooke was 
the only judge who appeared willing to explore this supervisory role of the judiciary.  
 
The idea of declarations of inconsistency was not revisited until 1998 in Quilter v Attorney 
General.322 Justice Thomas, in his dissenting judgment, concluded that the legislation in question 
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was inconsistent with NZBORA and it would be impossible for the Court to use s 6 to avoid the 
inconsistency. However, he stopped short of making a formal order declaring the inconsistency.323  
 
In Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review a unanimous Court of Appeal noted that if a 
limitation on a right was not justified, the Court may “declare” this to be so.324 This statement could 
have been interpreted as confirmation by the Court that there is jurisdiction to issue formal 
declarations of inconsistency. However, in another part of the judgment, the Court refer to the 
same “declaration” as a “judicial indication”.325 This interchangeable use of the word “declare” and 
“indicate” suggests that it is more likely the Court meant “declare” in the lay sense rather than in 
the legal and remedial sense. This interpretation of the Court’s reasoning was applied by O’Regan 
J in Boscawen v Attorney General where the Court noted in obiter that Judges are not well placed 
to give opinions without a specific factual background to assess the inconsistencies.326  
 
Following Moonen, a series of cases addressed the procedural question of whether an application 
for a declaration of inconsistency could be made where it had not been sought in the Court of first 
instance.327 However, these cases did not address the substantive question of whether the 
jurisdiction existed in any depth. In Hansen, McGrath J noted that the Court had a responsibility to 
“indicate” that a rights-consistent approach could not be found using interpretative principles. 
However, he noted that such an “indication” would usually be apparent from the Court’s 
reasoning.328  
 
In 2009, Professor Geiringer concluded that “prospects for a formal remedial jurisdiction are poor” 
and New Zealand Courts’ were likely to continue their “tentative” approach to a rights dialogue in 
the absence of an express remedial jurisdiction to issue declarations of inconsistency.329 Her 
analysis was strengthened by the fact that, around the time of Geiringer’s article, the Courts had 
proved unwilling to issue declarations of inconsistency, leaving the outlook for a declaratory 
remedial jurisdiction looking bleak.330 However, after many years of cautious analysis, in 2015, the 
High Court issued its first remedial declaration of inconsistency with NZBORA in Taylor v Attorney 
General.331 
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Taylor v Attorney-General  
In Taylor v Attorney-General, the Court declared the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced 
Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010 inconsistent with NZBORA. Under the Electoral Act 1993 (the 
Act), prisoners sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three years or more were prohibited from 
voting. In 2010, the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Act (the 
Amendment), the same Amendment assessed in Ngaronoa, came into force and extended the 
prohibition on voting to all prisoners.332 As discussed in Chapter VII, the Attorney General issued 
a s 7 Report which noted that the effect of the Amendment Bill to disenfranchise all convicted 
persons detained in prison on election day was inconsistent with NZBORA.333 The Attorney 
General acknowledged that the right to vote is not an absolute one. However, the blanket ban 
envisioned by the Amendment Bill could not be justified because it was not rationally connected to 
the objective of the Bill. The objective of the Bill appeared to be to disenfranchise serious offenders, 
but it was “questionable that every person serving a sentence of imprisonment is necessarily a 
serious offender.”334 The Bill would operate to arbitrarily disenfranchise citizens based entirely on 
their date of sentencing, which was unrelated to the seriousness of their offences.335  
 
In 2015, a group of five prisoners, including Arthur Taylor, argued in the High Court that the 
amended s 80(1)(d) unjustifiably limited the NZBORA s 12(a) guarantee that all adult New Zealand 
citizens possess the right to vote. They applied for a formal declaration of inconsistency from the 
High Court, with that application heard by Heath J. There were two issues: first, whether the High 
Court has jurisdiction to issue remedial declarations of inconsistency; and, second, whether a 
declaration was necessary in this case.336  
 
The applicants argued that the Court can fashion appropriate remedies to vindicate citizens when 
their rights are violated.337 The Attorney General argued that a jurisdiction to issue declarations of 
inconsistency would be incongruent with judicial function in New Zealand as it would amount to an 
advisory opinion.338 The Attorney General interpreted Hansen as prohibiting the Court from going 
further than indicating inconsistency. In making this argument, the Attorney General said that 
McGarth J stopped short of saying a Court had a responsibility to declare an inconsistency, instead 
noting that normally a Court’s view of an inconsistency will be “sufficiently apparent from the 
Court’s reasoning.”339   
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Justice Heath assessed the Attorney General’s argument about jurisdiction by assessing various 
academic articles. He particularly focused on Rishworth, who viewed the judicial function as 
including making decisions about the constitutional significance of NZBORA.340 He also placed 
emphasis on Baigent’s Case and its view that judicial function extended to fashioning appropriate 
remedies to respond to NZBORA breaches.341 Justice Heath also noted that by enacting s 92J of 
the Human Rights Act 1993, Parliament had given the Human Rights Review Tribunal the power 
to issue formal declarations of inconsistency in relation to s 19 of NZBORA. Justice Heath found it 
difficult to believe that Parliament would intend to endow a Tribunal with this function but not a 
Court of higher jurisdiction.342 Accordingly, Heath J found that the jurisdiction to issue declarations 
of inconsistency existed.343  
 
Justice Heath also held that a declaration should be issued in this case. He noted that the 
inconsistency arose in relation to the most fundamental aspect of a democracy. He rejected the 
Attorney General’s argument that such a declaration would breach the principle of comity. He noted 
that his role was to declare the true legal position, and he was not concerned with the political 
consequences of his decision.344 The Attorney General appealed this decision to the Court of 
Appeal on the basis that the Court had no jurisdiction issue such a declaration. The appeal was 
heard by Kós P, Randerson, Wild, French and Miller JJ, and a unanimous judgment was given by 
Wild and Miller JJ in 2017. The Court considered when and why a Court might go further than a 
‘Hansen indication’ and issue a declaration of inconsistency. A ‘Hansen indication’ describes the 
situation where the Court uses the interpretative method described in the previous part but is 
unable to ‘cure’ the inconsistency fully and, from its reasoning, it becomes clear that there is an 
inconsistency. The Court of Appeal focused their analysis on the dialogical nature human rights.345 
Their Honours considered that a Hansen indication would ordinarily be enough to trigger an 
expectation that the other branches of government would respond.346 However, the Court also 
noted that the power to issue a declaration exists and should be left as discretionary for the 
Court.347  
 
The Court of Appeal distinguished between Mr Taylor and the other prisoners. As Mr Taylor’s rights 
were not affected by the 2010 Act, the Crown should have been attentive to the issue of 
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standing.348 With regard to the other prisoners, the Court found that Heath J had the power to issue 
a declaration and was right to exercise his discretion to do so.349  
 
The Attorney-General then appealed the matter to the Supreme Court and the case was heard by 
Glazebrook, Ellen France, William Young, O’Regan JJ and Elias CJ.350 The Human Rights 
Commission were given leave to appear as intervener. The Respondents cross-appealed the 
Court of Appeal’s decision that Mr Taylor did not have standing. The majority judgment of Ellen 
France and Glazebrook JJ, rejecting the appeal and upholding the cross-appeal, was given by 
Ellen France J.351 Elias CJ concurred with Ellen France and Glazebrook JJ’s conclusion but added 
her own additional reasoning to the majority judgment.352 William Young and O’Regan JJ would 
have upheld both the appeal and the cross-appeal and held that the Court did not have jurisdiction 
to issue a declaration of inconsistency under NZBORA.353 
 
The Attorney-General’s submissions were based around two main arguments. First, that NZBORA 
did not envisage the power to issue declarations of inconsistency, and second, that such a power 
would be inconsistent with judicial function in New Zealand.354 After tracing the common law history 
of declarations of inconsistency, Ellen France J addressed each of these arguments in turn.355  
 
The majority rejected the argument that NZBORA did not envisage the power to issue declarations 
of inconsistency and noted that a remedial declaratory power was the next logical step from the 
case law. The settled position from this case law is that an effective remedy must be made 
available for any breaches of NZBORA.356 Baigent’s Case makes clear that the Courts must draw 
upon a range of ordinary remedies to provide an effective remedy for breaches of NZBORA. This 
aspect of NZBORA is reflected in Article 2 of the ICCPR. Justice Ellen France noted that, in this 
case, there is no effective remedy other than a declaration. Further, she noted that unless granting 
such a remedy would be at-odds with the language of NZBORA, the Courts should provide the 
remedy. 357 The Attorney General argued that the legislative history and language of NZBORA did 
not indicate that such a jurisdiction existed.358 However, Ellen France J rejected this. She 
concluded that the lack of remedies clause in NZBORA was not persuasive and, in doing so, noted 
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that the White Paper said that in most situations where NZBORA was engaged, the Courts would 
be able to provide a remedy from their “present armoury.”359  
 
Justice Ellen France explored the significance of ss 3 and 4 of NZBORA. Section 3 notes that 
NZBORA is applicable to acts done by the legislature. Section 4 clarifies that no Court may declare 
an enactment invalid because of an inconsistency with NZBORA. The Attorney General had 
argued that parliament does not breach individual rights when it enacts inconsistent legislation 
because parliament has changed the individual’s rights by legislating inconsistently.360 Justice 
Ellen France rejected this argument, saying that section 4 preserves parliament’s right to legislate 
inconsistently with NZBORA but that NZBORA remains the standard despite parliament’s decision 
to legislate inconsistently with the standard.361 Justice Ellen France also noted that s 4 leaves open 
the possibility that the Courts may make a formal declaration.362 
 
The Attorney General also argued that a remedial declaratory jurisdiction in the context of 
NZBORA would amount to an advisory opinion and would be inconsistent with judicial function in 
New Zealand. This submission relied on the Court of Appeal’s view that a declaration of 
inconsistent is “not a declaration of right. It determines no legal rights and conveys no legal 
consequences as between the parties.”363  
 
Justice Ellen France did not agree that there would be no consequences from such a remedy.364 
She noted that a declaration of inconsistency would provide a formal confirmation that the 
respondents were persons disqualified to vote by a provision inconsistent with their rights. She 
believed that this would provide the victims of the breach with some level of vindication.365 The 
Attorney General’s argument also relied on the lack of any interpretative dispute in the present 
case, given that all parties accepted that s 80(1)(d) was capable of only one reading. Justice Ellen 
France noted that this would not always be the case, and where there was an interpretation dispute 
a declaration would clarify the interpretation.366 In the context of the ICCPR, Ellen France J noted 
that a declaration may have implications on a complaint made under the Optional Protocol.367  
 
The Attorney General’s arguments about judicial function relied on the case of Momcilovic in which 
a majority of the Australian High Court held that issuing a declaration of inconsistency was not 
within the judicial function conferred by the Australian Constitution Act 1900 (UK). Her Honour 
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rejected this comparison on the basis that the Australian Constitution could be differentiated from 
the New Zealand Constitution as it was established on the basis of a clear separation of powers 
between the branches. Australia was especially strict in terms of the realms of judicial power.368 
As Taggart suggested, the Australian constitution is generally treated as “establishing a firm 
separation of powers between the three branches of government, much stricter than in the [United 
States of America] or Canada.”369  
 
Based on the above, Ellen France J concluded that the High Court had jurisdiction to issue a 
declaration of inconsistency. As the issue on appeal was around jurisdiction, and having found that 
the jurisdiction exists, Ellen France J found there was no basis to disagree with the High Court’s 
exercise of the jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.370  
Justice Ellen France also allowed the cross-appeal on the basis that the 2010 Amendment 
expressly continued the prohibition on voting which affected Mr Taylor, and the case focused on 
the jurisdiction of the Court to make a declaration. Therefore, Mr Taylor had standing to bring it.371  
 
Overall Chief Justice Elias agreed with Ellen France J’s reasoning, and her Honour joined the 
majority. However, Elias CJ issued her own judgment with emphasis on specific points.372 Her 
Honour felt that the Attorney General’s argument that parliament changes fundamental rights by 
legislating inconsistently was “over-ambitious”. She noted that this submission was inconsistent 
with the constitutional position of NZBORA, as well as the principle of legality which requires 
Parliament to expressly rather than impliedly repeal fundamental rights.373  
 
Chief Justice Elias also addressed the Attorney General’s argument that a declaratory jurisdiction 
would be inconsistent with judicial function. In doing so, her Honour rejected the Court of Appeal’s 
view that a declaration of inconsistent is not a declaration of right.374 Chief Justice Elias saw a 
declaration of inconsistency as an obvious remedial response due to s 4.375 She also noted that 
the Attorney-General’s argument was inconsistent with the obligations of the judiciary to provide 
remedies for breaches of NZBORA. Unlike the Court of Appeal, her Honour preferred to shift the 
emphasis of the remedy away from a remedy to assist parliament in its function, and towards a 
remedy for those whose rights had been affected.376 Her Honour also held that this jurisdiction did 
not need to originate in legislation as the powers to issue declarations form a part of the inherent 
jurisdiction of the High Court. She used this reasoning to explain why parliament had enacted 
                                                     
368 SC judgment at [59]-[63].  
369 Michael Taggart. “Australian Exceptionalism in Judicial Review” (2008) 36 FL Rev 1 at 4.  
370 SC judgment at [65]-[67] and [70], per Ellen France J.   
371 SC judgment at [69], per Ellen France J.  
372 SC judgment at [74], per Elias CJ.  
373 SC judgment at [102], per Elias CJ.  
374 SC judgment at [105], per Elias CJ.  
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legislation to empower the Human Rights Review Tribunal with declaratory powers, as they do not 
have inherent jurisdiction.377  
 
Justices William Young and O’Regan issued a relatively soft dissent, given by O’Regan J. The 
Minority did not dispute that the Court had an obligation to provide remedies for breaches of 
NZBORA and that it was open to the Courts to “indicate” an inconsistency. However, their Honours 
preferred to see such indications remain as a “step in the reasoning” rather than a remedy which 
could be brought in a standalone claim.378 The Minority were skeptical that declarations of 
inconsistency could be an effective remedy as they did not believe that a declaration would 
appreciably benefit the victim of the breach. They noted that in overseas jurisdictions where Courts 
had this power, there was some legal consequence of the declaration such as the declaration 
being brought to the attention of the legislature.379 If a declaration was issued without formal 
legislative consequences, there was a risk that the Court would be ignored, and their authority 
within the constitution undermined. In the minority’s view, the declaration would “hang in the air 
and possibly create some sort of moral obligation on the part of the legislature to reconsider.”380 
Despite this, the minority agreed that it could be consistent with judicial function. However, mere 
consistency with judicial function did not create the jurisdiction.381  
 
Taylor is a turning point in judicial rights protection. After nearly 30 years of hesitancy, the Court 
finally concluded that the judiciary has jurisdiction to issue declarations of inconsistency. It also 
rightly rejected the Attorney General’s dubious argument that Parliament changes rights by 
legislating inconsistently with those rights. Such an argument is inconsistent with both section 6 
and our societal understanding of rights as both fundamental and existing outside of formal legal 
recognition. While NZBORA is not supreme law, in the age of rights with the growing dominance 
of the rule of law, they have attained a fundamental and normative status, becoming intrinsically 
linked with the rule of law, a foundational norm. For example, here the breach of prisoner’s right to 
vote resulted in a declaration of inconsistency by the judiciary and significant public criticism. 382    
 
Something changed between 1992, when Professor Brookfield first suggested that the power to 
order declarations of inconsistency existed, and 2018, when New Zealand’s highest Court affirmed 
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that jurisdiction. The fact that it took the judiciary nearly thirty years to exercise such a power 
illustrates that social norms are the driving force of our constitution. The power legally existed from 
1990 but it was not exercised until 2018 because the judiciary were cautious about not asserting 
dominance at law which was not reflected in the dominance of their underlying foundational norm. 
The judiciary were uncomfortable with exercising such a power until the rule of law gained a degree 
of normative dominance which meant that such an action was necessary and expected from the 
judiciary.  
 
The judiciary correctly interpreted the balance between the rule of law and parliamentary 
sovereignty in this case. Soon after Taylor, the Government introduced the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights (Declarations of Inconsistency) Amendment Bill to Parliament in early 2020.383 This 
amendment effectively endorses the Supreme Court’s view that judges should have the power to 
declare legislation inconsistent with rights. The Bill requires the Attorney General to present a 
report on the declaration of inconsistency but does not require the House to respond to such a 
report. However, it is possible that Standing Orders could be amended, as they were in 2014 the 
s 7 report to be tabled at Select Committee, to ensure that there is some prescribed mechanism 
to respond to such a report.  The public, likewise, were unperturbed by the exercise of such judicial 
power.384 While the Amendment Bill is somewhat weak in that it just confirms what the Court has 
already declared and does not require the House to formally respond to any declaration, it is a 
clear indication that Parliament accepts that judges have a role in questioning and, where 
appropriate, criticizing Parliament’s legislative decisions.  
 
The minority’s concerns around declarations have also proved unjustified in this case. The minority 
argued that a declaration would hang in the air and not be responded to by Parliament. This is no 
reason not to order such a declaration. The declaration is not just directed at parliament; it is also 
directed at the victim of the rights breach and society at large. Even if it was only directed at 
parliament, as Cooke noted, the risk of declarations “hanging in the air” might be a risk which 
needs to be taken in the interests of safeguarding NZBORA.385  
 
Further, in this instance, the declaration did not hang in air. Following the declaration in Taylor, on 
25 February 2020, the Electoral (Registration of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Bill was 
introduced to the House which would enfranchise people who are serving a term less than three 
years in prison and “better facilitate participation in the electoral system of prisoners who are to be 
                                                     
383 Law Society “Bill allows declaration of inconsistency with NZBORA” (18 March 2020): 
https://www.lawsociety.org.nz/news-and-communications/latest-news/news/bill-allows-declaration-of-
inconsistency-with-nzbora; New Zealand Bill of Rights (Declarations of Inconsistency) Amendment Bill  
384 For an example of the media coverage of Taylor see: A Emanuel “The Prisoner who beamed into NZ’s Top 
Court seeking the right to vote.” The Spinoff (10 March 2018) https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/10-03-2018/the-
prisoner-who-beamed-into-nzs-top-court-seeking-the-right-to-vote/ 
385 Temese v Police (1992) 9 CRNZ 425 at 427, per Cooke P. 
85 
 
released from prison following a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 3 years or more”.386 The 
threshold of three years meant that the prisoners would be able to vote on a government which 
would be in power upon their release from prison. This effectively reinstates the original s 80(1)(d) 
of the Electoral Act 1993. This is significant because it was the blanket ban which was considered 
by the Supreme Court and the Attorney General in his s 7 report. As at April 2020, the Bill is before 
the Justice Committee. The repeal of the Amendment Act is, perhaps, unsurprising because it 
overturns a policy enacted by the opposition that was vocally opposed by Labour at the time of its 
enactment. There is, therefore, no risk of losing political face by adopting the Supreme Court’s 
view of the inconsistency. In fact, the opposite is true.  
 
If Parliament’s sovereignty remained absolute, such an action by the judiciary would not be 
possible or accepted. While declarations do not affect the validity of the law, they include a clear 
subtext. Parliament has not done what it should have done and, therefore, it should be criticized. 
In other words, Parliament has broken the rules. If Parliament remained sovereign in a Diceyan 
sense, it would be able to enact any law it chooses and judges would not have a basis to declare 
that such a law was enacted in breach of a moral (or legal) duty on parliament not to enact 
legislation which is inconsistent with rights. This action by the judiciary was possible because the 
balance of the foundational norms has tipped, ever so slightly, in favour of the rule of law.  
 
Another Powerful Tool: Value-Based Interpretation  
In recent years, the judiciary have taken the novel step of using a tool which was available to them 
at law but which they were previously hesitant about using; declarations of inconsistency. In this 
part, I argue that the judiciary have another tool available to them to ‘cure’ inconsistencies which 
many have been cautious to use to its full potential; value based interpretation. I also suggest that, 
as the rule of law has gained a degree of dominance over parliamentary sovereignty and 
Parliament has proven itself unable to protect rights alone, there is room for the judiciary to be 
bolder in its use of value based interpretation. Like declarations of inconsistency, this tool has been 
legally available to the judiciary since NZBORA’s enactment (and, in the case of the principle of 
legality, before NZBORA’s enactment) but judges have been hesitant to use it for fear of 
encroaching on parliamentary sovereignty in a way which was not justified by its dominance at a 
societal level. I suggest that, if rights are to be protected, it is necessary for judges to capitalize on 
the momentum created by the acceptance of declarations of inconsistency, recognize the shift in 
the normative balance and be bolder in their use of value based interpretation.  
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Rights protection by interpretative means  
Judges are required, under s 5 of the Interpretation Act 1999, to ascertain the meaning of an 
enactment “from its text and in light of its purpose.” Section 5 captures the traditional rule that 
judges must interpret the law in a way which is consistent with Parliament’s intention and upholds 
the foundational norm of parliamentary sovereignty.387 But s 5 is just one aspect of the 
interpretative exercise. While value based interpretation is well established at common law, in 
recent years, s 6 of NZBORA has added a new dimension to value-based interpretation and has 
given judges stronger powers to protect those rights which are included in NZBORA.  I suggest 
that the provision of this increased power is attributable to the increased dominance of the rule of 
law and cultural importance of human rights. While NZBORA endowed judges with this power, it 
has not been fully utilized. This is in part due to the failure of some judges to recognize that the 
tides have turned and parliamentary sovereignty is no longer as absolute as it once was. This 
results in those judges constraining themselves despite Parliament’s implicit approval that such a 
power is exercised by the judiciary and the shift in social acceptance of judicial exercises of power. 
 
Value-based interpretation at common law  
The common law principle of legality describes the interpretative presumption that, if parliament 
wishes to abrogate fundamental rights, it must do so with clarity.388 It has been argued that this is 
not an entirely new principle and its origins can be traced back to Lord Mansfield’s decisions in the 
House of Lords during the 18th century.389 In Somerset v Stewart Lord Mansfield held that slavery 
was not supported by English common law. He noted that slavery is “so odious, that nothing can 
be suffered to support it, but positive law.”390 Lord Mansfield used his interpretative powers to 
declare that the common law of chattel slavery was so abhorrent that it required positive, and 
express, legislative action to exist. This was an early manifestation of the underlying ideas of 
judges as guardians of rights that would lead to the development of the principle of legality.  
 
In 1999, the House of Lords ruled on R (Simms) v SS for the Home Department (Ex Parte Simms). 
The Court noted that: 391   
…the principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the 
political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is because 
there is too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed 
by the democratic process.  
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Simms takes the traditional premise of the principle of legality even further. It requires not only 
clear language but also that the legislature actively decide to abrogate a fundamental right. The 
requirement for express language reflected the requirement that Parliament turns its mind to the 
right and its curtailment and make an active decision to legislate inconsistently with that right. 
The principle of legality was referenced in Transport Ministry v Payn where the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal noted that:392  
It has long been recognised that if there is to be any denegation from the liberties enjoyed by individuals 
in favour of powers given to an official it is essential that the charge should be authorised in definite terms.  
 
This principle has received increasing attention in New Zealand over the last 20 years, particularly 
by former Chief Justice, Sian Elias.393 For example, in Hamed v R, Elias noted that “because of 
the principle of legality, intrusive search is not properly to be treated as implicit in general statutory 
policing powers.”394 Burrows has referred to the principle of legality as effectively establishing a 
“judicially created bill of rights” in New Zealand.395 In other words, the common law rights protected 
by the principle of legality (and, indeed, the principle of legality itself) exist alongside, and 
independently of, those rights protected by statute.396  
 
There is no exhaustive list of rights to which the principle of legality can be applied and it likely 
goes beyond those recognized in NZBORA. For example, private property rights are not protected 
by NZBORA but have a long tradition in the common law. In 2005, the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
(Private Property Rights) Amendment Bill was introduced to add private property rights to NZBORA 
but it did not pass its second reading. The member who introduced the bill, Gordon Copeland, 
noted on 11 May 2005 in Parliament:397  
Most New Zealanders are very familiar with two popular expressions…One is: ‘an Englishman’s home is 
his castle’, meaning that one has the right to defend, use and enjoy one’s own property. The other is: ‘no 
confiscation without compensation’. Those two great private property rights reach right back in our legal 
tradition to the Magna Carta. 
 
The lack of protection of the right to property in constitutional legislation does not mean it does not 
exist, rather, it exists as part of this “judicially created” bill of rights which is protected by the 
principle of legality.  
 
When it comes to taking away existing property rights, the Courts will not adopt a construction that 
takes away more rights than the particular statute and its proper purpose require.398 And, 
consistent with the principle of legality, the Courts will require clear statutory language before it will 
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permit property to be taken, especially without compensation.399 This example illustrates both that 
common law rights exist alongside, and independent of, NZBORA but also that the influence of the 
judiciary in the rights conversation is beneficial. In a modern age it is no longer appropriate for 
private property rights to be absolute, as they once were. 400  The judiciary were able to develop 
the right to private property in a way that was consistent with the parallel change in society. This 
example also undermines arguments put forward by Waldron and others that the principle of 
legality effectively creates a ‘blank cheque’ which can be filled in with any principle which is in 
vogue at the time. 401 The Courts have, indeed, never set down a comprehensive list of which rights 
will be subject to the principle of legality. That being said, there is nothing in judicial practice in 
New Zealand to date which would suggest that the principle of legality will be applied to a right or 
principle without that right or principle having a well-established history at common law. The rights 
to which it has been applied to date have had long traditions at common law. For example, the 
right to non-retrospectivity in R v Pora,402 the right to privacy in Hamed v R403 and the right to 
property in SMW Consortium (Golden Bay) Ltd v Chief Executive of Ministry of Fisheries.404 There 
are few who would dispute that such rights, at least at an abstract level, are worthy of significant 
protection.  
 
In summary, the principle of legality is not a new concept. It has existed for some time and has 
been applied to various common law rights properly considered as fundamental. This approach of 
deferring to judges to safeguard rights has been successful. Judges have the relevant expertise 
to scope rights according to societal parameters, as they have done in respect of well-established 
rights such as the right to property. They have also applied the principle of legality to protect though 
rights which are not legislatively provided for.  
 
Value based interpretation in NZBORA  
As established in the previous section, the principle of legality has existed as an interpretative 
device for many years and the use of value-based principles in statutory interpretation is not a new 
concept. Section 6 of NZBORA, however, added a new dimension to the interpretative exercise.  
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In case law, s 6 has been understood in two different ways. First, as a promulgation of the principle 
of legality. Alternatively as a more robust interpretative tool available for judges which builds on 
the principle of legality and its rationale.405 In Baigent’s Case, Gault J acknowledged that NZBORA 
“probably [goes] a little further than the common law presumption of statutory interpretation that 
where possible statutes are not to be interpreted as abrogating the common law rights of 
citizens.”406  
 
I agree with Gault and others that s 6 builds on the principle of legality but enables judges to go 
further. Section 6 cannot be construed as replacing the principle of legality. Justice Tipping notes 
that “all relevant construction principles”, presumably including the principle of legality, should be 
considered in the initial inquiry of the operative provisions of NZBORA.407 Section 6 must, 
therefore, do something different from the principle of legality or else such a process would be 
redundant.  
 
As Geiringer notes, the two phase approach set forth by Hansen supports the premise that section 
6 adds another layer to the principle of legality. Geiringer describes the Hansen approach as 
requiring, first, consideration of the meaning of the legislation in light of traditional principles of 
statutory interpretation (including the principle of legality), and second, if the meaning violates a 
protected right in a manner not demonstrably justified by section 5 then the Court must ask whether 
the provision “can be given” a different meaning under section 6.408  
 
The fact that s 6 creates, in Geiringer’s words, a “more potent” interpretative tool which exists 
alongside the principle of legality lends support to the premise that judges have been given more 
power in the modern age. This increased power is attributable the increase in dominance of the 
rule of law. However, when NZBORA was enacted, parliamentary sovereignty remained dominant 
despite the increase of the rule of law. This is reflected in the enactment of NZBORA as a 
parliamentary bill of rights. Since then, the rule of law has continued to gain dominance as reflected 
by the use and acceptance of judicial declarations of inconsistency.   
 
Despite being endowed with a new tool for protecting rights, judges have historically been cautious 
about s 6. Even Cooke J noted that “the preference will come into play only when the enactment 
can be given a meaning consistent with the rights and freedoms. This must mean, I think, can 
reasonably be given such a meaning. A strained interpretation would not be enough.”409 Similarly, 
                                                     
405 For an example of judges who have interpreted section 6 as reflecting the principle of legality see: R v Rangi 
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all the judges in Hansen made a point of cautioning against ‘over-stretching’ parliament’s 
language.410  
 
It seems that the majority of judges acknowledge that s 6 adds something more to the interpretative 
exercise but are concerned not to displace Parliament’s intention and sovereignty in respect of the 
provision in question. I suggest that this hesitancy to use s 6 is problematic as the use of s 6 is 
critical if rights are to be protected.  
 
The Effectiveness of the Interpretative Method in Rights Protection  
In this part, I present two examples where the minority used s 6 in such a way which would have 
safeguarded rights better than the majority was able to using a narrower approach to s 6.  
 
R v Pora  
In 1993, s 56 of the Criminal Justice Amendment Act (CJAA 1993) allowed the Courts to set a 
minimum non-parole period as part of sentencing. However, s 4(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 
(CJA) 1962 promulgated the general principle of non-retrospectivity, which prohibited non-parole 
periods being applied for offences committed prior to 1 September 1993.411 The CJA protected the 
right to non-retrospectivity in the law in this way as courts were given the power to apply non-
parole periods from this date.412  Non-retrospectivity ensures that a citizen only is convicted and 
sentenced according to the law in place when he or she committed the relevant offence. This is a 
critical aspect of the rule of law, which ensures citizens can understand with some clarity how they 
must act under the criminal law.413 The right to non-retrospective application of criminal provisions 
is deemed a fundamental right by its inclusion in ss 25(g) and 26 of NZBORA.414 Section 25(g) 
holds that:415  
everyone who is charged with an offence has, in relation to the determination of the charge…the 
right, if convicted of an offence in respect of which the penalty has been varied between the 
commission of the offence and sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser penalty.   
 
However, in 1999, Parliament enacted the Criminal Justice Amendment Act (No. 2) 1999 (CJAA 
1999), which is discussed in Chapter V as an example of the legislative process resulting in rights 
inconsistent legislation. The CJAA amended the CJA, s 80 to include a minimum non-parole period 
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of 13 years for murder involving “home invasion”.416 Section 2(4) of the CJAA 1999 held that 
section 80 applies “even if the offence concerned was committed before [this amendment was 
enacted]”, thereby creating an inconsistency with the CJA s 4(2). Therefore, if a defendant 
committed a murder involving a home invasion in 1992, it was unclear whether s 4(2) or s 80 (as 
amended by s 2(4) of CJAA 1999) would apply.417 This was the precise situation that arose in R v 
Pora. Pora was convicted of murder in 1992 and was sentenced to life imprisonment without a 
non-parole period because s 4(2) of the CJA prevented non-parole periods for offences committed 
before 1993, consistent with the right to non-retrospectively in the law.  
 
However, in 1999, Pora’s conviction was overturned on appeal and a new trial was ordered. After 
the new trial, Pora was again convicted and was sentenced under s 80 of the CJA, as amended 
by s 2(4). Accordingly, the sentencing judge applied a minimum non-parole period of 13 years. 
Pora appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the minimum non-parole 
period had been imposed despite s 4(2) of the CJA.418 The Court of Appeal was unanimous in the 
result as it related to Pora, but split on the correct interpretation of the law. The Court unanimously 
held that the sentencing court should not have applied a non-parole period as part of Pora’s 
sentence.  
 
Justice Keith issued the majority decision. The majority held that the provision in the CJAA 1999 
must have at least some retrospective effect. Under the majority’s reasoning, this retrospectivity is 
limited to increasing non-parole periods from 10 to 13 years after 1 September 1993, but it could 
not create a non-parole period for offences committed before that date.419  
 
The majority’s starting point in the interpretation of the section was to conduct an indepth analysis 
of the words as they appear in the section. The majority did accept that the meaning was not to 
ascertained only by the immediate text and that surrounding material such as drafting history was 
relevant.420 However the majority’s judgment is notable not for its substance but for what its 
substance lacks. The reasoning makes brief mention of s 6 of NZBORA and the principle of legality, 
though not using that term. The references that are made to s 6 are framed as an after-thought. 
For example, their honours give four reasons for the conclusion that the power does not apply to 
offences committed before 1 September 1993. The first is the words of the section, the second is 
the structure of s 80 as amended, the third is the relationship between ss 56 and 2(4) and finally, 
what the majority terms “principle”. Under the heading of “principle”, the majority notes that a 
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reading of limited retrospectivity gives greater conformity with the right to non-retrospectivity and 
cites a text which identifies the presumption that if a statute is clearly to have some retrospective 
effect then it should not be construed to have more retrospective effect than its language “renders 
necessary to achieve the legislative purpose.” This is effectively a reference to the principle of 
legality but the presumption is flipped. Rather than, if parliament wants to breach the principle of 
non-retrospectivity, it must be express, the presumption is framed as, if parliament expressly allow 
a breach of the right to retrospectivity, such a breach cannot go beyond the extent parliament has 
expressly allowed. Also under the heading of ‘purpose’, the majority notes that “s6 of the Bill of 
Rights adds strength to that presumption” and that “s6 would limit the retrospectivity to 1 
September 1993.”  
 
Rather than incorporating section 6 and the principle of legality into the interpretative analysis, the 
majority conduct their analysis based on the words within the section, the surrounding context and 
legislative history and then use s 6 to confirm that their interpretation is correct because it goes 
some way to protect the right to non-retrospectivity.  
 
The minority took a very different approach. It comprised of Tipping and Elias JJ. Thomas J also 
joined the minority but gave his own reasoning, while also endorsing Elias’ judgment. Justice Elias 
considered various statutory interpretation principles such as the doctrine of implied repeal. 
Overall, Elias J was concerned that these principles could be applied rigidly to situations where it 
was not appropriate or may run contrary to other interpretative requirements, such as s 6.421 Justice 
Thomas cited Lord Reid, who said that these statutory interpretation principles are the Court’s 
“servants” not their “masters.”422 The implication being that the Court decides whether to apply a 
principle in a certain case and how much weight to give it in the circumstances. Regarding the 
argument that the doctrine of implied repeal meant the amended s 80 should be given interpretative 
priority over s 4(2), Elias J cited Re Marr which noted that this represented a “mechanical 
approach” that was “out of step with the modern, purposive approach to the interpretation of 
statutes.”423 Elias J preferred to focus on which provision should dominate, rather than rigidly 
consider which was enacted later in time.424  
 
Elias considered that the best way to determine which provision was dominant was to be informed 
by NZBORA and other common law principles, such as the principle of legality.425 In this case, the 
NZBORA and common law pointed to non-retrospectivity, which meant that section 4(2) had to be 
the dominant provision. In other words, because s 4(2) preserved a right in the NZBORA, both the 
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422 Pora at [134].  
423 Pora at [37].  
424 Pora at [44].  
425 Pora at [53].  
93 
 
principle of legality and s 6 applied. Applying the principle of legality, parliament cannot have 
intended the right to non-retrospectivity to be repealed by ambiguous language. Elias J did not 
consider that Parliament had been express enough to warrant the Court departing from a 
fundamental right in this situation.426 Therefore applying the interpretation of Hansen put forward 
by Geiringer, the ordinary meaning was prevented by the principle of legality from being 
retrospective.  
 
Unlike Elias and the minority’s approach, the majority’s decision meant that offences after 1 
September 1993 could have a non-parole period increased from 10 to 13 years but offences before 
1 September 1993 could not. This outcome is difficult to justify. It arose because the majority 
focused predominantly on the words of the section and its surrounding context while using s 6 and 
common law principles of value based interpretation as an ex post facto ‘check box’. This is not 
the correct use of s 6 or the principle of legality. The principle of legality means that, in the absence 
of express words, parliament cannot have intended to infringe rights implicitly. This enables judges 
to conclude that, because parliament has not been express, it cannot have intended to breach 
rights. It is not a matter of ignoring parliament’s true intention; rather, the principle of legality creates 
a presumption about that intention which judges are entitled to adopt. Even notwithstanding the 
principle of legality, s 6 instructs judges to apply the most rights consistent meaning. Essentially, 
this adopts the approach described by Rishworth, where judges attempt to ‘cure’ rights breaches 
by interpretative means: “whatever parliament meant, they cannot mean this.”427  
Ngaronoa v Attorney-General  
In Ngaronoa, a 4-1 majority of the Supreme Court held that Parliament did not need a supermajority 
when enacting the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010 (the 
Amendment Act). The enactment of the Amendment Act is discussed in Chapter V. Like the CJAA 
1999, the Electoral (Disqualification of Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010 is another 
example of legislation which Parliament enacted in questionable circumstances. It was referred to 
a Select Committee which did not have appropriate expertise and was subject to a s 7 Report. 
Nevertheless, as I concluded in the previous chapter, it was enacted. This is, perhaps, attributable 
to parliament’s acceptance of rights in the abstract but hesitancy to protect the rights of 
‘unfavorable’ groups of society because of the absence of political points to be won. 
 
In Ngaronoa, the majority incorrectly declined to apply the principle of legality or NZBORA as, in 
their view, it was not engaged. Chief Justice Elias again issued a compelling dissent that applied 
the principle of legality to determine that Parliament had failed to follow the requirement in s 268 
of the Electoral Act for a supermajority.  
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Section 268 is an entrenchment provision. Such a statutory provision makes it more difficult to 
amend a certain part of the law by requiring a special legislative procedure be adopted to do so. 
Doing so protects parts of the country’s constitutional law which are fundamental to society.428 
During parliamentary debates in October 1956, the Hon John Marshall, former New Zealand 
Minister of Justice, described entrenchment as being “a genuine … attempt to place the structure 
of the law above and beyond the influence of Government and party.”429 Section 268 lists a number 
of fundamental provisions of the Electoral Act that can be amended or repealed by agreement of 
75% of the House of Representatives. The provisions listed in s 268 are described as the “reserved 
provisions”.  
 
Section 268(1)(e) states that the following statutory sections are reserved provisions; 
 Section 74, and the definition of the term adult in s 3(1), and s 60(f), so far as those provisions 
prescribe 18 years as the minimum age for persons qualified to be registered as electors or to 
vote.  
 Section 74, labelled “qualification of electors”, then states that “subject to the provisions of” the 
Electoral Act, every adult who meets certain requirements pertaining to residency and 
citizenship can vote.  
 Section 3(1) defines an adult as a person “of or over the age of 18 years” and s 60(f) makes 
provision for members of the Defense Force who are overseas but will be of or over 18 years 
on polling day.  
 Section 80(d), as enacted through the Amendment Act, then disqualifies from registering to 
vote all sentenced prisoners while they remain detained in prison. 
 
The appellants, all New Zealand prisoners, argued that by disqualifying prisoners from registering 
to vote the Amendment Act effectively amended s 74, protected by s 268(1)(e), so as to trigger the 
supermajority requirement in s 268(2). The respondents, made up of the Attorney General, the 
Department of Corrections and the Electoral Commission, argued that only those parts of s 74 that 
prescribe the minimum voting age are entrenched.430  
 
In the High Court, the appellants argued that the whole of s 74 was a reserved provision. Justice 
Fogarty found that, under s 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), the natural 
meaning of s 268(1)(e) was that “so far as those provisions prescribe 18 years” was to limit the 
entrenchment to the minimum voting age as referred to in those three provisions.431 Justice Fogarty 
found the appellant’s argument “forced and fallacious”.432 The appellants then appealed to the 
Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal agreed with Fogarty J’s conclusion, but disagreed with the 
                                                     
428 G Palmer “The Constitutional Significance of the Abolition of the Legislative Council in 1950” NZJPIL 15 at 
132; see also Geddis and Shiels “Tracking the Pendulum Swing on Legislative Entrenchment in New Zealand” 
(2019) 41 SLR 207. 
429 K Jackson and A McRobie New Zealand Adopts Proportional Representation: Accident? Design? Evolution? 
(Aldershot, Ashgate Press, 1998) at Table 6.1.  
430 Taylor v Attorney-General [2016] NZHC 355 (HC judgment); and Ngaronoa v Attorney-General [2017] NZCA 
351 (CA judgment). 
431 HC judgment at [107].  
432 HC judgment at [108].  
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manner his Honour arrived at his conclusion. The Court of Appeal did not believe that NZBORA 
was engaged at all because s 268(1)(e) itself did not impose any limit on electoral rights; it was a 
manner and form provision that applied in a neutral fashion to any changes to the reserved 
provisions.433 The Court of Appeal, like Fogarty J, then placed emphasis on the words “so far as 
those provisions prescribe 18 years”.434 The Court considered that if Parliament’s intention was to 
entrench all of section 74, it would have done so more clearly. They also emphasized the opening 
words of section 74, namely that the section was “subject to the provisions of this Act”.435  
 
The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, and relied on the fundamental nature of 
enfranchisement and contended that the voting age is inextricably linked to the entitlement to vote. 
They advanced two alternative arguments. First, there is a distinction between the parts of s 74 
dealing with fundamental and entrenched aspects of the right to vote and parts which dealt with 
the “modalities” of voting which were not entrenched.436 Alternatively, they argued that all of s 74 
was entrenched.437 They applied s 6 of NZBORA, arguing that the Court were required to prefer 
an interpretation of s 268(1)(e) that was consistent with fundamental rights.438 The Attorney 
General argued that the wording of the section made it clear that Parliament’s intention only was 
to entrench the minimum voting age. The Attorney General also argued that section 6 of NZBORA 
was not engaged because s 268(1)(e) is a manner and form provision.439  
 
The majority was made up of Justices William Young, Glazebrook, O’Regan, and Ellen France, 
and judgment was given on behalf of the majority by Ellen France J.440 Justice Ellen France first 
turned to the interpretation of s 268(1)(e). Like the Court of Appeal, her Honour analyzed the 
meaning of “so far as those provisions prescribe 18 years”. Her Honour concluded that those words 
must qualify the reference to s 74 because ss 3(1) and 60(f) do not specifically prescribe 18 years 
as the minimum voting age, however, reading ss 74, 3(1) and 60(f) together has the effect of 
prescribing the minimum voting age. Justice Ellen France concluded that the words “so far as” 
before “those provisions” created a “carve out of an aspect of section 74”, specifically, the minimum 
age to register to vote.441  
 
Her Honour considered that the appellant’s argument may work if the reference to ss 3(1) and 60(f) 
was separated out from the reference to s 74 in s 268(1)(e), but this was not the case. In s 
268(1)(e), the s 3(1) and s 60(f) references are connected to the s 74 reference by an “and”. Her 
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Honour found that this suggested a link between the age qualification in s 74 and the following 
provisions. 442  Her Honour also considered it was significant that s 268(1)(e) was distinct from the 
rest of the subsections in s 268. All of the subsections in s 268(1) cite the reserved provision and 
give a brief overview of the section cited. However, s 268(1)(e) cites the reserved provision but 
adds the further rider “so far as those provisions prescribe 18 years.” In the Majority’s view, if 
Parliament wanted to entrench s 74 as whole, they would not have added such a rider and broken 
the pattern in s 268(1).443  
 
Justice Ellen France also noted that s 74 starts with “subject to the provisions of this Act”. There 
are other provisions in the Electoral Act which specify exceptions to the general rule in s 74 that 
all adults can vote. In the Majority’s view, unless all of those provisions specifying exceptions to s 
74 were impliedly entrenched, amendment of any of those provisions would avoid the 
entrenchment of s 74. In support of this argument, Ellen France J noted that if the whole of s 60 
was impliedly entrenched, then s 60(f) would not need to be referred to in s 268(1)(e).444  
 
After concluding that the natural meaning of s 268(1)(e) and s 74 meant that only part of s 74 was 
entrenched, Ellen France J traced the legislative history of the Electoral Act and the purpose of 
entrenchment.445 Her Honour noted that s 189(1)(e) of the Electoral Act 1956 followed the same 
pattern and language as its successor s 268(1)(e).446 Justice Ellen France placed emphasis on the 
fact that legislative practice since 1956 has been to treat the entrenchment of s 74, previously s 
39, as limited to the minimum voting age. If this was not correct, Parliament could have changed 
the wording when the enacted the Electoral Act 1993, but they did not.447  
 
Finally, Ellen France J assessed the applicability of NZBORA and the principle of legality to the 
analysis.448 As a starting point, the Majority did not believe that s 6 of NZBORA applied because s 
268 gives purely procedural protection in a substance-neutral fashion; for example, it does not 
distinguish between lowering and raising the minimum age to vote even though one would infringe 
on the right to vote and the other would broaden that right. Alternatively, even if s 6 did apply, there 
was no possible way to interpret s 268(1)(e) other than as the Majority had done. Accordingly, the 
Majority dismissed the appeal. 449  
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Like the majority in Pora, Ellen France applied NZBORA and the principle of legality as an ex post 
facto ‘check box’. Though in this case, her honour did not consider that it applied. A conclusion 
that NZBORA and the principle of legality do not apply to a case touching on enfranchisement, 
one of the most fundamental of human rights, is questionable. Further, the principle of legality, as 
a common law principle of interpretation, is always engaged. There can be no distinction between 
the procedural and the substantive when it comes to human rights.  
 
Chief Justice Elias issued a dissenting judgment in which she concluded that all of s 74 was 
entrenched by s 268(1)(e) and the amendment of s 80 had required a supermajority as it affected 
the entrenched qualification of voters in s 74.450 As a starting point, Elias CJ turned to NZBORA.451 
Chief Justice Elias criticized the Court of Appeal’s view that s 6 of NZBORA had no application to 
a manner and form provision because the enactment itself could not infringe a substantive right 
contained in NZBORA. The Court of Appeal had relied on Terranova Holmes to say that just 
because an interpretation of an enactment could offer less protection of a right than the protection 
offered in NZBORA, that does not mean that the interpretation is inconsistent with NZBORA. The 
Court believed that if s 6 applied beyond cases where there was an inconsistency, then there 
would be “replication of the protection” under NZBORA.452 Chief Justice Elias strongly disagreed 
with this analysis, calling it “inappropriate for legislation properly seen as constitutional.”453 Her 
Honour considered that the Court of Appeal’s analysis would see the rights in NZBORA as being 
set apart from the rest of the law rather than being fundamental to society.454 As Cooke said in R 
v Goodwin, NZBORA “is intended to be woven into the fabric of New Zealand law.”455  
 
The Chief Justice noted that the qualification of voters has a direct bearing on the right to vote set 
out in s 12 of NZBORA. Section 268(1) should be understood as protecting and promoting the right 
to vote. Where a provision is enacted to promote and protect rights, it should be interpreted in a 
way which is consistent with that purpose. In this way, enactments like s 268 work with NZBORA 
to promote human rights rather than duplicating those rights. Accordingly, for the Chief Justice, 
NZBORA was critical to the analysis of s 268.456  
 
Viewing the issue through s 6 of NZBORA, her Honour disagreed with the Majority’s interpretation 
of the wording of s 268(1)(e). Her Honour was unable to read the words “so far as those provisions 
prescribe 18 years” as referring to s 3(1) and s 60(f) but not to s 74.457 This was reinforced by the 
pattern of section 268 where none of the other subsections limit the scope of the reserved provision 
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they are referring to. Chief Justice Elias’ interpretation of s 268(1)(e) would be consistent with s 
268(1)(c) which cites the reserved provision then adds to it “and the definition of the term general 
electoral population in s 3(1)”.458 Her Honour noted that it was “highly improbable”, based on the 
other reserved provisions and considering the fundamental nature of the right to vote, that the 
qualification of electors would not be entrenched.459   
 
Chief Justice Elias also disagreed with the Majority’s view that the words “subject to the provisions 
of this Act” in s 74 supported a narrow interpretation of section 268. The Majority considered that 
if all s 74 was entrenched, these words would mean all disqualifications of voters would also be 
entrenched. In her Honour’s view, the entrenchment of the qualification of voters would not lead to 
an implied entrenchment of all disqualifications. Rather, it would mean that disqualifications to vote 
can be removed by ordinary parliamentary processes but no new disqualifications could be added 
without a supermajority of MPs (or majority vote at a referendum) because this would limit the 
qualification of voters. 460 Finally, Elias CJ looked to the legislative history of s 268.461 Her Honour 
noted that this question of whether all of s 39 (now s 74) was entrenched or just part had been 
debated in the House since 1975 and the question had never been resolved.462 
 
In conclusion, her Honour found that because the Amendment Act imposed a new disqualification 
on voters and required a supermajority. As it was passed by simple majority, the Amendment Act 
did not comply with s 268(1)(e). However, as her Honour’s decision was a minority judgment, she 
did not consider possible remedies.463   
 
I agree with Elias CJ that the majority’s reasoning was flawed from the outset. First, as noted 
earlier, the principle of legality is always engaged. It approaches all interpretative issues through 
the lens that parliament would not intend to implicitly override rights. The crux of this claim was 
that legislation disenfranchising prisoners was improperly enacted and required a supermajority. 
This is clearly an issue which “engages” a rights analysis and, therefore, the principle of legality 
and NZBORA. Furthermore, a procedural protection of the right to vote must surely require an 
analysis of the legislation against the intention of a parliament who would not legislate 
inconsistently with rights without due consideration. It is artificial to separate procedural and 
substantive rights protections in such a way and would not be in the spirit of NZBORA. Second, 
the majority noted that even if s 6 applied, there was no way to interpret the legislation in any way 
other than how the majority suggested. This was clearly not the case, as Elias CJ was able to 
interpret the legislation consistently with rights by using s 6.  
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Appropriate Approach to the Interpretative Method  
I suggest that the majority in Ngaronoa, like the majority in Pora, failed to safeguard rights because 
they did not take full of advantage of value based interpretation through s 6 or the principle of 
legality. In both cases, the majority attempted focus was finding Parliament’s intention based on 
the objective meaning of the words and in light of the purpose of the Act and unnecessarily 
constrained themselves to considering on the objective meaning of the words.  
 
Rather, they should have considered Parliament’s intention in light of the presumption that 
Parliament will not breach rights implicitly. Section 6 frames and guides the process of determining 
Parliament’s intention and, in Cooke’s words, should be woven into the interpretative exercise. It 
cannot be an after-thought as it was for the majority in Ngaronoa and Pora. Further s 6 instructs 
the judiciary to apply the most rights-consistent meaning. If there is another way that a provision 
could reasonably be interpreted which is more rights-consistent, the judge must apply that 
meaning. The minority in both cases proved that there was a reasonable, rights-consistent 
meaning available which was required to be applied under s 6. Accordingly, the majorities’ fear of 
contradicting Parliament’s intention in respect of the provision before them resulted in them running 
contrary to Parliament’s intention in any case by failing to adhere to s 6.  
 
In both of these examples, Parliament had enacted legislation which was rights-inconsistent. In 
Ngaronoa, it was rights inconsistent because of parliament’s political complacency towards 
prisoner rights and in Pora, it was rights inconsistency because of the introduction of amendments 
by SOP. In short, Parliament failed to safeguard human rights. This left a clear opening for judges 
to step in and cure the inconsistency via s 6. Unfortunately, the majorities’ overly cautious approach 
prevented them from doing so. Such caution was unwarranted because, as illustrated by the use 
of declarations of inconsistency and the acceptance of such power, the balance has shifted 
between parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. The public is willing to accept a more 
assertive judiciary because of the rise in the rule of law. It is time that the judiciary recognize this 
shift, adopted the minorities’ view and use s 6 in such a way.   
 
Conclusion 
Judges have the tools available to them and the expertise to make a significant difference in 
rights protection in New Zealand and to catch the inconsistencies which Parliament inevitably will 
not address. In recent years, judges have become willing to use, and Parliament has become 
willing to accept the use of, declarations of inconsistency. While this power has been legally 
available to judges for some time, the judiciary have approached it with hesitancy, illustrating that 
the balance of social norms is the ultimate driver of our constitution. Similarly, judges have 
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approached value-based interpretation which significant nervousness. This nervousness is 
rooted in out-of-date conceptions of the absoluteness of parliamentary sovereignty. As discussed 
in previous chapters, parliamentary sovereignty as a social rule has weakened in dominance. 
New Zealanders now expect more from their government than just Hobbesian-esque commands. 
There is a substantive requirement to those commands, namely that they comply with human 
rights. It falls to the judiciary to ensure as much. If judges fail to rise to this challenge, who will? 
The tools are there and society is ready for judges to use them, all that remains is for the 









































THE NEXT SHIFT? 
SUBSTANTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
The New Zealand judiciary have a tendency to approach changes in their constitutional role with 
caution. This is illustrated by their approach to declarations of inconsistency and s 6 of NZBORA. 
The judiciary tend to exhibit a loyalty to the social status of the foundational norms, so much so 
that they often miss shifts in the dominance of those norms because of caution around misreading 
the situation, as occurs in the context of section 6.  
 
While Parliament has accepted the judiciary’s new found dominance in the context of Taylor and 
declarations of inconsistency, there is no guarantee that this will always be the case especially 
considering that the amendment to NZBORA does not impose any obligation on Parliament to 
respond to such a declaration. In such a context, and assuming that the rule of law continues to 
gain normative dominance, it is possible that calls for substantive judicial review may increase. For 
completeness, in this final part of my thesis, I briefly address the possibility of substantive judicial 
review in New Zealand. I suggest that, while substantive judicial review is not the feared, all-
encompassing judicial dominance it once was, it is unlikely to arise in the short term considering 
the judiciary’s approach to changes in its constitutional role and remaining loyalty to Westminster 
systems.  
 
Lord Cooke’s Dicta  
Where such a unavoidable inconsistency with rights arises Lord Cooke suggested, in a series of 
cases from 1979 and an article in 1988, that the judiciary may have the power to refuse to apply 
legislation that breaches certain fundamental rights.464 In 1984, Cooke P (as he was then) famously 
noted that “it is arguable that some common law rights may go so deep that even parliament cannot 
be accepted by the Courts to have destroyed them.”465  
 
Many of Lord Cooke’s neo-Diceyan critics were concerned about what they saw as judicial activism 
in Lorde Cooke’s approach.466 In 1986, Justice Kirby of the High Court of Australia argued that 
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judges need not undermine Parliamentary sovereignty because they had the power to protect the 
public without doing so. In Kirby J’s view, the chief protection against Parliamentary abuses of 
power lay in the democratic process and the interpretation of legislation.467 Justice Kirby said that 
Judges should interpret legislation to ensure consistency with basic constitutional principles but if 
the legislation is clear then judges should not “substitute [their] opinion for that of the elected 
representatives assembled in Parliament”.468 In short, Kirby J thought that Judges already had the 
power to curb the worst defaults in the system and ensure that justice was assured.469 Justice 
Kirby’s argument does not account for the fact that, in some case, judges cannot use their 
interpretative powers to find a consistent meaning.470 Where parliament is express, the principle 
of legality cannot be used to disregard parliament’s express meaning. While the judiciary can issue 
a declaration of inconsistency, this does not allow the judiciary to disapply the law they declare 
inconsistent. The only way for the judiciary to prevent the effect of an express inconsistency with 
rights would be through substantive judicial review. Kirby also does not account for the lack of 
political interest in protecting the rights of socially isolated or unpopular groups. In such situations, 
the courts must step in as they have the appropriate expertise.  
 
Substantive judicial review describes the power by which the judiciary can review the content of 
legislation passed by parliament. In Westminster systems, primarily because of parliamentary 
sovereignty, the judiciary may not review the substance of primary legislation.471 Conversely, in 
the United States, substantive judicial review has been a staple of constitutional law since Marbury 
v Madison.472 As discussed in Chapter III, the primary reason that the United States and the United 
Kingdom developed differently in this way was historical. In the United States, separation of powers 
was used to empower the judiciary against legislative tyranny; however, in the UK, the events of 
the Glorious Revolution created a strong tradition of the sovereignty of Parliament as a protection 
of individuals by the legislature against the Crown.  
 
Criticisms of Substantive Judicial Review: Democracy and Discretion  
In 1985, the White Paper suggested that New Zealand enact a Bill of Rights which empowered the 
judiciary to disapply legislation which was inconsistent with the rights listed in the bill of rights, 
consistent with Lord Cooke’s view of the courts as being the protectors of certain fundamental 
rights.473 This would have given the judiciary a power of substantive judicial review. But it was 
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rejected. In this part, I demonstrate that the reasons for rejecting such a power were misguided. 
Notwithstanding this, I conclude that the addition of such a power in New Zealand will not occur 
until there is a fundamental shift in New Zealand’s underlying foundational norms. While there are 
indications that such a shift has begun, the change is likely to continue to occur incrementally as 
has been the case for all constitutional change.  
 
An express power of substantive judicial review was removed from the bill of rights because of two 
primary perceived problems with such a power:474 first, it is undemocratic to allow judges to 
undermine the will of the elected officials in parliament; and second, it would give too much 
discretionary power to judges. I will assess each of these perceived problems and demonstrate 
why they are not as persuasive as they may at first seem.  
 
First, that substantive judicial review is undemocratic.475 This argument rests on the premise that 
it would be counter to majoritarian democracy to give the judiciary the power to overturn the will of 
the elected and politically responsible majority. The judiciary are unelected and not politically 
responsible, unlike the legislature.  
 
Whether substantive judicial review is counter to democracy depends on one’s understanding of 
democracy. Freeman notes that “ultimately the case for or against judicial review comes down to 
the question of what is the most appropriate conception of a constitutional democracy.”476 Aaron 
Lloyd suggests that we should prefer a democracy which is based on both the principle of liberty 
and the principle of equality and that, if democracy is understood in such a way, substantive judicial 
review cannot be seen as un-democratic.477 Lloyd supports this conclusion by reference to the 
difference in understanding of democracy of Hobbes and Locke.478 Both Hobbes and Locke base 
their analysis on a social contract. However, Hobbes suggests that when an individual submits to 
the sovereign, they relinquish all their political power. In other words, the sovereign is supreme no 
matter what they do. 479  Locke viewed this as nonsensical, questioning why an individual, who 
                                                     
474 There were also other problems identified, such as the impact on  Māori. For a contemporary discussion 
about the impact of the draft Bill on  Māori see Durie, J. “Part II and Clause 26 of the Draft New Zealand Bill of 
Rights.” Legal Research Foundation Seminar: A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (1985) at 175-194, particularly 
185.  
475 Alexnder Bickel The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (2nd ed, Bobs-Merill 
Company, Inc, 1962) at 16-17: “[J]udicial review is a counter-majoritarian force .... [and this] is the reason the 
charge can be made that judicial review is undemocratic .... [A]lthough democracy does not mean constant 
reconsideration of decisions once made, it does mean that a representative majority has the power to accomplish 
a reversal.” 
476 S Freeman “Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review” (1990) 9 LP at 331.  
477 A Lloyd “Lord Cooke’s Fundamental Rights and the Institution of Substantive Judicial Review” (1999) 9 AULR 
at 1173. 
478 A Lloyd “Lord Cooke’s Fundamental Rights and the Institution of Substantive Judicial Review” (1999) 9 AULR 
at 1173.  
479 Hobbes Leviathan (1973) at 89.  
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submits to the social contract out of distrust, would be trusting enough to submit to an omnipotent 
ruler.480  
 
Lloyd suggests that, under Hobbes’ conception, the main premise underlying the social contract is 
liberty. However, under Locke’s conception, the main premises are liberty and equality. By 
equality, Locke is referring to natural rights.481 I agree with Lloyd’s view. This difference between 
Hobbesian and Lockean traditions is illustrated by the United States and UK approaches to the 
distribution of power between the branches of government. The UK adopted a more Hobbesian 
approach in the sovereignty of parliament whereas the US adopted an approach more reminiscent 
of Lockean traditions and as such, substantive judicial review was considered democratic in the 
United States model. If democracy is underpinned by liberty as well as equality, substantive judicial 
review is not undemocratic because it is preserving the equality aspect.  
 
The Lockean tradition is preferable because it better protects human rights and aligns with the 
increasing dominance of the rule of law in New Zealand. As discussed in Chapter II, the Hobbesian 
understanding of society is problematic. It is also increasingly out of step with what individuals 
expect from their governments. For example, under the Hobbesian approach to democracy and 
society, law is utilitarian.482 This utilitarian understanding of the law cannot be reconciled with the 
cultural value of human rights in modern society and the growing dominance of the rule of law. As 
a society, we expect to be protected from breaches of fundamental rights. This is reflected in the 
shift in the rule of law from a strictly procedural matter to including both substantive and procedural 
protection. As the rule of law continues to gain dominance, displacing parliamentary sovereignty, 
New Zealand’s understanding of democracy is likely to continue to shift to a more Lockean 
understanding. However, while it may be desirable, we are not there yet.  
 
The second perceived problem with substantive judicial review may be that it gives too much 
discretionary power to judges. I disagree with this criticism, and suggest that the enactment of 
NZBORA effectively renders this a non-issue. In addition, notwithstanding the enactment of 
NZBORA, the avoidance of judicial discretion is not possible. This second criticism of substantive 
judicial review is based on legal positivist arguments such as those put forward by Joseph Raz.483 
Raz criticises ideas of natural law and argues that law is reminiscent of Hobbesian understandings 
of authoritative command. There is no objective ‘right answer’. Raz supports this by reference to 
arbitration where parties agree to be bound by whatever the judge says and, where the positive 
                                                     
480 Locke Two Treatises of Government (1988) at 328.  
481 See Held Models of Democracy (3rd ed, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987) at 52-53: “the whole process is 
conditional on the state adhering to its essential purpose: the preservation of “life, liberty and estate” 
482 I Dore “Deconstructing and Reconstructing Hobbes” (2012) 72 LLR at 832.  
483 Joseph Raz "Authority, Law and Morality" in Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and 
Politics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995) at 196-197. 
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law is clear, judges apply that law without considerations of its substance because the positive law 
is the authoritative directive. 
 
Conversely, Lord Cooke suggests that there is objective truth contained in the law. Lord Cooke 
suggested that if society was operating legitimately, and all the facts of a case were established, 
most people would agree on the fair result.484 In other words, fairness is couched in common 
community understandings and emerges from the community itself not the governance of that 
community. Kymlicka likewise suggests that the question of whether something is just is answered 
by reference to society’s shared understanding: 485  
I believe that the ultimate test of a theory of justice is that it cohere with, and help illuminate, 
our considered convictions of justice. If on reflection we share the intuition that slavery is unjust, 
then it is a powerful objection to a proposed theory of justice that it supports slavery. 
 
Lord Cooke’s view of a judges role was not only to safeguard fundamental rights from breach by 
legislation but also, where Parliament did not identify fundamental rights, the judiciary should 
determine which rights were fundamental.486  
 
In New Zealand, we have a list of statutory rights identified by the legislature as fundamental. That 
is not to say that these are the only fundamental rights. However, if substantive judicial review was 
permitted but confined only to these statutory rights, judges would assess whether legislation 
enacted by Parliament was consistent with the rights identified by Parliament as fundamental. This 
is not necessarily inconsistent with Hobbesian-derived conceptions of the command theory of the 
law. Dare has suggested that a decision by the Court to overturn the law can be characterised as 
a new command but does not affect the applicability of the command before it is overturned.487 If 
the ability of judges to strike down legislation was not confined to only statutory rights, it is possible 
that judges could declare a provision invalid by reason of its inconsistency with a right deemed 
fundamental at common law such as the right to own property. But, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, there is nothing to suggest that judges in New Zealand would take a step in respect of a 
common law right without the existence of a strong and significant cultural, social and legal history 
of that right. If New Zealand judges’ caution around s 6 and declarations of inconsistency are any 
indication, the power would unlikely be wielded lightly.  
 
Notwithstanding whether such a power is confined to statutory rights or exercised in respect of 
common law rights, fears of judicial discretion are misguided as discretion is already inherent in 
the process applied in the interpretative exercise. Words have subjective meaning and can be 
                                                     
484 Robin Cooke “Fairness” (1989) VUWLR 19 at 423.  
485 W Kymlicka Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2002) at 6.    
486 Cochrane and Chan “The Lord Cooke Project: Reviewing Lord Cooke’s Extrajudicial Writing” (2013) 44 
VUWLR 247.  
487 Tim Dare "Kronman on Contract: A Study in the Relation Between Substance and Procedure in Normative 
and Legal Theory" (1994) 7 CJLJ at 339-342; 
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interpreted differently depending on the circumstances.488 A judge must apply their own 
understandings of fairness and political morality to ascertain whether a word can have such a 
meaning in the particular context it is used. It would not be possible to interpret legislation without 
some level of discretion and an application of one’s own conceptions of fairness. As Lord Cooke 
notes “a judge can hardly avoid attributing to it what is, in his or her opinion, as fair and just an 
operation as is reasonably possible in those circumstances.”489  
 
There is extensive academic discussion about the existence of parliamentary intention and the 
process by which judges find it or, as some argue, create it which I do not intend to canvass here.490 
For my purposes, it is sufficient to say that section 6 and the principle of legality assume that 
parliamentary intention is presumed and therefore malleable.  This means that judges already 
apply discretion in the interpretative exercise by virtue of section 6, therefore, fears of judicial 
discretion are misguided because it is already alive and well in the interpretative process. And the 
sky has not fallen.  
 
Of course, in New Zealand the voiding of legislation for inconsistency with NZBORA rights is 
prevented by s 4 of NZBORA. It is desirable that section 4 is removed in the future. Some argue 
that legislative tyranny is sufficiently protected against by the electoral process. In other words, 
where Parliament breaches rights, it can be held responsible in an election. This is not a sufficient 
remedy. As Dworkin notes: 491   
the voters can throw a legislator out of office at the end of his term if the voters disagree with 
what he has done. But that is no argument: a wrong is not justified by an opportunity for 
revenge.  
 
Further, we have seen that unpopular groups of society are less protected by the democratic 
process as exemplified by the enactment of the CJAA 1999 and the Electoral (Disqualification of 
Sentenced Prisoners) Amendment Act 2010. As established in the previous chapter, as a result of 
the legislative process and the dominance of the executive, it is inevitable that breaches of rights 
in legislation will occur. Parliament is unable to safeguard rights without assistance and the 
judiciary is the most logical institution to provide such assistance. Judges have the tools and 
expertise to assess complex rights-based issues. As Lloyd notes “one would not call a plumber to 
                                                     
488 See discussion of interpretation of words in Ludwig Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Dover 
Publications Inc, New York, 1955).   
489 Sir Robin Cooke ‘The Discretionary Heart of Administrative Law’ in C Forsyth and I Hare (eds) the Golden 
Metwand and the Crooked Cord (Oxford, Clarendon, 1998) at 205. 
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fix faulty electrical outlets.”492 We defer to judges on this point to provide a check on the legislature 
because it is appropriate to do so.  
 
Conclusion  
The increasing dominance of the rule of law with the cultural rise of human rights means that 
parliamentary sovereignty is losing dominance and New Zealand is taking on a more Lockean 
understanding of democracy. New Zealanders now expect more than just an authoritative 
command, they also expect that command to meet certain substantive fundamental requirements 
dictated by the rule of law. As substantive judicial review would require a substantial shift in our 
norms, it is unlikely that the judiciary will be given or will assert a power of substantive judicial 
review until the rule of law gains even more dominance. This will be a matter of incremental change 
to the normative relationship. It will many years, if ever, before the ghost of Thomas Hobbes is 





















                                                     







The New Zealand constitution consists of rules of both intra and extra-legal origin. The rules of 
extra-legal origin include, what I term, foundational norms. These foundational norms exist outside 
the legal system and are informed by the values of society. As those values change, so to do the 
foundational norms.  
 
The most important foundational norms for any analysis of rights protection is parliamentary 
sovereignty and the rule of law. Parliamentary sovereignty has deep roots in New Zealand.  Under 
a traditional understanding, Parliament’s sovereignty was absolute. This absolute sovereignty was 
possible because the rule of law was strictly procedural in nature and did not constrain Parliament’s 
ability to determine the content of legislation. With the rise of human rights, however, the rule of 
law has taken on a substantive element. Since the rule of law is now substantive, it is in conflict 
with parliamentary sovereignty. It prevents Parliament from enacting any legislation it chooses as 
that legislation must comply with human rights.  
 
As these norms exist in competition, a zero sum game emerges where when one gains a degree 
of dominance, the other must give way to an equal and opposite degree. Which norm gains or 
loses that degree of dominance is dictated by the value attributed to that norm by society. 
Parliament and the judiciary understand their power in these terms. Where the rule of law increases 
in dominance, the judiciary may, likewise, increase in dominance. The division of power within the 
legal system must reflect the status of the foundational norms outside the system. There have 
been occasions where the legal system has fallen out of step with the social norms due to bold 
actions of one branch of government. Where this has happened, the legal system has promptly 
responded to realign the legal system with the balance of power between the foundational norms.  
 
In 1990, NZBORA was enacted which reflected the status of the norms at that time. In short, 
Parliament was given the primary role of rights protector, however, the judiciary’s role was more 
ambiguous. They were legally empowered with a number of tools such as s 6 and declarations of 
inconsistency but did not use these tools until the balance of foundational norms had been tipped 
in a way to allow such an exercise of judicial power.  
 
Since 1990, Parliament has been unable to live up the role of primary rights protector. This is 
because of characteristics of the legislative process but also because Parliament’s goal is 
ultimately political survival. The effect of this is that it is complacent towards certain groups of 
society whose protection will not garner votes. It is for this reason that scoping and applying rights 
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must be a legal rather than political question. If it becomes a political question, minority rights will 
not be sufficiently protected, as illustrated by the experience of prisoner rights in New Zealand.  
 
It is inevitable that inconsistencies will arise out of the parliamentary process. Judges need to catch 
these inconsistencies if rights are to be protected. Judges have the appropriate expertise to do so 
and the supercharging of the rule of law has allowed them a benchmark against which to measure 
laws.  
 
In recent years, judges have been more willing to exercise the power given to them under NZBORA 
but they can do more still, short of substantive judicial review with the tools already available to 
them. Judges in New Zealand have been empowered, via s 6 of NZBORA, to use interpretative 
means to cure inconsistencies but they have failed to embrace this power as much as is necessary. 
It is necessary and desirable that judges use the interpretative method to its full potential as 
Parliament has shown itself to be incapable of protecting rights alone, it has implicitly approved 
the use of such power by enacting section and the rule of law has gained such dominance within 
our system that society accepts a more dominant judiciary. Any remaining constraints on the 
judiciary’s use of s 6 in the way I have described are self-imposed, unnecessary and do not align 
with the status of our norms as they sit today.  
 
During her final sitting as Chief Justice of the New Zealand Supreme Court in 2019, Dame Sian 
Elias made the following remarks:493  
A final court should not sleepwalk in its function…It has to believe in its role. If it cannot explain what it is 
doing and why, who will? If its members don’t believe in the Court, who will?  
 
In conclusion, I echo the former Chief Justice’s sentiment. If rights are to be protected and justice 
maintained, the judiciary must use the tools at their disposal to properly fulfill their role within New 
Zealand’s system of rights protection. There has been a shift in the foundational norms which gives 
space for the courts to take bolder steps to safeguard human rights. In the face of such a normative 
shift, New Zealand’s common law system has no room for judicial sleepwalking. Now is the time 
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